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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The term “open production” is frequently used to describe production systems that rely on volunteer 
participants who are willing to participate, produce, and bear private costs in order to provide a public 
good. Examples of open production are becoming increasingly common in many industries. What 
make these productions possible? How may they be sustained in a world of organizations in which the 
evolutionary products of economic selection are elaborate hierarchical forms of organization? One way 
to address these questions is to look at how open productions solve problems that are common to all 
production organizations  such as, for example, problems in the division of labor, allocation of tasks, 
collaboration, coordination, and maintaining balance between inducement and contributions. Under the 
conditions of extreme decentralization that are the defining feature of open productions, this approach 
implies a detailed observation of individual problem solving practices. This is the approach I develop 
in my dissertation. Unlike much of the prior literature on open productions, I deemphasize motivational 
elements, status-seeking motives, and allocation of property rights issues. I focus instead on actual 
work practices as revealed by the day-by-day problem solving activities that qualify open productions 
projects as production organizations despite the absence of formal contractual arrangements to regulate 
principal-agent relations. What my work adds to the extensive, informative, and well-developed 
discipline-based explanations that are currently available, is a focus on the emergence of micro-
organizational mechanisms through which problem assignment (Chapter 2), problem resolution 
(Chapter 3), and sustained participation (Chapter 4) are obtained in open productions. In my essays, I 
draw from organizational sociology and the behavioral theory of the firm to specify models that relate 
individual problem-solving activities to structured patterns of action through emergent work practices. 
In the models that I specify and test, I emphasize processes of attention allocation (Chapter 2), repeated 
collaboration and group diversity (Chapter 3) and identity construction (Chapter 4) as central to our 
understanding of the dynamics of problem-solving in organizations. One element of novelty in my 
study is that my research design makes these work practices directly observable at a level of detail, 
completeness, and precision that was inaccessible in the past. To illustrate the empirical value of the 
view that I develop I examine problem-solving activities – i.e., bug fixing and code production – within 
two Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS) projects during their entire life span. Readers of my work will 
know more about how organizational micro-mechanisms emerge in open productions.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Motivating Questions  
 
“Is the apparently anarchistic process of open source production, in which no one tells anybody else 
what to do, a new model of business organization?” (Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole) 
 
When economists Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole (2001: 821) raised this fundamental question, 
Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS) was just on the verge to turn from a curiosity for few enthusiasts 
into a mainstream phenomenon affecting business corporations, end users and policy makers alike 
(Levine & Prietula, 2014). Now F/OSS is ubiquitous and the number of F/OSS projects is constantly 
growing. Sourceforge, the most popular F/OSS infrastructure repository, hosts more than 430,000 
projects and 3.7 million registered users. Each day users of Sourceforge alone download on average 
more than 4 million programs, commit more than 14,000 changes to source code, and track more than 
2,700 software bugs. The Linux and Android operating systems, and the Apache Web Server are the 
largest, most successful and influential projects. They operate on millions of computers and devices 
and rely on the distributed contributions of thousands of individuals. F/OSS projects span a wide range 
of applications, including programming languages (such as Perl and Python), user software (such as 
Mozilla Firefox and LibreOffice) and programming environments (such as Eclipse). 
The term Free/Open Source Software refers to software released under a license that permits 
inspection, use, modification and redistribution of the software’s source code (Crowston et al., 2012). 
F/OSS represents an alternative approach to technology development and innovation. Rather than 
implementing formal intellectual property rights that induce the formation of contracts between firms, 
developers and final users, F/OSS projects “open” their boundaries by enlisting all participants as 
project contributors and giving them access to the software source code. F/OSS projects aim at 
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providing private incentives to maximize adoption and individual contributions but reduce the 
opportunities for appropriating the economic value of the innovation, as in the case of public goods 
(West, 2003). F/OSS may be seen as a private-collective innovation model that combines elements of 
individual investment and collective action (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). This innovation model is 
based on the creation of incentives for individuals and organizations to sustain private costs in order to 
generate public goods innovations, which are non-rival and non-exclusive in consumption. Although 
software with F/OSS licenses and proprietary software may be developed in the same way, most F/OSS 
products are developed by teams of geographically dispersed participants who often work on a 
voluntary basis (Lee & Cole, 2003).  
The private-collective model of collaboration, innovation and production can now be 
generalized beyond software. The term “open production” has been introduced to describe production 
systems relying mostly on volunteer participants who are willing to collaborate, bear private costs and 
defer self-interest in order to provide a public good (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011). Similarly to Levine 
and Prietula’s (2014) definition of open collaboration, open productions are entities that (i) create 
goods of economic value; (ii) grant open access to participants to contribute and consume freely; (iii) 
are based on constant interactions and information exchange; (iv) coordinate purposefully participants’ 
labor. Examples of open production are becoming increasingly common in engineering (Enkel, 
Gassman & Chesbrough, 2009), health care (Kamel Boulos & Wheeler, 2007; Eysenbach et al., 2004), 
product design (Jeppesen & Fredericksen, 2006; Dahlander & Wallin, 2006), and software 
development (Raymond, 1999; West & Gallagher, 2006) – the specific production activity that I 
examine in my dissertation.   
What makes these productions possible, and how may they be sustained in a world of 
organizations in which selection favors the proliferation of hierarchical forms of organization (Simon, 
4 
 
1965)? How can production organizations “in which no one tells anybody else what to do” (Lerner and 
Tirole, 2002: p. 821) substitute traditional organizational arrangements such as hierarchy-based 
decision making and contracts that regulate principal-agent differences in the incentive structure?”  
These are questions of core theoretical importance in the study of organizations. During the last decade 
economists (Lerner & Tirole, 2002; 2001), organizational sociologists (Bailey, Leonardi & Barley, 
2012), political scientists (Feldman, 2010), students of technological innovation (Baldwin & von 
Hippel, 2011; Dahlander & Gann, 2010) and legal scholars (Benkler, 2006) have recognized the 
importance – and difficulty – of providing coherent answers in the context of open production. In my 
dissertation I address these difficulties directly, by examining the internal organizational logic of open 
production – i.e., by considering open production projects as specific forms of economic production. 
As such, open productions have to address the same issues facing conventional hierarchical 
organizations such as, for example, division of labor, allocation of skills to tasks, collaboration, and 
coordination.  My work adds to existing research a focus on the micro-organizational mechanisms that 
make open production effectively possible as a strategy for technology development. Unlike much of 
the prior literature on open productions, I do not emphasize incentives, status-seeking or efficient 
allocation of property rights. I concentrate instead on the actual day-to-day activities through which 
fundamental organizational mechanisms such as task assignment, collaboration for problem resolution, 
and sustained participation emerge and ultimately make open productions sustainable problem-solving 
arrangements. The research design that I have implemented and the models I have developed allow me 
to examine work practices at a level of resolution that has so far been inaccessible for prior research.  
I focus on individual acts of problem solving - the smallest possible constituent unit of work 
practices, emphasizing emergence of micro-organizational mechanisms through which problem 
assignment (Chapter 2), problem resolution (Chapter 3), and sustained participation (Chapter 4) are 
obtained in open productions. In particular, I am interested in understanding how interaction between 
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participants and problems generates and sustain the basic coordination micro-mechanisms produced by 
hierarchical arrangements in more conventional production organization. Inspired by this general 
orienting question, I aim at answering the following research questions, each centered on a specific 
aspect of such emergence. Highlighting interdependencies of attention allocation processes, in Chapter 
2 I ask “How do individuals in self-managing, decentralized work teams decide which task to work 
on”? In Chapters 3 and 4 I instead focus more on the performance implications of collaborative work 
practices in open productions, in terms of time to solve problems and the likelihood to retain and 
sustain voluntary contributions in presence of fluid organizational boundaries. Stressing processes of 
repeated collaboration and expertise heterogeneity in groups, in Chapter 3 I ask: “How does the 
internal composition of collaborative work groups in open productions affect the time in which 
problems are solved”? Finally, based on the idea that voluntary contributors construct their identity 
profiles as specialists or generalists by narrowly focusing or widely dispersing their efforts across 
knowledge domains, chapter 4 addresses the following question: “How do decentralized work groups 
in open productions manage to retain their human capital despite the presence of porous boundaries 
that favor constant member turnover”? In the remaining parts of the introduction I expand and motivate 
these research questions in a broader context informed by organizational sociology, the behavioral 
theory of the firm and open innovation. 
The goals of this dissertation may be summarized as follows: the first goal is to provide an 
overarching framework for the concept of “open production”, showing how it emerges from, and 
extends beyond, the basic model of problem-solving organizations. I build on previous work on open 
innovation (Lakhani, Lifshitz-Assaf & Tushman, 2013) and decentralized production communities 
(Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006), but capture a broader range of processes, drawing from a behavioral 
perspective on organizations (Gavetti et al., 2012), including very fundamental concepts such as 
attention allocation, organizational learning, and division of labor. The second goal is to extend current 
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explanations based on motivation and incentives to show how open productions are sustained through 
mundane work practices. In open productions problem-solving acts that link individuals to tasks are 
transparent (i.e., immediately visible) to all participants. I argue that both individual decision-making 
and organizational outcomes are embedded in, and determined by, this transparent problem-solving 
structure. The third goal is to identify future avenues of research related to open productions to inspire 
organizational scholars to study how these new organizational arrangements affect collaborative 
practices and the production of innovation.  
1.2 Research on collaborative open production 
In the last fifteen years, organizational scholars have tried to understand how open production 
in general, and F/OSS projects in particular, work as organizational solutions to the problem of 
producing and distributing public goods (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003). The task has proven particularly 
challenging because of the ‘‘anarchistic’’ nature of the production process of F/OSS. This type of 
“open production” manifests itself in extreme forms of decentralized decision-making, and in the 
absence of exogenously established hierarchical structures and formal coordination mechanisms 
(Lerner & Tirole, 2001). How are F/OSS productions possible under such apparently adverse 
organizational conditions? More specifically I ask how do fundamental organizational mechanisms 
such as the ones outlined in the previous paragraph emerge in these conditions to make open 
productions sustainable. Available research suggests a variety of possible answers such as the expected 
returns on reputation and knowledge that participation in successful projects may afford (Lakhani & 
von Hippel, 2003; von Krogh & von Hippel, 2006), the presence of a diffuse shared gift-exchange 
culture (Bergquist & Ljungberg, 2001; Zeitlyn, 2003), the widespread availability of efficient and 
effective communication technologies (Lanzara & Morner, 2005; Scacchi, 2004), the fact that direct 
monitoring may act as an efficient safeguard against free riding problems (Baldwin & Clark, 2006), 
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and the presence of conscious processes of boundary maintenance (Ferraro & O’Mahony, 2012). 
Available explanations typically strive to answer the fundamental question, first raised by Lerner and 
Tirole in their seminal paper (2002: 198): “Why would thousands of top-notch software developers 
contribute for free to the creation of a public good?” Most research has focused on individual 
motivations. Empirical studies on this subject have documented a series of factors that induce 
individuals to contribute to F/OSS projects.  
In a recent review Crowston and colleagues (2012) show that motivations are highly 
heterogeneous and generally fall into three broad families. The first includes extrinsic motivations, 
which such as status or reputation which may represent signals of competence and hence contribute to 
future career development (Hars & Ou, 2002; Hertel, Niedner & Hermann, 2003; Stewart, 2005). The 
second includes intrinsic motivations, like pure enjoyment and satisfaction deriving from sharing 
information or learning opportunities (Ghosh, 1998; Shah, 2006; Stewart & Gosain, 2006). Finally, the 
third family includes motivations that are extrinsic in principle, but could be internalized so that they 
are felt as self-regulating behavior instead of exogenous impositions (Deci and Ryan, 1987; Roberts, 
Hann & Slaughter, 2006). These internalized extrinsic motivations include, among others, peer 
recognition and reciprocity. For instance, Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) show that mundane, but 
necessary tasks in F/OSS projects – tasks that couldn't be explained by purely extrinsic or intrinsic 
motivations – are performed because participants feel part of a community where free user-to-user 
assistance is the standard modus operandi. Socialization and collaborative work practices induce the 
establishment of unwritten norms and informal institutions that encourage and foster individual 
participation in the project. While early work on motivation focused mostly on the intrinsic vs extrinsic 
framework, recent developments have advanced this latter line of research by exploring the role of 
actual work practices in sustaining collaborative behavior (von Krogh et al., 2012). Building on the 
social philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981; 1998), von Krogh and colleagues (2012) illustrate a 
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"motivation-practice" framework that depicts how the relationship between individual motivation and 
economic outcomes is embedded in day-to-day social practices and their supporting institutions.  
Although recent studies have documented increasing synergies between business corporations – 
such as IBM and Microsoft – and open source communities (Dahlander & Magnusson, 2008; West & 
Gallagher, 2006) this work purposely look at projects composed almost entirely by volunteers, in order 
to rule out alternative explanations due to extrinsic pay-based motivations. In this dissertation I take an 
alternative approach grounded in a detailed examination of how individual problem-solving attempts 
actually happen as a consequence of dynamic work practices linking problems and participants 
(Pentland, Hærem & Hillison, 2011; McGrath & Argote. 2001). Attention to work practices is not 
completely new in studies of open productions.  In F/OSS projects the actual activities of software 
contributors have been directly investigated with a focus on their emergent, decentralized character 
(Crowston, Li, Wei, Eseryel, & Howison, 2007; Crowston & Scozzi, 2008; see also Crowston, Wei, 
Howison, & Wiggins, 2012, for recent literature reviews discussing this stream of research). For 
instance, reuse of software code has been investigated as a specific form of knowledge recombination 
fostering the ability to generate innovation in F/OSS production (Haefliger, von Krogh & Spaeth, 
2008). What I add to these studies is an attempt to analyze work practices founded on an overarching 
perspective on individuals and problems in organizations which views them as existing in a relation of 
mutual constitution, in the sense of Breiger (1974, 2000, 2002) and Breiger and Mohr (2004). 
According to this perspective, organizations may be understood in terms of a dual association between 
individual carriers of potential solutions (whose organizational identities are defined in terms of the 
problems with which they are associated) and problems (whose organizational identities are defined in 
terms of the individuals engaged in their resolution). Although important in any organization, the 
quality of contributors and the nature of their tasks and work practices are rarely sufficient, in isolation, 
to explain how and why one specific organizational arrangement is more or less effective than the 
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feasible alternatives. Given the key organizational characteristics of open productions – the weakness 
of centralized control and formal coordination and the direct and unrestricted access of participants to 
problems – all the basic components of organizational structure are endogenous, interdependent, and 
regulated by processes of self-selection and self-assignment (von Krogh, Spaeth & Lakhani, 2003). In 
particular, self-assignment to problem-solving activities lies at the heart of any F/OSS project because 
both the implementation of new software functionalities and also ‘‘bug-fixing’’ – that is, the correction 
of defects and misbehaviors generically called ‘‘software bugs’’ – can be conceived of as problems that 
contributors have to resolve if their software product is to progress into any sort of stable state.  
This leads to a view of open productions as problem-solving organizations in which the micro-
mechanisms of problem solving become the focus of investigation. Work practices, observed for the 
first time at the most fine-grained level of detail, emerge from sequences of actions linking participants 
and problems in F/OSS projects. As Lakhani and von Hippel write (2003: p. 940): “We think that it is 
important to analyze the micro-level functioning of successful open source projects to really understand 
how and why they work. For example, we think it would be useful to conduct empirical studies to 
explore other puzzling aspects of how an open source project functions such as: how is coordination 
achieved among open source software contributors; how can problems be segmented into modules of a 
size that fit the sources and incentives of individual users to effectively contribute?” Although these 
suggestions were put forward over ten years ago, most literature on F/OSS and open innovation either 
investigated a variety of motivation and incentives-related reasons for understanding contributors’ 
participation or explored a series of hybrid strategies for firms to tap into open production communities 
to produce innovation. Those questions may be addressed only by considering open productions as 
specific problem-solving arrangements and by concentrating on their internal organizational logic. My 
research design and the very fine-grained level of detail of the continuous time problem-solving data 
that I collected allow for one of the first times to respond to that call.   
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1.3 Open productions as problem-solving organizations 
One way to think about organizations is as problem-solving arrangements designed to 
economize on the limited cognitive resources of their members, simplify decisions, encourage 
coordination, and reproduce production relations (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958). 
Building conceptually on the path breaking work of Herbert Simon on problem-solving (Simon, 1969; 
Newell & Simon, 1972) and on its more recent “evolutionary” developments (Marengo et al., 2000; 
Marengo & Dosi, 2005), I consider organizational problem-solving as a particular form of production 
activity. I posit that the dual association linking participants to problems generates information through 
individual acts of production. Participants use this information to allocate their attention and decide 
their level of engagement with the overall project. The global structure of this open production system 
emerges from individual acts of problem-solving which crystallize into interdependent work practices – 
defined analytically as structured sequences of problem-solving events. The individual decision to 
engage organizational problems is modeled as a function of: (i) the characteristics of the problems; (ii) 
the characteristics of the participants, and (iii) the characteristics of the associations linking participants 
to problems. 
In this dissertation I consider “bug-fixing” – or attempts by project participants to resolve 
software problems (software “bugs”) – and production of software code as the core organizational 
problem-solving activity. Bug-fixing possibly represents the most transparent example of 
organizational problem-solving, as it exemplifies a setting in which problems, problem-solvers and 
solutions encounter each other in a space of decision opportunities (Cohen, March & Olsen 1972). 
Bug-fixing and code production have long been recognized as the essential activities in the 
development and maintenance of F/OSS products (Crowston, 2008; Michlmayr, 2007) and are 
frequently viewed as providing a significant contribution to the success of F/OSS projects (Crowston & 
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Scozzi, 2008; Crowston et al., 2012). Yet, the conditions of extreme decentralization characterizing 
problem-solving activities in F/OSS environments poses the question of how collaboration may be 
fostered and sustained in the absence of centralized control. In decentralized productions characterized 
by distributed work carried out by highly autonomous participants, the answer to this question does not 
reside in the design of optimal hierarchical control systems or incentives. My attempt to address this 
concern starts from a simple representation of organizational problem-solving activities as embedded in 
structures of connections linking problems and participants – the latter being the bearers of potential 
solutions (Cohen March & Olsen, 1972). 
1.4 Outline of the empirical studies 
I organize the empirical chapters of this work using the inputs-mediators-outputs-inputs (IMOI) 
model (Ilgen, et al., 2005) – a general framework that has been repeatedly used in research on teams 
and teamwork (Hackman & Morris, 1978; McGrath, 1991). Figure 1 shows the baseline IMOI model. 
 
Figure 1.1: Inputs-Mediators-Outputs-Inputs Model (adapted from Ilgen et al., 2005) 
 
This model most closely matches the theoretical constructs I use to support my arguments and 
provides additional structure for framing the empirical studies of my dissertation. I opt for the IMOI 
model rather than its predecessor, the Input-Process-Output (IPO) model (Hackman & Morris, 1978) 
because it postulates the existence of feedback processes linking outputs to inputs, conceiving outputs 
as inputs to upcoming processes (Crowston et al., 2012). This view is consistent with the idea that the 
constant encounter of participants and problems in a transparent environment endogenously generates 
new solutions and new opportunities for problem-solving. Furthermore, this framework is consistent 
Inputs Mediators Outputs 
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with the idea that while organizations transform inputs into outputs they are also transformed by the 
very same process (Padgett & Powell, 2012; Padgett, Lee & Collier, 2003). This model of team 
production is also apposite because problem-solving processes in open production occur in small teams 
with porous boundaries whereas most studies have been conducted at the project level of analysis. 
When needed I adapt the framework to include theoretical constructs directly related to the 
development of F/OSS software. 
Figure 1.2 reports the resultant framework with the relevant constructs that I adopt in the 
empirical part of the dissertation. Inputs characterize starting conditions of the production process, such 
as organizational participants’ characteristics and problems characteristics. Mediators characterize 
processes that drive the transformation of inputs into outputs. These processes represent typically group 
level variables or dynamic interdependencies among individuals that affect organizational participants 
as they work to solve their problems, conducting to the outputs of the model. Examples of mediators 
are social and cognitive processes that underlie the production process, such as collaboration, allocation 
of attention and decision-making. They usually represent the variables of theoretical interest in the 
models I specify. Outputs characterize relevant consequences of the production process, typically 
performance measures such as time to fix problems or quantity of innovation produced. They are 
usually, but not always, the dependent variables in my models. 
 
Figure 1.2: Constructs studied in the empirical part of the dissertation and their relations 
Inputs 
Individual characteristics 
Participation 
Experience 
Problem characteristics 
Saliency 
Complexity 
Mediators (Processes) 
Coordination 
Attention allocation 
Decision-making 
Collaboration 
Specialization 
 
Outputs 
Solved problems 
Innovation 
Retention of human 
capital 
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I build on behavioral theories of organizations to specify models that relate individual problem-
solving activities to the structured pattern of action through emergent work practices (Barley & Kunda, 
2010). In the models that I specify and test, I emphasize processes of relational coordination – i.e., 
coordination emerging from direct interaction among participants (Gittell, 2002) – as central to our 
understanding of the dynamics of problem-solving in open production.  Not only do I build on 
behavioral theories of organizations, but also I maintain the analytical focus on the interaction among 
individuals determined by joint involvement in problem-solving activities.  To illustrate the empirical 
value of this perspective I examine problem-solving activities within several large F/OSS projects. This 
setting is particularly useful because the decentralization typical of F/OSS projects implies that 
organizational structures are not exogenously imposed, but emerge directly from the problem-solving 
activities of individual participants. This empirical setting facilitates more direct observation of the 
emergence of organizational structures and routines from actual work practices linking participants to 
problems. More specifically, I focus on processes of attention allocation (Chapter 2), repeated 
collaboration and expertise diversity (Chapter 3) and identity specialization (Chapter 4) which take 
place when a distributed group of software contributors coordinate to produce software and fix bugs.  
Figure 1.2 illustrates the overall organization of my work into three studies – each examining 
specific aspects of problem solving in collaborative open productions. The first study (Chapter 2) is 
designed to address the following question: “How do individuals in decentralized work teams decide 
which task to work on”? The chapter focuses on inputs and processes to explain the mechanisms 
behind task self-assignment decisions. The chapter builds on the view that organizational decision-
making is the outcome of interacting flows of problems, opportunities and problem solvers (Cohen, 
March & Olsen, 1972). The study is centered on the idea that attention allocation is the mechanism by 
which problems and problem solvers meet each other in a space of decision opportunities (Ocasio, 
2012). Because attention is a scarce resource in information-intensive organizations, understanding 
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patterns of attention allocation is crucial for achieving effective coordination and division of labor 
(Simon, 1947; Sullivan, 2010). Extant literature has focused mainly on bottom-up (i.e., driven by 
problem characteristics) or top-down (i.e., driven by problem solvers’ cognitive schemas) processes of 
attention allocation in organizations. I argue that problem selection decisions are embedded in a 
relational context that constitutes patterns of information usage, inducing organizational members to 
lower their search costs and better evaluate problems at stake. Hence, problem selection decisions don't 
occur in isolation, but are situated within a connected system made of attention allocation ties linking 
problems to other individuals. I analyze the structure of this system by proposing and investigating two 
fundamental mechanisms that sustain a situated view of attention: attention clustering and attention 
spread. By using newly developed Stochastic Actor Oriented Models (SAOM) for bipartite graphs 
(Conaldi, Lomi & Tonellato, 2012), I find that problem selection decisions show a tendency towards 
attention clustering and a tendency toward disassortative attention spread, and that these two effects are 
compounded by the high levels of experience of problem solvers. This chapter contributes to the 
literature on organizational attention and distributed cognition by extending recent work on attention 
networks (Prato and Stark, 2013). Whereas current work emphasizes that market valuations are 
embedded in attention networks that shape individual perceptions, my study sheds light on two specific 
mechanisms that inform organizational participants when they self-select specific problems to solve. 
The second and third studies (chapters 3 and 4) focus more on processes and outputs, as they 
intend to illuminate the factors enhancing performance in open productions. In the second study I delve 
into the performance implications of distributed problem-solving in open productions by looking at 
how organizations learn to coordinate activities that reduce the average problem latency time, or the 
time passed between the appearance of a problem and its resolution. The chapter addresses the 
following question: “How does the internal composition of decentralized work groups in open 
productions affect the way in which individuals collaborate to solve problems”? The emergence of 
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open, collaborative forms of economic organization, such as open source software projects, invites 
reconsideration of the relationship between organizational structures and learning activities. Repeated 
collaboration represents a crucial mechanism through which organizations learn. Research on group 
learning shows that experience in working together helps groups within organizations to achieve better 
coordination, establish shared norms, and reduce task completion time (Reagans, Argote & Brooks, 
2005). However, extended collaboration time may induce group members to overly focus on existing 
solutions and available routines,  which in turn hinders the search for solutions that may be more 
effective but more distant from established practices (Katz, 1982; Levinthal & March, 1993). 
Following existing work (e.g., van der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005) I argue that group learning is 
contingent on the distribution of task-related expertise among group members. My results build on 
prior research and go beyond it by suggesting that the effect of repeated collaboration on group 
performance is moderated by the degree of expertise diversity in the group. Groups that are composed 
of individuals with homogeneous expertise outperform groups with heterogeneous expertise at lower 
levels of prior collaboration, because homogeneity helps establish common ground in the early phases 
of collaborative practices. At the other end, groups composed of individuals with heterogeneous 
expertise outperform groups with homogeneous expertise at higher levels of prior collaboration, 
because specialization and expertise diversity are essential to establish a clear understanding of “who 
knows what” in the group (Liang, Moreland & Argote, 1995). This study is important as it extends 
theory on organizational learning by investigating relevant contingency effects for performance-based 
learning, whereas prior work has instead supported arguments about unconditional and linear effects of 
experience working together. 
The third study addresses the following question: “How do decentralized work groups in open 
productions manage to retain their human capital despite the presence of porous boundaries that favor 
constant member turnover”? I investigate how open collaborative productions take advantage of a 
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modular structure to achieve outcomes, such as specialization and knowledge transfer, which are 
obtained through formal organizational design solutions in more traditional production settings (Simon, 
1969; Baldwin & Clark, 2006; Baldwin, 2008).  In particular, I observe how organizations are able to 
retain, and benefit from, participants who tend to specialize their identity within modules and 
knowledge domains, because other participants find it easier to understand their expertise and their role 
in the project (Shah, 2006; Fang & Neufeld, 2009). However, participants who reach out and 
collaborate with the same contributors within or across different modules are able to gain legitimacy 
without the need to constrain their identity on a narrow knowledge domain. As a result they tend to 
stay longer in the project. This chapter contributes to the literature on open innovation by identifying 
the mechanisms that sustain individual participation in open productions, in absence of evident 
economic incentives.  
Taken together, the three studies included in my dissertation help advance our understanding of 
relational coordination in open collaborative productions by identifying specific processes and 
mechanisms that facilitate collective problem-solving under extreme conditions of decentralization. 
1.5 Empirical setting 
Consistent with the literature on F/OSS and open innovation, I focus my attention on bug-fixing 
and code commits, the two most prominent problem-solving activities in software projects (Crowston 
and Scozzi, 2008). Bug-fixing refers to the sequence of tasks that are intended to resolve software 
problems that cause computer programs to behave in unintended and undesirable ways. Code commits 
refer to submitting the latest changes of the software source code to the repository  with the aid of a 
concurrent version control (CVS) system (i.e., a system devoted to tracking and providing control over 
concurrent changes to source code). 
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Using the software Bicho (Robles et al., 2009) and CVSAnalY (Robles et al., 2005), I collected 
the raw data by parsing the web pages of all relevant bug reports and CVS commits within two F/OSS 
projects, Epiphany (a web browser) and Apache (a web server application). The raw data were then 
dumped in a MySQL database and subsequently imported into R - the statistical modelling 
environment within which I conduct all my analyses. For study 1, I coded the complete set of bug-
fixing activities recorded in Epiphany’s bug repository during one release cycle of the software (from 
March to September 2006). Throughout the release cycle 135 developers were active in resolving 719 
bugs.  All bugs engaged by developers during the release cycle are included and all actions taken while 
working on them are included. I then coded the complete set of bug-fixing activities (Study 2) and code 
commits (Study 3) within the Apache HTTPS server between 1996 and 2013. During this period 2630 
participants were active in the bug repository attempting to solve 5646 bugs, whereas 111 participants 
were active in the CVS repository making 1454 commits to modify 10757 software files. Detailed 
descriptions of the data and the samples are contained in each of the chapters that are structured as 
independent, self-contained studies. 
An important feature of my research design that makes F/OSS a good empirical setting for 
studying problem-solving in open productions is social transparency (Stuart et al., 2012; Dabbish et al., 
2012). Social transparency refers to a new and growing phenomenon affecting collaboration practices 
over the internet. The contemporary social web provides an unprecedented level of transparency in the 
form of immediate traceability, and extensive visibility, of participants’ history of actions on public or 
shared artefacts, such as bug or code repositories in F/OSS projects. The decisions of any participant 
are thus immediately visible to all members of the community and produce information that other 
participants may take into account in their own process of decision-making. In the case of F/OSS 
projects, patterns of past interactions between contributors and software bugs or code repositories 
induce local dependencies that may influence future associations between participants – as bearers of 
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potential solutions – and problems. This process of endogenous structuration generates the possibility 
of observing recurrent work practices, or patterns of association between problems and participants, 
and, indirectly, between participants through problems. Inherent characteristics of participants and 
problems also influence the likelihood of their association, thus leading to complex patterns that may 
give rise to core organizational properties such as collaboration, coordination, and specialization 
(Lomi, Conaldi & Tonellato, 2012). 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
The next three chapters are focused on the three empirical studies that I briefly outlined in this 
introduction. Parts of Chapter 2 are based on the following two papers that I had published with my co-
authors: 
Conaldi, G., Lomi, A., & Tonellato, M. (2012). Dynamic models of affiliation and the network 
structure of problem solving in an open source software project. Organizational Research Methods, 
15(3), 385-412.  
Lomi, A., Conaldi, G., Tonellato, M., & Pallotti, F. (2014). Participation motifs and the emergence of 
organization in open productions. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 29, 40-57. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 are working papers constituted by unpublished material. In Chapter 5 I draw 
general theoretical implications based on the three empirical studies, identify current limitations and 
propose further directions that have the potential to advance our understanding of problem solving in 
collaborative open productions. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
RELATIONAL COORDINATION IN AN OPEN SOURCE 
SOFTWARE PROJECT: 
THE ROLE OF ATTENTION NETWORKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing from insights of a structural perspective within the attention-based view of the firm and social 
cognition, this paper argues that the process through which organizational members self-assign to 
competing problems in open productions unfolds through the interdependent acts of attention allocation 
linking members and problems. Hence attention processes are not individual, but embedded in the 
evolving portfolio of problems to which a member is attentive and in the evolving attention structures 
of other members to whom he or she is tied. In this way multiple members are linked to multiple 
problems by attention networks. I analyze the bipartite dynamic structure of these networks by 
proposing and investigating two fundamental mechanisms that sustain a situated view of attention: 
attention clustering and attention spread. I explore these mechanisms by examining problem-solving 
attempts performed by 135 participants in an open source software project on the 719 problems 
(software bugs) recorded during a complete release cycle of the software. I find that attention allocation 
decisions show a tendency towards clustering of related problems and towards disassortative attention 
spread, and that these two effects are driven by the high levels of experience of problem solvers. The 
discussion focuses on the broad theoretical implications of the study for the relationship between 
attention and problem-solving in open productions. 
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2.1 Introduction and motivation 
When organizational participants are involved in the process of finding solutions to problems, 
attention becomes crucial as decision-makers tend to concentrate organizational resources to areas 
where attention has been allocated (March & Simon, 1958; Sullivan, 2010). However, the task of 
spreading attention over a broad spectrum of organizational problems is complex. Instead of trying to 
uniformly distribute the limited attention across all problems, as if they were equally important to the 
organization (Bouchet & Birkinshaw, 2008), effective problem-solving practices require that 
organizational participants are selective in their efforts. As attention has always being recognized as a 
scarce resource in organizations (Simon, 1947; Ocasio, 2011), the principle of selective attention 
allocation across competing problems becomes crucial for achieving effective problem-solving. But 
how is this process structured?  
Extant research focuses on the role that formal structures play in guiding members' attention 
toward the most salient problems and the most attractive opportunities (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio & 
Joseph, 2005). This top-down approach – driven by goals, schemas, and rules – links attention to 
cognitive primers. According to this view participants are not perfectly rational individuals, but 
individuals who are embedded in a social and cultural system, based on cognitive schemas that are 
often taken for granted and not necessarily optimal from a purely economic standpoint. Actors are 
anchored to categorical interpretations of the task environment, each rooted in established institutional 
logics that drive attention and ultimately action (Fligstein, 2002; Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008). A second, competing stream of research investigates how certain characteristics of problems 
render them visible or accessible beyond the constraints of these top-down procedural structures, to 
capture the attention of individual members more effectively (Hansen & Haas, 2001; Sullivan, 2010). 
This bottom-up approach is stimulus-driven and links attention to characteristics of the stimuli that are 
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to be attended to (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). An example of the bottom-up mechanism is represented 
by the effect of problem salience, or “urgency” (Sullivan, 2010) on the likelihood that the problem is 
engaged with by organizational decision-makers. Although the two separate processes have been 
extensively tackled in the literature on organizational attention, the ecological mechanisms underlying 
attention competition haven’t received enough theoretical and empirical investigation (Sullivan, 2010). 
In particular, while scholars belonging to the Carnegie School tradition have generally argued that 
attention competition is situated in a particular context, there is a research gap regarding the specific 
attention allocation mechanisms operating within this contextual structure articulated as an ecology of 
people, problems and solutions (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972).  
If top-down and bottom-up exogenous, stand-alone mechanisms of situated attention have been 
the focus of a recently burgeoning literature on organizational attention (for a review see Ocasio, 
2011), I argue that, with a few notable exceptions, the idea of attention networks of interdependent acts 
of attention allocation has been largely overlooked in recent empirical work. Drawing originally on 
March and Olsen's (1976) intuition that one's attention is a function of other's attention, this view posits 
that the attention allocation patterns of one person are contingent on, and situated in, a structure of 
interdependent actors, problems and solutions. More recent work rooted in a situated cognition 
perspective has further advanced this intuition. Most notably, Prato & Stark (2013) showed that 
financial analysts’ estimates of stocks’ earnings per share are shaped by the other stocks that populate their 
field of view. Furthermore, their analysis revealed that analysts’ valuations are also influenced by the 
attention spectrum of those neighboring analysts that are connected through coverage of shared stocks. 
These findings suggest that individual estimates of a stock don’t happen in a vacuum but are embedded in 
the broader attention structure that connects analysts and stocks. In other words, individual valuations of a 
focal stock are influenced by the valuations of “neighboring” individuals, not only on the focal stock, but 
also on peripheral stocks. 
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Against this backdrop this paper presents an alternative approach to the main body of existing 
literature on organizational attention, using the emerging evidence of the ecologically situated nature of 
attention mechanisms as its point of departure. This approach focuses on how individual decisions 
about whether to engage with an organizational problem or not actually happen as a consequence of 
dynamic attentional processes linking individuals and problems in organizations (Conaldi, Lomi & 
Tonellato, 2012). More specifically, I examine how problems and individuals encounter each other in a 
space of potential attention opportunities and how such encounters are both affected by, and give rise 
to, “attention networks”, or dependence structures of attentional engagement decisions in which 
individuals and problems are embedded. According to this view, the attention of organizational 
members is embedded in the organization’s network of tightly and loosely coupled decision-making 
channels defined as “the formal and informal concrete activities, interactions, and communications set 
up by the firm to induce organizational decision-makers to action on a selected set of issues” (Ocasio, 
1997, p. 194). In the process of evaluating which organizational problem to engage with, individuals 
use these channels as a source of information about other individuals’ previous attention allocation 
choices. I argue that the bipartite network linking individuals to problems internalizes the information 
produced by individual acts of problem-solving and by constantly letting other members access this 
information to decide which problems to select next. The global structure of this situated attention 
system emerges from individual decisions of problem selection, which consolidate into regular patterns 
of network ties. I present two attentional mechanisms that match these regular configurations of ties to 
meaningful properties pertaining to the structural distribution of attention in open productions: 
attention clustering and attention spread.  
These two distinctive structural features of the attention network deserve closer scrutiny as they 
reveal underlying forms of micro-behavioral mechanisms. The first mechanism I identify is attention 
clustering of related problems – the tendency of organizational members to concentrate their attention 
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on groups of problems linked to the same set of individuals. Organizational members tend to select 
problems embedded in attention clusters because they can make better evaluations of their saliency due 
to easier comparison and categorization processes (Smith & Collins, 2009; Zuckerman, 2004). 
Furthermore, by selecting problems embedded in attention clusters, organizational members can better 
build on prior learning developed about the same, familiar individuals (Tsai, Su & Chen, 2011). In the 
network linking organizational participants to organizational problems the tendency toward attention 
clustering is captured by the recurrence of patterns of bipartite closure (Wang et al., 2012).  
The second feature is attention spread, which captures the tendency of organizational problems 
that have already attracted attention of many active members to be progressively more (or less) likely 
to attract additional active members (Barabási & Albert, 1999). A disassortative attention spread (a 
tendency against assortativity) would be evidence that participants prefer to allocate their attention to 
problems that are not already attended to by other participants. The possible outcome of a 
disassortative attention spread would be a more balanced allocation of attention over available 
problems. In the context of our argument disassortativity is important because in hierarchical 
organizations this outcome is frequently obtained by formal mechanisms of attention allocation based, 
for example, on hierarchical problem-scheduling routines. 
I then discuss how traditional top-down mechanisms governing attention allocation decisions, 
such as reinforcing cognitive schemas and reputation-based competition induced by organizational 
members’ experience, moderate the above-mentioned network configurations. In particular, I show 
how reinforcing schemas associated with experience tend to induce tenured individuals to allocate their 
attention to increasingly familiar problems (i.e., embedded in clusters of related problems) while 
reputation concerns tend to induce experienced individuals to engage with less popular problems (i.e., 
problems that show a tendency toward a disassortative attention spread). 
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My contributions to the organizational literature are twofold. Firstly, I contribute to the 
burgeoning debate on situated cognition by extending the concept of attention networks through the 
identification of different mechanisms showing the situated nature of attention allocation processes. 
According to this view, problem solvers’ selection of tasks at hand are intertwined with, and affected 
by, attention to decisions of fellow individuals to which they are indirectly tied through shared 
problems. Secondly, I contribute to the literature on organizational networks by providing new lenses 
through which to investigate the dynamics of bipartite attention ties on individual behavior and 
cognition. Attention networks are bipartite (two-mode) structures linking individuals to problems that 
they attend to. The vast majority of the literature on organizational networks reduce two-mode 
structures to one-mode networks. For example, the two-mode association between companies issuing 
securities and the investment banks managing the issues (Podolny, 1994) may be decomposed into two 
one-mode associations. The first is between companies affiliated indirectly through the banks 
managing their issues. My modeling efforts avoid this artificial reduction by directly modeling indirect 
ties between actors and their effect on behavior (Conaldi et al., 2012).   
 
2.2 Illustration of research issues in the empirical context  
Consistent with the notion of situated attention (Ocasio, 1997) and distributed social cognition 
(Smith & Collins, 2009), in this paper I explore the mechanisms through which individuals self-assign 
to problems in open productions. In particular I investigate the effect of attention networks on 
individual decisions to select problems to solve within a large Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS) 
project named “Epiphany”. F/OSS projects are organizations that exploit the (geographically) 
distributed knowledge of a team of (mainly volunteer) contributors in order to produce new software. 
The setting is particularly apt because it exemplifies a context in which an organization faces problems 
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to which seeks and generates solutions when exogenously established hierarchical structures and 
formal coordination mechanisms are weak. Given the weakness of centralized control, and the direct 
access of participants to problems, all the basic components of organizational attention structure are 
endogenous and regulated by processes of self-selection and self-assignment. More specifically, the 
model is applied to the dual association between software problems (or software “bugs”) and software 
contributors observed throughout one complete release cycle of Epiphany (Conaldi & Lomi, 2013).  
Figure 2.1 visualizes my idea of an attention network by displaying the actual data that I analyze in the 
empirical part of the paper. Blue squares represent project contributors and red circles represent 
software bugs. 
 
Figure 2.1: The observed organizational attention network. Blue squares are members. Red circles are problems. 
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Figure 1 suggests a core-periphery pattern with a small number of core participants engaged in 
the resolution of a large number of problems, and a larger periphery of participants characterized by a 
much lower level of engagement in organizational problem-solving activities (Crowston et al., 2006)  
According to this network representation of organizational problem-solving, organizational 
problems and organizational participants are linked by a dual relationship (Breiger, 1974): on the one 
hand problems (software bugs in our case) are connected through the set of organizational participants 
(software developers in our case) jointly working on their resolution; on the other hand organizational 
participants are connected through the problems they jointly engage with. This idea of duality is central 
to the study of organizations where the identity of units at one level is frequently defined in terms of 
patterns of association at a different – higher or lower – level (Breiger, 2000). The association between 
individuals and tasks, and between individuals and knowledge, for example, are typically considered 
the fundamental building blocks of organizations (Carley, 1991). These associations are “dual” in the 
sense that they connect (and indeed “define”) social entities standing in a mutually constitutive relation 
(Breiger & Mohr, 2004). In empirical research the mutual constitution of social entities across levels of 
organizational analysis frequently takes the form of a bipartite network (Pattison & Breiger, 2002). 
Bug-fixing has long been recognized as playing an essential role in the development and 
maintenance of F/OSS products (Crowston, 2008). Decentralized bug-fixing activities are frequently 
viewed as a core organizational problem-solving activity providing a significant contribution to the 
success of F/OSS projects (Crowston & Scozzi, 2008). Processes of resolution of software bugs in 
F/OSS projects have attracted considerable attention recently and represent a well-recognized area of 
interest in the broader context of research on the social organization of open productions (Zanetti et al., 
2013). While bug-fixing is obviously only one of the many problem-solving activities carried out 
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within F/OSS projects, it is representative of the decentralized, user-centered process of quality control 
and improvement that is typically observed in F/OSS productions (Conaldi & Lomi, 2013). From this 
perspective bug-fixing represents an essential element in the overall quality control process, ensuring 
quality improvement between successive releases (Michlmayr, 2007). 
 
2.3 Theory and hypotheses 
This study arises in response to the fundamental question of how organizational participants 
allocate attention resources to solve problems. Research on decision-making and problem-solving in 
organizations has often taken the position that problems trigger the search for solutions (March & 
Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963; Thompson, 1967). However, in a world of bounded rationality, 
organizational problem-solvers don't keep searching until the evaluated optimal solution is found; 
rather they pick the first satisfactory choice. In other words, individuals look for solutions to problems 
locally, in the “neighborhood” of the problem under attention. (Cyert & March, 1963; Winter et al., 
2007). When individuals are involved in problem-solving activities, organizational attention becomes 
the most crucial factor for decision-making processes, as problem solvers devote increasing levels of 
cognitive and physical resources to regions of problems that have attracted most attention. Scholars 
who belong to the so-called Carnegie School have thoroughly demonstrated that, when looking for 
solutions to problems at hand, organizational participants do not engage problems uniformly, because 
they have limited attention capacity (Simon, 1947; March & Simon 1958). This situation leads to a 
scenario in which boundedly rational individuals and organizations have to allocate their limited 
attention to problems sequentially (Cyert & March, 1963). As in any decision on resource-allocation, 
there is a trade-off: the gain in attention by one problem domain means a concomitant loss of attention 
by another, and organizational participants are more likely to generate solutions in problem areas that 
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have already are attracted a substantial amount of attention. As a matter of fact, multiple, neighboring 
problems compete for participants attention. 
Building on the Carnegie School legacy, Ocasio (1997) advanced a perspective called the 
attention-based view (ABV) of the firm. The central argument of the ABV (Ocasio, 1997, p. 188) is 
that “to explain firm behavior is to explain how firms distribute and regulate the attention of their 
decision-makers”. Broadly speaking, the ABV describes and explains how organizational responses are 
shaped by the manner in which organizations devote attention to their environments and by the way in 
which stimuli are distributed and channeled into decision-making processes (Ocasio, 1995). 
Organizations generate attention-directing cues that guide the behavior of individuals in a context of 
bounded rationality. Besides, to help channeling participants’ attention towards certain areas of the 
organizational environment and not others, firms rely on certain organizational design features, such as 
hierarchical systems, functions, departments, communication channels. The seminal paper that presents 
the ABV, proposes a set of constructs and connecting mechanisms that “explicitly link[s] individual 
information processing and behavior to the organizational structure through the concepts of procedural 
and communication channels and attention structures” (Ocasio, 1997, p. 188). In particular the concepts 
of situated attention and structural distribution of attention prove crucial in the context of this study. 
According to the former principle, organizational participants’ focus of attention depends on the 
features of the situation in which they are embedded. According to the latter, the specific situation in 
which participants are embedded, and how they attend to it, is affected by the way in which the 
organization regulates and allocates problems, solutions, and problem-solvers to particular functions, 
communication channels, and routines. In other words, organizations create structures that affect what 
problems attract participants’ attention, the solutions available to them to solve these problems, and 
eventually the decisions they make. Together, these two principles constitute a structural view of 
attention which helps explain how the problems that attract participants’ attention depend on the way in 
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which organizations design specific structures.  
Traditionally, research on ABV has demonstrated that organizations contextual and procedural 
attention structures influence the business opportunities identified by decision-makers by affecting the 
way in which they allocate their limited attention on proximate, relevant stimuli (Barnett, 2008). At the 
intra-organizational level, Williams & Mitchell (2004) found that business opportunities such as new 
market entry pursued by managers are enabled by the infrastructure of organizational information, 
conceptualized as the way in which organizations design the communication links between their 
subunits. Furthermore Cho & Hambrick (2006) found that the attention of managers employed by 
airline companies moves from an internal to an external market orientation as a result of a shift from a 
regulated to a deregulated industry, exemplifying what Ocasio (1997) calls a “change in the rules of the 
game”, that opens the leeway to exploration of new ventures. Similarly, Yu et al. (2005) explored the 
effect of different contextual structures on the likelihood to shift managerial attention away from the 
current set of issues. The authors in particular explored the role of turnover, leading to the introduction 
of new members into the decision structure, and how this inception of new attention schemas lead the 
company to focus its attention on a more novel set of problems associated to their merger integration 
process. 
However, the emergence of open, collaborative forms of economic production (Bailey et al., 
2012; Levine & Prietula, 2014), such as open source software projects, invites reconsideration of the 
relationship between organizational structures and actual attentional patterns, giving rise to what has 
been labeled a theory of “social transparency” (Dabbish et. al., 2012). In open production, most work 
practices are carried out using social applications that let members track and follow the activities of 
other members, irrespective of their location. In open source software this new approach mixes version 
control systems with features of social media to create transparent work environments, where every 
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action undertaken by any individual is immediately visible and traceable by other project participants 
(Dabbish et al., 2013). Social transparency indicates the fact that origin and history of all actions are 
visible to other participants. Contributors to open productions keep everyone up to date on things they 
do or work on and in turn decide which individuals or problems of interest they want to pay attention 
to. Actions from tracked individuals and problems appear in each contributor’s feed, thus shaping the 
overall attention network.. In our example Bugzilla stores the complete history of every change that has 
been applied to each bug report. Since social transparency allows participant to be aware of what 
feature of the project is being modified, when, where and by whom, this meta-information is used by 
other participants to coordinate their efforts and respond to changes in content appropriately (Stuart et 
al., 2012). I argue that these type of transparent cues will generate direct and indirect effects on the 
attention allocation mechanisms of other members, and their consequent decisions about problems self-
assignment. For instance, software contributors can now infer someone else’s technical expertise when 
they co-edit a bug report, or guess which of several similar problems has the best chance of being 
solved in the short term. Contributors combine these attentional inferences into effective strategies for 
coordinating work and selecting tasks.  
Recent advancements in social psychology and theories of managerial cognition highlight the 
relevance of the situated context in which cognitive processes are embedded (Smith & Collins, 2009). A 
further development along these coordinates introduced the concept of situated attention, according to 
which individual acts of attention allocation are situated in, and influenced by, an ecology of individuals 
and situations to which they are compared (Ocasio, 2012).  If an organizational member's situated 
attention is ultimately a function of other members' attention, I can argue that these multiple 
dependencies give rise to attention networks, where transparent attentional cues are used by individuals 
to assess and decide their own level of engagement in problem-solving activities. I conceptualize and 
derive hypotheses on these endogenous attentional mechanisms in the following section. 
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2.3.1 Attention clustering 
When considering problem-solving activities in open productions the most striking 
organizational feature is the emergence of sustained collaboration around related problems. Adopting a 
situated attention approach, I argue that a problem-solver’s decisions are not merely the outcome of 
matching characteristics of the focal problem with one’s goals and expertise; they are always evaluated 
against the backdrop of other concurrent acts of attention allocation. That is, the multiple problems across 
which multiple problem-solvers allocate their attention will profile the characteristics that are considered as 
salient and meaningful when evaluating whether to attend to the focal problem or not. 
According to Goldberg (2011: p. 2), the “meanings that social actors attribute to symbols and 
actions emerge from the multiple associations they make between them”. This suggests that the 
evaluations individuals make of the problems they are facing should be understood as having a 
relational dimension (Mohr, 1998; Emirbayer, 1997). When assessing individuals’ attention allocation 
decisions we should not only take into account the decisions they take on specific problems 
independently, but rather the relationships between those decisions and a series of other elements that 
make up the specific socio-cognitive domain in which they are embedded. Hence, when organizational 
members evaluate the saliency of a problem they consider the number and characteristics of other 
problems to which it is related (Piezunka & Dahlander, 2014).  
A problem is more strongly related to another problem the more individuals exclusively engage 
with both of them, suggesting – for instance – that the two problems are evaluated on a common 
metric, possess common features, or are linked by relationships of complementarity. This type of 
clustering of problems channels organizational member’s attention because it helps to facilitate their 
understanding of the focal problem. Thus, if a problem is related to other problems – through shared 
acts of attention allocation – organizational members can better assess its salience and characteristics, 
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by evaluating them on the backdrop of other problems that are cognitively close. For instance, this 
process might enable the creation of heuristics that ease information-processing; that is, the 
establishment of labels and categories that facilitate a shared understanding of the problem under focus 
(Piezunka & Dahlander, 2014). The presence of related problems increases the likelihood that an 
individual will engage with a focal problem because organizational members are better equipped to 
make a sound assessment of its salience and characteristics.  
It is well known and has been empirically demonstrated that organizations tend to search for 
solutions locally (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & March, 1993; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). However, 
we know less about how organizations sequentially and proactively look for problems to solve. When 
attending to one problem, individuals are likely to later shift their attention to a related problem where 
they can build on experience of prior collaborations with the same individuals. In bug-fixing, where 
writing “patches” to bugs is considered the most time-consuming action, code developers tend to 
improve time efficiency by engaging with bugs that were triaged by trusted individuals, whose efforts 
were likely to be recognized as valuable in past collaborations. This idea of local search suggests that  
individuals’ problem engagement choices take advantage of the proximity of new problems clustered 
with other problems through common individuals with whom they are already affiliated.  
I characterize attention clustering using the network structure that links problems and problem 
solvers. In a bipartite affiliation network, direct ties between objects of the same kind are not allowed. 
Ties are only possible between objects belonging to different sets (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010). As a 
consequence, in bipartite affiliation networks cycles of odd lengths cannot occur: the shortest possible 
cycle in an affiliation network is a four-cycle. Clustering in a bipartite affiliation network, therefore, 
may only be defined in terms of a relation linking pairs of different kinds of objects – in my case 
participant-problem dyads. For this reason I consider the four-cycle as the elementary component of 
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clustering of related problems. Figure 2.2 illustrates a four-cycle configuration. At time t, individuals i 
and j attend to problem p1. Individual i attends alone to problem p2. At time t+1 i and j extend their 
attention also to problem p2. The result is a four-cycle structure which reveals the tendency toward the 
clustering of attention across shared problems. 
                p1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    i                       j 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               p2 
             p1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 i                        j 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              p2 
Time = t Time = t+1 
Figure 2.2: Attention Clustering 
 
Like the notion of neighborhood in social networks, the four-cycle configuration in bipartite 
affiliation networks is important for our current purposes because it defines a “setting” – or a cluster – 
for situated attention towards organizational problems that are linked indirectly through the individuals 
attending to them (Pattison & Robins, 2002). The presence of four-cycles in a problems-individuals 
attention network reveals self-organizing tendencies toward sustained collaboration. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more a problem is clustered with other problems, linked by attention 
ties to the same set of individuals, the higher the likelihood that problem solvers will attend to that 
problem. 
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2.3.2    Attention spread 
While the attentional process of clustering of a problem with other problems increases the 
chances of an encounter with, and a more accurate evaluation of, a problem, another fundamental 
mechanism shapes the way in which attention networks influence individuals’ problem selection 
decisions. In organizational members’ evaluations of whether or not to select a problem to solve, it also 
matters how many other organizational members a problem is affiliated to and, dually, how many 
problems the focal member has already engaged with. I can thus distinguish problems according to 
whether they attract attention from focused or active members. I can also classify individuals according 
to whether they prefer to spread their attention to already popular problems – those that have attracted 
the attention of a large, diversified set of individuals – or to problems which are of a more confined, 
specialist interest. I refer to a network configuration as showing a tendency toward assortative attention 
spread if a problem attracts the attention of a multiple set of individuals who in turn are attentive to 
many different problems. Figure.2.3 shows assortative attention spread in detail.  
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Figure 2.3: Attention Spread 
 
At time t participant i is very active, or has high out-degree (because he or she spreads her 
attention to many problems) and problem p is very popular, or has high in-degree (because it attracts 
the attention of many participants). At time t + 1 participant i decides to engage with problem p thus 
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determining a situation whereby attention is preferentially allocated to more popular problems – a form 
of preferential attachment (Barabási & Albert, 1999).  
Problems that attract a disassortative attention spread reach into more distant knowledge 
domains of the organization by appealing to individuals who spread their attention on a multitude of 
different types of problems, regardless of their popularity among problem solvers.  The degree of 
assortativity of attention spread affects how a focal organizational member evaluates a problem, which 
influences the likelihood that he or she decides to attend to it. Attracting a large number of individuals 
who in turn spread their attention on a large number of problems might hinder information-processing. 
A problem that attracts contributions from a large number of individuals can potentially benefit 
organizational performance as it provides access to a more diverse spectrum of expertise that these 
individuals bring to the problem-solving process. At the same time, however, the more heterogeneous 
the contributions to the focal problem are, the more difficult it is to categorize it (Zuckerman, 1999; 
Hsu, 2006). If a problem cannot be clearly evaluated, it is more challenging for the organization to 
coordinate work around its resolution. This also means that tasks and division of labor within the 
community are likely to be unclear with respect to the problem, making it more difficult for the 
organization to assign the problem to an appropriate person for evaluation. A disassortative attention 
spread (a tendency against direct connection between participants with high outdegree and problems 
with high indegree) would be evidence that participants prefer to allocate their attention to problems 
that are not already attended to by many other participants. The possible outcome of disassortative 
attention spread would be a more balanced allocation of attention over available problems. In bug-
fixing, for instance, a bug that is re-assigned multiple times attracts more heterogeneous contributions 
from a more diverse set of individuals, making it less likely to get eventually fixed (Guo et al., 2010). 
The most likely end result is that trustworthiness of information drops and the bug is left increasingly 
unattended to. 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The greater the degree of assortative attention spread a problem attracts, 
the lower the likelihood that problem solvers will attend to it. 
 
2.3.3    Interaction hypotheses: the role of individual experience  
I posit that endogenous attention mechanisms of problem selection are influenced by top-down 
cognitive schemas that derive from organizational experience. For instance, excessive experience may lead 
organizational members to overly focus on existing solutions and habitual routines (Cohen & Bacdayan, 
1994), which in turn discourages a more wide-ranging search for novel solutions in an ever-changing 
landscape of problems. Thus, competency traps (Levitt & March, 1988) sometimes make group members 
reinforce their schemas and stick to familiar socio-cognitive environments where they minimize the level of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962). Furthermore, shared mental models developed in earlier repeated 
collaborations may induce organizational participants to withhold ideas that could alter the status quo and 
help maintaining conditions under which the exploration of more novel and riskier solutions is discouraged 
(Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In the framework of this 
study this process generates a mechanism by which experienced individuals tend to overly rely on attention 
clusters when they decide which problem to engage with. Sticking to clusters of problems attended to by 
the same individuals induces organizational members to tackle problems that are less ambiguous and 
diverge less from what they have already learned by collaborating repeatedly with the same subset of 
people. 
In the bug-fixing context where a great deal of distributed expertise coordination is required, 
experienced developers tend to develop shared mental models (SMM) of problem-solving routines 
(Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) and transactive memory systems (TMS) of “who knows what” in the 
team (Liang, Moreland & Argote, 1995) as the result of previous transparent interactions and shared 
work experience. SMM and TMS facilitate coordination and problem-solving by developing a shared 
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agreement of where specific expertise is located in the community. Hence, as SMM and TMS 
consolidate over time due to increased experience of working together, I expect experienced 
contributors to attend to clusters of related bugs more than inexperienced contributors. 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Individual experience moderates the relationship between attention 
clustering of problems and problem selection, such that the higher is an organizational member’s 
experience, the more likely that member is to allocate her or his attention to clusters of related 
problems.  
 
In the context of open productions, contributors with high experience tend to advance towards 
the center of the projects, embracing roles with higher coordination duties (Dahlander & O'Mahony, 
2011). Those in coordinating roles are expected to be very active and to have a wide attention span in 
order to tap into the highest possible proportion of reported problems.  However, they are less likely to 
engage with bugs that have already attracted a great deal of attention, leaving them to the discussion of 
specialized members with more idiosyncratic expertise in that specific problem. Besides, they carry the 
necessary authority to initiate discussion around bugs that are otherwise left unattended. 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Individual experience moderates the relationship between attention 
spread and  problem selection, such that the higher is an active organizational member's experience, 
the less likely he or she is to attend to popular problems.  
 
2.4 Research design 
2.4.1 Data 
I collected data on the complete set of problem-solving actions recorded during one release 
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cycle of Epiphany, a successful F/OSS project started in 2002 with the goal of building a web browser 
for the GNOME graphical desktop environment. I collected information on every problem-solving 
attempt observed from March to September 2006 by parsing the web pages of all relevant bug reports 
in Epiphany’s official bug repository – used by contributors to track all problems affecting the software 
during development – with the specialized software, Bicho (Robles et al., 2009). A more detailed 
description of the empirical setting and data collection methods is presented in Conaldi et al. (2012). 
During the release cycle I recorded a total of 135 contributors allocating their attention over 719 
software bugs. I constructed the participant-by-problem matrix by coding every action undertaken by 
contributor i on software bug p as a tie linking i to p. I subdivided the observation period into four time 
panels (t1-4), each covering a period of approximately 45 days, and recorded all the changes in the 
network of ties linking individual contributors and software bugs. For example, if contributor i engages 
with software bug p only during the first month of the cycle, the tie linking i to p will be present in the 
network at t1 but will be absent from the network in the following panels. I used the Jaccard coefficient 
to measure the amount of pair-wise stability in the panels (Snijders et al., 2010). The three Jaccard 
coefficients relative to the four panels in our dataset vary between 0.29 and 0.49. This means that 
between 29% and 49% of the ties linking contributors and software bugs remain unchanged in the 
transitions between successive time panels, while the remaining ties change. 
 
2.4.2 Variables and measures 
The dependent variable in this study refers to decisions of contributors to self-assign to specific 
problems to solve. Therefore I model problem selection as the likelihood of contributor i to engage bug 
j at a particular time t. Acts of problem solving give rise to attention networks because once a bug is 
first engaged by a contributor all subsequent activities undertaken on the same bug will be fed to the 
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focal contributor. Therefore, I can posit that when contributor i engages with bug j he or she is going to 
pay attention to all future activities on j. I represent attention networks as participant-by-problem 
matrices by coding every problem-solving act undertaken by contributor i on software bug j as a tie 
linking i to j. My empirical model specification is based on an attempt to characterize problem 
selection patterns in terms of (i) baseline change rates; (ii) attentional mechanisms of theoretical 
interest; (iii) other endogenous network effects; (iv) exogenous individual covariates, and (v) 
interactions between attentional mechanisms and individual covariates. 
Change rates control how quickly new opportunities arise for changing network ties linking 
individuals to problems. Baseline change rates refer to the average number of opportunities that 
individuals face to change their affiliation to problems, either by engaging with a new problem or by 
abandoning prior problems. As I discuss below, I include the effect of Core developer on rate to 
control for the additional choice opportunities that core developers enjoy as contributors “who 
contribute most of the code and oversee the design and evolution of the project” (Crowston & 
Howison, 2005: 7). 
Attentional mechanisms of theoretical interest are associated with self-organizing properties 
which represent the main focus of the study. They capture systematic dependencies created by the dual 
association of participants and problems.  A summary of these mechanisms can be found in Table 1. 
I include three endogenous network effects in addition to those represented by the two 
mechanisms that I have discussed (clustering of problems and assortative attention spread). The first is 
Outdegree (density) which I include to capture the baseline tendency of contributors to allocate their 
attention to software bugs, i.e., the likelihood that contributor i will engage with software bug p at all. I 
expect the estimate of the associated parameter to be negative to reflect the fact that problem-solving 
activities are costly. The second is Software bug popularity which captures the tendency of software 
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bugs that are already engaged with by many contributors to be progressively more (or less) likely to 
attract additional contributors. The third is Contributor activity, which I include to capture positive 
feedback dynamics associated to “learning by doing” (Argote & Epple, 1990). A positive coefficient 
would indicate that contributors who engage with many sofware bugs are progressively more likely to 
engage with additional bugs. These additional forms of local dependence are summarized in Table 2. 
Exogenous covariates may refer to characteristics of both individuals (e.g., experience), as well 
as problems (e.g., severity). Exogenous individual (or “participant-specific”) covariates are included to 
control for the tendency of differences among problems and among participants to affect individual 
problem-solving attempts. Among exogenous actor-specific covariates referring to software 
contributors, Core developer is included to control for the well-known tendency of core developers to 
perform higher levels of activity within open source projects. Contributor experience is incorporated to 
control for the effect of tenure in the project, whereas Contributor CC’ing only is included to tease out 
the effect of being active in the project only by being put in Carbon Copy (CC) of a bug report. 
Among exogenous problem-specific covariates, Software bug severity is included to control for 
the propensity of contributors to engage with software bugs that are considered more urgent or 
important by contributors. Within the project Software bug severity is classified on a seven-point scale 
ranging from “enhancement” (low) to “blocker” (high). I considered a software bug as severe if it was 
assigned to the two highest levels in the scale. Software bug communication refers to the number of 
comments attached to the bug report, whilst Software bug CC’ing refers to the number of contributors 
attached in carbon copy. The two effects are both transformed into dummy variables by choosing as 
cut-off the upper quartile of their distribution. The two dummies are included to control for the effect 
of extra saliency of certain software bugs on the propensity to attract the attention of contributors. A 
summary of exogenous actor-specific covariates is shown in Table 3. 
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Table 1.1: Summary of attentional mechanisms of theoretical interest 
 
     
Assortative attention spread Preferential attachment - or tendency 
for active contributors to engage with 
popular software bugs  
       i    p         i    p 
 
     
Attention clustering  Four-cycle - or tendency for pairs of 
contributors to engage with the same 
software bugs  
      i        j     i         j 
 
     
 
Note. Blue squares represent software contributors. Red circles represent software bugs. Solid lines represent existing ties. Dashed lines in light gray represent potential ties. yip 
indicates a tie between contributor i and software bug p. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of endogenous network controls. 
 
Parameter Included to control for Configuration(  ) Configuration(    ) Network statistics 
Outdegree (density) Overall tendency to engage with a 
software bug 
   i          p  i          p 
 
 
 
Contributor activity 
Positive feedback in activity  - or 
tendency for active contributors to 
engage with a progressively larger 
number of software bugs  
          
 
 
    
 
Software bug popularity Tendency for popular software bugs to 
attract extra contributors 
p 
 
 
       P 
 
 
Note. Blue squares represent software contributors. Red circles represent software bugs. Solid lines represent existing ties. Dashed lines represent 
potential ties. Yip indicates a tie between contributor i and software bug p. 
  

p
ipy

pp
ipip
yy

i
ip
p
ip yy
i 
 
    
  
  
 
  
 
    
  
  
i 
i 
 
i 
 
49 
 
Table 2.3: Summary table for exogenous actor-specific covariates (contributors = 135, software bugs = 719) 
Attribute Type Motivation Operationalization Proportion 
Contributor experience Constant Controls for the effect of learning One if a contributor was active in the prior release cycle, zero 
otherwise 
0.430 
Core developer Constant Controls for the effect of formal roles One if a contributor is classified as “core developer,” zero 
otherwise 
0.029 
Contributor CC’ing only Changing Controls for the effect of marginal 
roles 
One if a contributor was involved only in cc’ing activities, 
zero otherwise 
0.155(t1) 0.141(t2) 
0.133(t3) 
Software bug severity Constant Controls for the effect of centralizing 
tendencies 
One if a software bug had a severity level above “normal” in 
the prior release cycle, zero otherwise 
0.349 
Software bug communication Changing Controls for the effect of awareness 
in the project 
One if a software bug lies in the upper quartile of the 
distribution of number of received comments 
0.168(t1) 0.227(t2) 
0.191(t3) 
Software bug CC’ing Changing Controls for the effect of centralizing 
tendencies 
One if a software bug lies in the upper quartile of the 
distribution of number of contributors assigned to software 
bugs in carbon copy 
0.136(t1) 0.153(t2) 
0.129(t3) 
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Table 2.4: Summary of actor-relations interaction terms 
 
Parameter Included to control for Configuration(  ) Configuration(    ) Network statistics 
     
Experienced contributors 
attention spread 
Tendency for active experienced 
contributors to engage with popular 
software bugs 
       i    p       i    p 
 
     
    
 
Experienced contributors 
attention clustering 
Tendency for pairs of experienced 
contributors to engage with the same 
software bugs 
 
      i         j 
 
    i         j 
 
 
     
 
Note. Black squares (circles) represent contributors (software bugs) with an attribute. Dotted squares (circles) represent contributors (software bugs) without that same attribute. 
Solid lines represent existing ties. Dashed lines represent potential ties. yip indicates a tie between contributor i and software bug p. vi indicates that contributor i is an experienced 
contributor whereas vp indicates that software bug p is a severe bug. Therefore yip1vi indicates a tie between experienced contributor i and software bug p1
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Finally, the interaction of actor-specific covariates with structural network effects are included 
to capture the tendency of nodes with specific attributes to become part of specific local network 
structures. I include in the model two interaction terms to test for H3a and H3b in an attempt to test 
whether the effect of embeddedness in attention sub-network structures varies according to individual 
characteristics of organizational members. Experienced contributors attention clustering and 
Experienced contributors attention spread are included to control for the specific tendency of 
experienced contributors, respectively, to be part of local collaboration clusters and to be attracted to 
problems that have received an exceptional level of attention. A summary of interaction terms included 
in our model is shown in Table 4. 
 
2.4.3 Stochastic Actor-oriented models for bipartite data 
I start by assuming that the network structure observed at any one time develops as a result of 
interdependent individual decisions. This is the main assumption underlying a newly derived class of 
Stochastic Actor-oriented Models (SAOM) for social networks (Snijders, van de Bunt & Steglich, 
2010). Actors are only allowed to change the ties under their direct control (i.e., values in their own 
row), and no single actor has control over the entire network structure. Statistically, this assumption 
leads to a representation of the network structure that is observed at any moment as a realization of a 
continuous-time Markov Chain Y(t) – where observed realizations are y(tτ) (with τ = 1,2,…,T) 
(Snijders, 2001). At any point in time the process produces the observed network Y(t) = y. In this 
specific case I discuss y as  a bipartite network of size NxM, with tie variables yip = 1 if participant i 
engages with problem p, and  yip = 0 otherwise. Formally, the model is a continuous-time Markov 
process, whose state space is defined in terms of all the possible combinations of network ties 
(Snijders, 2001). 
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Linking SAOM to data requires specification of two main components. The first is a rate 
function   (   ) which controls how quickly opportunities for changing network ties arise. In our case, 
the relevant decision concerns the change in the individual portfolio of network ties to problems. 
Participants get opportunities to change their affiliation to problems at the rate:  
.         (1) 
The rate may be constant between observation moments (when , for all k), or it may 
change depending on actor-specific covariates( ).In the model I estimate below I make the number 
of opportunities for change dependent on differences in the status of participants (defined in terms of 
“core” versus “non-core” status). In this way I allow for the possibility that core developers enjoy 
greater freedom to change their affiliations to problems over time. 
 The second component of SAOM is the individual decision of participants (rows) to 
change their affiliation to problems (columns). This decision is controlled by an evaluation function (fi) 
representing the relative attractiveness for participant i of moving from y to y’, where y and y’ are 
successive network configurations differing in terms of only one tie. Among the possible m changes 
that a participant can make at any one time, he or she is assumed to choose so that fi(y, y’, x) + e(y, y’, 
x) is maximized. In this formulation fi is a deterministic evaluation function, x is a set of covariates, and 
e is a random disturbance or “error term.” The deterministic part of the evaluation function assumes the 
typical linear form (Snijders, van de Bunt & Steglich, 2010)   
         (5) 
where fi( ,y) is the value of the evaluation function for participant i depending on the state of 
the network (y), and the term sik(y) are the “effects” which may be associated with: (i) attention 
mechanisms; (ii) actor-specific covariates representing “exogenous” characteristics of the participants 
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or problems, and (iii) interactions between network motifs and exogenous covariates. Finally βk are 
parameters that may be estimated from data representing the weight, or strength, of the corresponding 
effect. 
 Individual decisions to change network ties are based on a comparison of the values of 
the evaluation function computed across the permissible choice options. More specifically, if 
y’=y(ip) denotes the network that would be observed if participant i changed his connections to 
problem p (creation of a new tie or termination of an existing tie, dependent on the existence of a tie), 
then the probability ofobserving one change would be: 
.        (6) 
With additional distributional assumptions the model just described is consistent with revealed 
preference interpretations as described, for example, in Maddala (1983: Chapter 3) and established by 
McFadden (1974). According to this interpretation, if participant i changes his affiliation profile (his 
row in the bipartite network), producing a change from configuration y to y’, then he is acting as if he 
prefers y’ to y. 
 
2.4.4 Model estimation and evaluation 
Because model estimation involves computing the transition probabilities between all possible 
neighboring states of the network, the state space of the model consists of all possible trajectories 
linking network configurations observed in adjacent time periods. Under such conditions conventional 
statistical estimation is unfeasible but parameters estimates may be obtained via an iterative Robbins-
Monro (1951) stochastic approximation algorithm using the Method of Moments (MoM) estimation 
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procedure (Snijders, 2001). The algorithm computes the evolution process of the network multiple 
times via Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations implied by the current model specification 
(Snijders, 2002). Parameter values are updated after each simulation reflecting the deviations between 
generated and observed statistics corresponding to the effects included in the model (Schweinberger & 
Snijders, 2007). For all estimated parameters averages and standard errors of these deviations are 
computed across all the simulated networks and used to compute convergence t-ratios. Convergence t-
ratios for all the estimates I report in Table 6 are smaller (in absolute value) than 0.1 – the critical value 
below which  a model is considered to be fully convergent (Snijders et al., 2010).  As suggested by 
Ripley et al. (2011), I repeated such estimation 3000 times to obtain reliable estimates of the standard 
errors.  
 
2.5 Results 
The discussion of the empirical results is organized around Table 2.5. Convergence t-ratios for 
all reported estimates are smaller than 0.1 in absolute values. The null model (Model 1), accounts only 
for the overall propensity of contributors to engage with software bugs, and for the effects of 
exogenous actor-specific covariates on such propensity. The main effects of the attentional mechanisms 
of theoretical interest on the individual choice of contributors (accounting for H1 and H2) are added in 
our main-effects model (Model 2). Finally our full model (Model 3) adds interaction terms to Model 2 
which account for the moderating effects of organizational members' tenure on the patterns of attention 
allocation (H3a and H3b). 
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Table2.5: Method of Moment estimates of SAOM for bipartite networks (Estimated standard errors in parentheses). 
 Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Change rate effects Rate of network change 1 2.548 
(0.171) 
3.453 
(0.390) 
3.780 
(0.450) 
 Rate of network change 2 1.876 
(0.129) 
1.870 
(0.130) 
2.001 
(0.151) 
 Rate of network change 3 4.159 
(0.216) 
3.934 
(0.301) 
3.971 
(0.451) 
 Core developer effect on rate 3.221*** 
(0.084) 
3.386*** 
(0.081) 
3.301*** 
(0.950) 
     
Exogenous actor-specific 
covariates 
Software bug communication -0.770*** 
(0.121) 
-0.860*** 
(0.127) 
-0.821*** 
(0.126) 
 Software bug severity -0.270*** 
(0.065) 
-0.317*** 
(0.069) 
-0.366*** 
(0.069) 
 Software bug CC’ing 0.399** 
(0.124) 
0.637*** 
(0.131) 
0.632*** 
(0.130) 
 Core developer 1.559*** 
(0.103) 
-0.658*** 
(0.161) 
-0.941*** 
(0.221) 
 Contributor CC’ing only -0.609*** 
(0.124) 
-0.255* 
(0.113) 
-0.270* 
(0.121) 
 Contributor experience 0.959*** 
(0.094) 
0.769*** 
(0.103) 
0.538** 
(0.157) 
     
Endogenous network effects Outdegree -2.498*** 
(0.072) 
-3.597*** 
(0.297) 
-3.275*** 
(0.347) 
 Software bug popularity   -0.048 
(0.183) 
-0.493* 
(0.226) 
 Contributor activity  0.453*** 
(0.049) 
0.442*** 
(0.056) 
Attentional mechanisms of 
theoretical interest 
Attention Clustering  0.033* 
(0.016) 
0.056 
(0.047) 
 Attention Spread  -0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.019 
(0.020) 
     
Interactions of theoretical 
interest 
Contributor experience * 
clustering 
  0.142* 
(0.065) 
 Contributor experience * 
attention spread 
  -0.041* 
(0.016) 
 
The Rates of network change (1-3) provide an estimate of the average number of opportunities 
for changing individual affiliation to problems. In the full model contributors face on average 
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approximately 4 opportunities for change in the last time period. Across all models choice 
opportunities appear to decrease in the middle of the release cycle. As expected, core developers enjoy 
significantly more choice opportunities than all other contributors throughout the release cycle, as 
captured by the strongly positive and significant Core developer effect on rate which implies an 
average of 3 extra opportunities. The negative Outdegree parameter indicates that attempting to resolve 
a software problem is a costly action. This result suggests that attention is a scarce resource. Problems 
of attention allocation arise as a consequence.  
 
In Model 1 I include exogenous contributor-specific as well as problem-specific covariates. The 
negative and significant parameter estimate for Software bug communication indicates that software 
bugs generating more discussion also tend to “scare away” contributors. Specifically, the odds of a 
software bug generating an exceptional level of discussion being  selected by a contributor against not 
being selected  are [e^(-0.770)=] 0.464, meaning that bugs generating long discussions are 53.6% less 
likely  to be engaged with than bugs stimulating a lower level of interest. Similarly, the negative and 
significant parameter for Software bug severity reveals that more severe bugs tend to discourage 
contributors from taking action – the respective odds being 0.763, or a decrease by 23.7%. This could 
be due to the fact that only a restricted number of contributors have sufficient confidence and skills to 
attend to software bugs collectively classified as severe. As a consequence, action directed towards 
severe bugs is relatively rare. By contrast, the number of contributors choosing to allocate their 
attention on specific software bugs by putting themselves in carbon copy of the relative bug reports 
increases the attractiveness of those software bugs, with a positive and significant Software bug CC’ing 
effect – the associated odds being 1.49, or an increase by 49%. However, the negative and significant 
parameter for Contributor CC’ing only indicates that, ceteris paribus, contributors only putting 
themselves in carbon copy of bug reports tend to produce fewer problem-solving attempts. Finally, the 
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positive and significant parameter estimates for Contributor experience and Core developer indicate, 
respectively, that experienced contributors and core developers tend to be more active. Specifically, the 
odds of experienced contributors engaging with a software bug against not engaging with it are 2.6 
times as large as the odds for inexperienced contributors.  
In Model 2 I include local dependencies taking the form of the various endogenous attention 
mechanisms discussed earlier in this paper.  The significant parameter estimate for Attention clustering 
supports Hypothesis 1, indicating that contributors tend to develop patterns of repeated collaboration: 
collaborating on a problem makes it more likely that two contributors will collaborate again on future 
problems. The negative and significant Assortative attention spread indicates that very active 
contributors choose to work on problems that are not already attended to by other participants: this 
represents strong evidence against preferential attachment and supports Hypothesis 2. In addition, the 
positive and significant parameter estimate for Contributor activity shows evidence of reinforcing 
feedback: the higher the level of current activity, the higher the level of future activity. One possible 
interpretation of this effect is as a consequence of processes of “learning by doing” which progressively 
lowers the cost of individual units of attention. The non-significant parameter for Software bug 
popularity indicates that already popular software bugs are not more likely to attract attention 
additional in the future. As a consequence of the associated tendency toward decentralized problem-
solving, attention is more homogenously distributed across problems. Finally, parameters estimates for 
exogenous contributor-specific covariates in Model 2 reveal that experienced contributors do not 
exhibit a significantly different choice behavior once I control for the main effect of the attentional 
mechanisms. 
The inclusion of interaction terms in Model 3 does not alter the parameter estimates for 
exogenous covariates already included in the previous model, with the exception of Core developer. In 
Model 3 experienced contributors do show higher propensity to attempt resolution of software bugs, 
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thus suggesting that a positive effect of experiential learning might influence the association between 
problems and participants (Argote & Epple, 1990) over and above the effect of attentional mechanisms 
taken into account.  
Contributor experience moderates the effects of the attentional mechanisms of theoretical 
interest in the hypothesized directions. Together with the no longer  significant clustering effect, the 
significant and positive Experienced contributors * clustering supports H3a, indicating that patterns of 
sustained collaboration when attempting to resolve software problems are driven by cognitive inertia 
developed by experienced contributors. Likewise, considered together with non-significant assortative 
attention spread, the significant and negative Experience * attention spread effect supports H3b and 
indicates that only experienced contributors prefer to select problems that are not already engaged with 
by other participants. The consequence is a tendency towards an anti-hierarchical pattern in which the 
most popular problems are “decoupled” from the most active – and experienced – participants. 
 
2.6 Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper I tackled the relevance of attention networks in understanding processes of 
problem-solving in open productions. Following the tradition of the Carnegie School (Simon, 1947: 
March & Simon, 1958: Cyert & March, 1963) I based my arguments on the idea that organizational 
attention is a valuable and scarce resource. Stemming from this idea is the evidence that problems 
compete for the limited attention of problem-solvers. The ABV literature (Simon, 1947; Ocasio, 1997) 
posits that organizations channel the attention of their participants through the design of working 
routines and communication structures. I extended this view by presenting two attentional mechanisms 
– attention clustering and attention spread – that show how apparently individualistic attention 
allocation decisions are in fact the result of the embeddedness of individuals in a complex network of 
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contextual interdependencies linking problems and problem-solvers in an organization. 
The analysis suggests that problems show a tendency towards a disassortative attention spread, 
indicating that already popular software bugs are not more likely to attract additional attention in the 
future by active individuals. As a consequence of the associated tendency toward decentralized 
problem-solving, attention is more homogenously distributed across problems. This result is in line 
with recent studies on network configurations in decentralized, virtual projects (Faraj & Johnson, 2011; 
Conaldi & Lomi, 2012), where a more homogeneous attention spread facilitates the recognition and 
resolution of the highest number of problems, which in turn guarantees the long-term viability of the 
project. In particular, the analysis shows a positive tendency towards attention clustering, indicating 
that attentional processes tend to follow repetitive patterns of joint interest towards problem-solving: 
collaborating on a problem makes it more likely that two contributors will allocate their joint attention 
to future problems. Furthermore, the interaction of organizational experience with the two network 
configurations seem to suggest that experienced members are responsible for driving the tendency 
towards attention clustering around already familiar problems, due to the effect of reinforcing cognitive 
schemas. On the other hand, organizational experience also drives the preference away from 
preferential attachment, showing that even though experienced members are less likely to allocate their 
attention outside their familiar cluster of problems, they try to boost or maintain their reputation by 
picking less obvious and less popular problems.  
My modeling efforts are consistent with March and Olsen’s (1976) view that the attention 
allocation of one decision-maker is a function of the attention of neighboring decision-makers. They  
are also in line with T.C. Schelling’s illuminating intuition that: “people’s behavior depends on how 
many are behaving a particular way, or how much they are behaving that way” (1978: p. 94). As is the 
case in many of Shelling’s examples in our case individual decisions generate endogenously 
transparent and freely accessible information to which potential participants may pay attention in 
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determining their own level of contribution to collective production efforts. Finally, this paper extends 
recent work on distributed social cognition (Smith & Collins, 2009; Kaplan, 2011) where market 
valuations are not performed in a vacuum, but are embedded in attention networks linking 
interdependent actors’ views (Prato & Stark, 2013). What I have added to this perspective is a series of 
specific mechanisms through which individual acts of attention allocation concatenate and reproduce 
behavioral patterns that are used to produce collective problem-solving efforts. 
Two main limitations of this work deserve special attention as they reveal clear opportunities 
for further research. The first limitation is inherent in the focus on differences in individual decisions to 
allocate attention to organizational problem-solving activities. Our emphasis on individual decisions 
and effort precluded analysis of the outcomes of such decisions. As a consequence I was unable to 
assess, for example, how effective the resolution of problems actually was during the release cycle of 
the software, how long on average problems remained unresolved within the project (the problem 
latency time), or how durable (or stable) the solutions that contributors implemented were (Cohen et 
al., 1972). Addressing these issues requires a research design oriented toward the consequences of 
problem-solving behavior. In this paper I focused on its antecedents i.e., on the individual decisions 
that affiliate organizational members to organizational problems. Data necessary to examine the 
effectiveness of observed problem-solving attempts are available. These may serve to illuminate the 
network dependency of problem-solving effectiveness by allowing analysis of the embeddedness of 
individual behavior and the outcomes of that behavior within the attention networks that enable and 
constrain organizational problem-solving. 
The second limitation relates to the empirical scope of this research. The results are not based 
on a random sample of F/OSS productions which might be considered representative of the open 
productions field, but instead constitute a single case study of a F/OSS project, albeit one which is 
relatively large and successful, and which has been analyzed using longitudinal data.  As such the 
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generalizability of the results reported here may only be assessed through systematic replication. . 
Despite these limitations, I believe this study advances the debate on the structural perspective 
on attention and situated cognition. It brings to bear different attention allocation mechanisms defined 
by the relationships between problems and participants within the context of open productions, which 
give rise to interdependent patterns of problem-solving activity. 
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Chapter 3 
 
THE EFFECT OF EXPERTISE DIVERSITY ON GROUP LEARNING 
AND PERFORMANCE:  
A CASE STUDY IN OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Repeated collaboration represents an important mechanism through which organizations learn. 
Research on group learning has shown that experience of working together helps groups within 
organizations achieve better coordination, establish shared norms and reduce task completion time. 
However, sustained collaboration of a group over a long period of time may induce group members to 
focus on existing solutions and habitual routines, and discourage efforts to seek further afield for new 
and better approaches to problem solving. Building on this evidence, I argue that group learning is 
contingent on the distribution of task-related expertise among group members. Introducing the 
moderating effect of task-related expertise diversity on group learning and performance, I examine the 
decentralized resolution efforts of 2143 individuals on 3470 software bugs in a large Free/Open Source 
Software project (F/OSS) over a period of 10 years. I find that groups that are composed of individuals 
with homogeneous expertise outperform groups with heterogeneous expertise at lower levels of prior 
collaboration, because I argue that homogeneity helps establish common ground in the early phases of 
collaborative practice. However, at higher levels of prior collaboration groups composed of individuals 
with heterogeneous expertise outperform groups with homogeneous expertise, because I argue that 
specialization and expertise diversity are essential to establish a clear understanding of “who knows 
what”. I discuss the implications and contribution of my work within the broader contexts of research 
on group dynamics and organizational learning. 
 
                                                          
1
 with Guido Conaldi 
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3.1 Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed an increase in the prominence of open productions as some 
industries shift toward systems of decentralized collaboration in which participants are willing to bear 
private costs in order to provide public goods (Levine & Prietula, 2014; Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011). 
Open productions usually take the form of project-based organizations composed of temporary groups 
that combine several individuals to carry out collective, short-term tasks (Schwab & Miner, 2008; 
Powell, 2003). Groups in project-based organizations stay together only as long as they work on one 
task. Their members may leave or join the group during the project lifetime to participate in the 
resolution of other tasks (Huckman, Staats & Upton, 2009).  
The main purpose of organizational groups is to let members with heterogeneous expertise 
interact to allow the performance of complex tasks that could not be undertaken individually (Casciaro, 
2013). There is a long-standing stream of research in organization theory and design examining the 
coordination mechanisms needed to integrate the complementary – and possibly diverse – knowledge 
of participants in such organizational groups (Mintzberg, 1979; Thompson, 1967). Repeated 
collaboration between organizational team members over the resolution of shared problems has been 
shown to be a pivotal mechanism for such knowledge integration and the successful execution of 
interdependent tasks (Skilton & Dooley, 2010). 
Research has extensively shown that groups learn from members' repeated collaboration 
(Hinds, Carley, Krackhardt & Wholey, 2000; Faulkner, 1983). For example, experience of working 
together help teams reduce procedure completion time (Reagans, Argote & Brooks, 2005), establish 
trustworthy norms (Uzzi, 1996), achieve better coordination (Faraj & Sproull, 2000), and  promote the 
sharing of tacit knowledge (Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003). Albeit the literature on learning has provided 
extensive support to the positive effect of repeated collaboration on group performance, a competing 
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stream of literature emphasizes dysfunctional dynamics in repeated collaboration. Katz (1982) 
examined the effect of group longevity on performance and found that groups whose members 
exhibited very high levels of repeated collaboration tend to underperform due to decreased 
communication rates among group members. Likewise, Perretti and Negro (2007) reported a negative 
relationship between prior collaboration and project performance in the Hollywood film industry, 
revealing the existence of a phenomenon that was subsequently found to have similarly detrimental 
effects in other creative industries (Skilton & Dooley, 2010). 
This paper aims to shed light on the contested relationship between group members' repeated 
collaborations and group performance in the context of open productions. I do this by examining the 
theoretical foundations of existing mixed findings and indicate more precisely the contingent factors 
for understanding under what conditions higher repeated collaboration is likely to be beneficial or 
detrimental for project group performance. In particular, I believe that lack of researchers’ attention to 
the distribution of task-related expertise among group members is a determining factor in the failure to 
thus far unravel this apparent inconsistency in findings. Existing research has shown that groups 
composed of members with a lower degree of expertise diversity tend to share more common ground 
(Stasser & Titus, 1985; Kraut, Fussell, Brennan & Siegel, 2002) and thus develop a higher absorptive 
capacity which is essential to ease knowledge transfer (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Meanwhile, a higher 
degree of expertise diversity amongst members of a task group tends to facilitate the recognition of 
expertise specialization, which is essential for the development of a shared understanding of “who 
knows what” in the team (Liang, Moreland & Argote, 1995).  
My study extends this earlier research in two specific ways. Firstly, I show that the relationship 
between group experience of working together and group performance is non-monotonic, with a state 
of decreasing returns coming into force beyond a certain point. Secondly, I demonstrate that expertise 
diversity is a moderator of the relation between repeated collaboration and team performance. Groups 
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composed of individuals with homogeneous expertise perform better than groups with heterogeneous 
expertise at lower levels of prior collaboration, because homogeneity helps establish common ground 
in the early stages of a group project (Kraut et al., 2002). At the other end, groups that are composed of 
individuals with heterogeneous expertise perform better than groups with homogeneous expertise at 
higher levels of prior collaboration. In this latter scenario specialization and expertise diversity are seen 
as crucial for maintaining group performance in the long run (Kane, Argote & Levine, 2005).  
The empirical part of the study uses data I collected on problem-solving tasks observed within 
Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS) projects. In particular, I examine bug-fixing activities in one of 
the largest and most successful F/OSS projects to date, the Apache web server. The emergence of open, 
collaborative forms of economic production such as Free/Open Source Software projects provides an 
optimal setting for testing my hypotheses. Theories of “social transparency” (Dabbish et al., 2012), 
associated with the diffusion of open productions, refer to the visibility and traceability of the complete 
history of actions taken by a distributed workforce in the task environment. In Free/Open Source 
Software projects developers are free to decide which task to perform, and each action is then coded in 
a knowledge repository which is transparent to any other developer. Exogenous coordination 
mechanisms such as hierarchy or planning play a limited role. Contributors organize their production 
on the basis of information generated by the previous actions of fellow participants (Stuart et al., 2012). 
When engaging in collaborative problem-solving activities organizational members learn directly from 
the collective experience while forming fluid working groups around shared artifacts, which store 
transparent information about previous actions of other members. As a consequence, this setting allows 
us to directly observe the emergence of repeated collaboration and knowledge integration from 
observable work practices, and to rule out possible alternative explanations related to formal team 
structure which have been investigated in other recent studies (Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010). 
The study is organized as follows: first I review the relevant literature that addresses the issues 
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of collaboration and knowledge integration in decentralized, self-managed groups. Then I develop my 
hypotheses on how repeated collaboration affects group performance and on how expertise diversity 
moderates this relationship. After describing the data and the statistical model I use to test the theory, I 
report my findings. I conclude with a discussion of how these findings contribute to the literature on 
organizational learning.  
 
3.2 Theory and hypotheses 
Organizational scholars have widely recognized the relevance of groups as fundamental entities 
to carry out work in organizations (Hackman, 1987; McGrath, 1991; Sproull & Kiesler, 1991). Cohen 
and Bailey (1997) define a group in an organizational setting as an aggregation of individuals who are 
linked by interdependent tasks, who perceive themselves and are perceived by others as a distinguished 
social entity, and who are embedded in a larger social system. Group members can therefore be 
geographically dispersed, but they must be aware of one another.  Distributed groups, sometimes called 
virtual groups, “are groups of people with a common purpose who carry out interdependent tasks 
across locations and time, using technology to communicate much more than they use face-to-face 
meetings” (Cramton, 2001). Distributed groups have become prevalent with the recent blossoming of 
open productions as vehicles bringing together geographically dispersed members to achieve a 
common goal (Bakker, 2010). One common characteristic of distributed groups is their reliance on 
communication technologies, enabling them to transcend spatial and temporal boundaries. Following 
Saunders and Ahuja (2006), in this paper I focus on temporary, distributed groups, which typically 
engage in a single task to accomplish their goal, disband after the task is carried out and reassemble to 
tackle other tasks that belong to the broader project. Such temporary (or project-based) distributed 
groups are ubiquitous in today's organizations and include arrangements such as task forces (Bigley & 
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Roberts, 2001; Weick, 1993), movie sets (Bechky, 2006; Perretti & Negro, 2007), project ventures 
(Schwab & Miner, 2008), and teams of software development (Boh et al., 2007). 
Analogous to the definition of organizational learning, group learning is a change in the group's 
knowledge as a result of a gain in experience (Argote, 2013). Group learning is defined as a “process 
involving the activities through which individuals create, retain and transfer knowledge through their 
experience of interacting with one another or with shared artifacts” (Argote, Gruenfeld & Naquin, 
2001: 370). For instance, the more group members acquire experience working together the more they 
generate a share understanding on which member is capable at solving what task (Liang, Moreland & 
Argote, 1995), or they might create new collective routines for better coordinating their work activities 
(Zellmer-Bruhn & Gibson, 2006). The key element enabling group learning is thus the accumulation of 
members' experience of working together, a facet of project-based, open collaboration which the data 
in my study – namely the history of group members' prior collaborations across multiple tasks – 
provides effective measurement of. 
Repeated collaboration among members of a group has been argued to be a major determinant 
of organizational learning and to increase group performance (Boh, Slaughter & Espinosa, 2007; 
Reagans, Argote & Brooks, 2005). As participants “[I]nteract over time, they develop common 
knowledge about tasks, goals and strategies that facilitate their work, which helps them to manage tasks 
and member dependencies more effectively” (Boh, Slaughter & Espinosa, 2007: 1320). The 
development of this common knowledge is eased by the fact that members embedded in close 
collaborative relationships face a higher motivation to share knowledge with a coworker (Reagans & 
McEvily, 2003), extending the benefits of their experience beyond their own individual learning. 
The explanations put forward for this easing of knowledge-sharing and the concomitant 
improvement of group performance divide broadly into two factors:  (i) cooperative norms and (ii) 
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reputation. Socialization of individuals within clusters of repeated collaborative ties favors the 
establishment and internalization of group norms, including cooperation. According to this perspective, 
knowledge transfer is likely to occur because of the development of shared norms and increased trust 
gained by working together (Granovetter, 1992; Uzzi, 1996). Reputation is also correlated with 
repeated collaboration because social control is high, meaning that the risk of retaliation in response to 
anti-cooperative behavior increases as cohesion of collaborative ties increases (Coleman, 1990).  
Besides knowledge-sharing, knowledge storage is also determinant in unveiling the relationship 
between repeated collaboration and group performance. Knowledge storage involves the use of the 
group’s transactive memory system (TMS), which refers to “shared system that individuals in groups 
and organizations develop to collectively encode, store, and retrieve information or knowledge in 
different domains” (Argote & Ren, 2012: 1377). TMS has been shown to facilitate group learning as 
well as group performance in many different industries such as engineering, industrial design and 
software development (Liang et al., 1995; Lewis, 2004; Faraj & Sproull, 2000). The mechanisms 
through which transactive memory improves performance have been thoroughly examined in the 
literature. Argote and Ren (2012) identify the following steps in showing how TMS boost competitive 
advantage: (i) TMS enables the formation of meta-knowledge directories of who knows what in the 
group. These directories provide members access to greater pool of knowledge than they possess on 
their own; (ii) as a consequence, when these directories of meta-knowledge are shared among group 
members, TMS induce groups to specialize, so that members who develop a specific experience in a 
particular field are the ones who become responsible for storing relevant knowledge and carrying out 
tasks in that field; (iii) by carrying out tasks in a certain field a member increases his or her legitimacy 
and trustworthiness, which other members are more likely to rely on. (iv) group members channel new 
knowledge in the same field to the person they perceive as expert, which further reinforces individual 
specialization (v) finally directories containing meta-knowledge of who knows what crystallize and 
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members are facilitated in knowing whom to address for information and whom to trust for carrying 
out  tasks in specific field, a process that eventually improves group coordination and performance.  
Consistent with this view, existing research has broadly suggested that groups improve their 
performance by learning from the experience of their members. However the relationship between 
learning and group performance is not straightforward (Druskat & Kayes, 2000). That is, learning does 
not necessarily generate performance improvements, and, in some circumstances, may even result in 
performance decrements, as was found by Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2003) and Katz (1982). Bunderson 
and Sutcliffe (2003) demonstrated that overemphasizing a team learning orientation in the near term 
can be detrimental for team performance, although a more balanced learning orientation leads to the 
formation of a more efficient adaptive behavior that in turn is beneficial for performance. In a study of 
50 R&D project teams Katz (1982) found that team performance improved over the first two years that 
members worked together, remained high until around their fourth year, and then declined. Even if 
these teams had become increasingly competent in working together over a longer term, their rate of 
improvement would have decreased over time. Both arguments are in line with a general tendency that 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm scholars called myopic learning (Levinthal & March, 1993). According 
to this view, learning becomes inefficient or dysfunctional under certain circumstances. For instance, 
excessive repeated collaboration may lead group members to overly focus on existing solutions and 
habitual routines, which in turn discourages a more wide-ranging search for novel solutions to the ever 
changing nature of problems they face. Thus, competency traps (Levitt & March, 1988) sometimes 
make group members stick to sub-optimal solutions and are hence detrimental to group performance. 
Furthermore, shared mental models developed in earlier repeated collaborations may encourage team 
members to withhold ideas that could alter the status quo and help maintaining conditions under which 
the exploration of more novel and riskier solutions is discouraged (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; 
Stasser & Titus, 1985; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
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All these arguments combined suggest a non-monotonic relationship between repeated 
collaboration and group performance. If there isn't enough collaboration group members can't establish 
sufficient common ground to allow knowledge-sharing. However, if there is too much repeated 
collaboration competency traps may bind group members to suboptimal solutions. Therefore I 
postulate: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between a group’s prior collaborations and group performance 
will be an inverted-U-shaped with decreasing returns after a certain point. 
 
To shed light on the controversial relationship between repeated collaboration and group 
performance, researchers must first open the black box of group processes to examine how expertise 
diversity moderates the effect of repeated collaboration on group performance. In summary, I argue 
that a higher degree of task-expertise homogeneity among group members would help to establish trust 
and common ground at lower levels of repeated collaboration. At the other end, a higher degree of task-
expertise heterogeneity would provide groups with a longer history of repeated collaboration the 
necessary level of specialization needed for the formation of transactive memory systems. 
The importance of group work grows as tasks become increasingly complex and intertwined 
and therefore beyond the capacity of single individuals to complete in isolation. However, as tasks 
grow larger, teamwork also becomes more challenging, because it entails a significant amount of 
coordination between its participants, particularly when activities are of an inherently more 
collaborative nature (Espinosa, Slaughter, Kraut, & Herbsleb, 2007; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et 
al., 1976). Part of the challenge in coordinating collaborative work lies in the integration of the task-
related knowledge of the various individuals into the activities of the group, a necessary process which 
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adds further complexity to the overall teamwork effort (Boh, Slaughter & Espinosa, 2007; Crossan et 
al. 1999). The term expertise diversity refers to “differences in the knowledge and skill domains in 
which members of a group are specialized as a result of their work experience” (Van der Vegt & 
Bunderson, 2005: 533). Existing research investigated the relationship between expertise diversity and 
group performance extensively (Mannix & Neale 2005; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). For 
example, Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002) operationalized expertise diversity by measuring how group 
members develop specialized expertise in a restricted number of domains or spread their efforts over a 
larger number of domains. In the former case they become narrow specialists, in the latter case they 
become broad generalists. They showed that team performance is positively related to team functional 
diversity as it leads to greater degree of information-sharing. Drawing from Bunderson and Sutcliffe 
(2002), Boh, Slaughter and Espinosa (2007) explored the impact of diversity on group performance 
among teams of software developers. The authors showed that generalist developers develop a broader 
experience that allows them to have a greater exposure to a variety of different opinions, problems and 
solutions. Hence, these members are better able at reconciling diverse experiences and coming up with 
more creative solutions. For this reason, teams whose developers have a broader spectrum of 
experience are more effective at integrating diverse information to solve their problems and accomplish 
their tasks (Rulke & Galaskiewicz 2000). 
Overall, past research found mixed evidence regarding the relationship between group diversity 
and performance. For example, Ancona and Caldwell (1992) discovered that, albeit being associated 
with greater communication which in turn predicts innovation, the direct effect of diversity in 
functional assignments on innovation is negative. Kilduff, Angelmar & Mehra (2000) hinted at 
different temporal dynamics in the relationship between diversity and performance. The authors found 
that the most successful teams of managers competing in 
a business simulation presented greater cognitive diversity in terms of interpretative ambiguity 
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early in the game but then  exhibited more clarity and consensus over time. Furthermore, van der Vegt 
and Bunderson (2005) found a non-linear relationship between expertise diversity and group learning 
and performance and explored the moderating role of collective team identification in disentangling 
possibly mixed results. In teams with low self-identification with the team, expertise diversity is likely 
to be negatively related to team performance, as team members tend to perceive each other as out-
group members and thus delegitimize and distrust each other's knowledge (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
I build on this body of existing research on the controversial relationships between expertise 
diversity, group learning and group performance by arguing that the curvilinear effect of group learning 
on performance is contingent on expertise diversity. Earlier I posited that groups at low levels of 
repeated collaboration struggle to create the common ground necessary to initiate group learning 
behaviors. However, now I add to that prediction by arguing that the lower the diversity in task-related 
expertise among group members is, the more the negative effect of low repeated collaboration is 
mitigated. In a F/OSS context, software contributors with low experience working together can benefit 
from sharing knowledge about process routines and technical concepts. A shared background ease the 
development of common ground for members communication, which in turn helps coordination due to 
more precise expectations about future scenarios of team work (Espinosa, Slaughter, Kraut, & 
Herbsleb, 2007). Many studies in this domain have demonstrated that task knowledge sharing and 
integration is necessary to induce positive outcomes in group work. However, distributed problem-
solving work is characterized by numerous incongruences making it hard for members with low 
experience in working together to make sense of tasks requirements and communication by other 
members. Absence of a shared background about specific expertise and skills of group members that 
haven’t worked long together long can be detrimental to the establishment of group cognitive processes 
such as shared mental models  (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) and the development of group norms 
(Uzzi, 1996; Bandow, 1997). Consequently, I anticipate that a homogeneous distribution of task-related 
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expertise can be especially beneficial for group performance when group members have short history 
of prior collaboration, and especially detrimental when group members have a long history of prior 
collaboration. 
On the other end heterogeneous expertise spread across members of groups with high levels of 
prior collaboration could also be beneficial. Groups with strong TMS tend to have worked in close 
proximity and collaboratively over a long period of time. Members of these groups have grown to 
understand how the other members work, what jobs they are best at, and what their unique abilities are. 
For instance, research on TMS indicates that meta-knowledge of who knows what in the team helps 
coordination because members know whom to address when they need information, and also because 
members develop expectations about whom to leave the task in a specific domain to be tackled. 
(Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004; Liang et al., 1995; Wegner, 1987). Knowing who knows what in the 
team has also been demonstrated to be beneficial in large software teams (Faraj & Sproull, 2000) where 
the process of integrating individually owned knowledge is crucial (Tiwana & McLean, 2005). Further 
studies have shown that understanding how individual task-knowledge and expertise may contribute to 
other group members work practices facilitates the development collective mind (Weick & Roberts, 
1993), which in turn induces coordination and efficiency. When groups with a high degree of repeated 
collaboration are instead characterized by homogeneous expertise, above-mentioned aspects of myopic 
learning are exacerbated by the fact that individuals find it harder to recognize each other's skills. 
Summarizing these arguments I postulate: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The degree of expertise diversity among collaborating group members will 
moderate the non-monotonic relation between repeated collaborations and performance. 
Heterogeneous groups will exhibit higher performance than homogeneous groups at high number of 
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prior repeated collaborations.  
Hypothesis 2b: Conversely, homogeneous groups will exhibit higher performance than 
heterogeneous groups at low number of prior repeated collaborations. 
 
3.3 Empirical setting: bug-fixing in Free/Open Source Software projects 
Free/Open Source Software is an optimal setting to study the effect of group processes on 
performance as most projects are developed by groups of organizationally - and geographically - 
distributed contributors who often work on a voluntary basis (Lee & Cole, 2003). F/OSS contributors 
collaborate from around the world and use technology-mediated communications to coordinate their 
actions (Raymond, 1999). They constantly form and disband fluid groups concentrated around the 
resolution of specific problems, such as bug fixes or modifications to the software source code. 
Contributors manage their teamwork through a variety of coordination tools, including mailing lists for 
technical discussions, a bug tracking system for monitoring and fixing bugs, a CVS (“Concurrent 
Versioning System”) code repository for storing a common version of the source code (Ankolekar et 
al., 2006).  
As an example of open productions Free/Open Source Software projects are characterized by 
decentralized, self-emerging coordination processes. Teams are for the most part self-managing, often 
without formalized role structures or officially nominated leaders. Individual contributors may play 
different functions in the project or move between functions as their tenure with a project increases. 
F/OSS project development relies mainly on a distributed coordination model. More peripheral 
participants usually start by learning how to fix bugs, provide documentation, and help socializing 
fellow newcomers, whereas more core contributors are responsible for project management and 
software development. However, even though core developers take on the role of project leaders, they 
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don’t exercise hierarchical authority. Researchers have widely shown that direct assignment of tasks to 
contributors is almost absent and the most common form of coordination is self-assignment (Crowston 
& Scozzi, 2008). This type of open production creates a significant information dilemma for 
contributors when they need to decide where to apply their effort (Benkler, 2006). The scarcity of 
traditional resource allocation mechanisms such as markets and hierarchies (Powell, 2003; Adler, 
2001), means that contributors must self-coordinate, and problems must compete for their attention. In 
a typical open production environment a number of shared artifacts, such as CVS and bug repositories, 
constitute the social foci around which individuals coordinate their activities. Project contributors 
distribute their effort to various projects and their shared artifacts, and use artifacts for various 
purposes. The project artifacts and discussions are often publicly visible to all members of the 
environment and are open to any participant who decides to contribute his or her attention or effort to 
the project (Dabbish et al., 2012). 
The transparency of work practices in open productions make F/OSS projects an optimal setting 
for my study of expertise diversity and group learning. F/OSS projects provide quasi-natural 
experiments for the analysis of the emergence of problem-solving processes in the absence of 
exogenous coordination mechanisms. Consistent with the literature on F/OSS and open innovation I 
consider bug-fixing – i.e., the sequence of tasks  intended to permanently solve software errors or 
glitches that cause computer programs to behave in unintended ways – as one of the most prominent 
problem-solving activities in software projects (Crowston & Scozzi, 2008; Ankolekar et al., 2006). 
Bug-fixing is a crucial activity for F/OSS communities since it heavily influences the quality of the 
software produced, and is thus consistently used in the literature to assess software quality and project 
performance (Yu, Ramaswamy & Nair, 2011; Crowston, Annabi, & Howison, 2003). The process is 
usually initiated by a contributor who encounters a problem (i.e., a bug) when using the software. The 
contributor then reports the bug to the project bug repository, such as Bugzilla, which is the focus of 
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analysis in this study. These repositories are shared artifacts that typically provide the tracking 
infrastructure for describing, triaging and resolving software bugs. Via the bug repository, contributors 
engage in focused, transparent conversations about the project and coordinate their distributed effort 
toward the resolution of its bugs.  
A Bugzilla bug report is made up of distinct sections which facilitate the decentralized, repeated 
collaboration of contributors on the resolution of the bug. When contributors decide to allocate their 
effort to the resolution of a bug they must go through the complete history of prior activities on that 
bug to learn what has and hasn’t been done thus far. The pre-defined fields within the report contain a 
variety of information on the bug and the sub-tasks undertaken by group members. Many subfields, 
like for instance operating system, version, component, product, severity and priority are initially filled 
in by the contributor when he or she submits the report, but can as well be modified by other 
contributors who decide to engage with the bug. Several other subfields are supposed to be 
continuously modified, to reflect current information such as the status of the report, the contributors 
who got assigned to solve the bug, the current resolution status. Bug reports contain also a “cc list” 
with all emails of contributors who decided, or were asked by someone else, to be kept informed about 
work on the bug. There are two sections within a bug report devoted to text-based interactions: a 
description box and a comments section. The former contains a comprehensive description of the 
effects of the bug and the necessary information for a developer to reproduce the bug. The latter 
contain any comments posted by any contributor such as a discussion of possible fixes or clarifications 
about specific features of the problem under investigation. Contributors also provide attachments to 
bug reports. Attachments are software patches that are intended to fix the defective behavior of the 
program. Attached patches must be reviewed by a different person who verifies the fix and declares the 
bug “fixed” and eventually “closed”. Like other bug-tracking systems, Bugzilla tracks the complete 
activity of any contributor around every report submitted to the repository. This sort of activity log 
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offers the complete history all past modifications to each subfield of the report, including for instance 
all contributors who were assigned to it, or all modifications to the bug severity level. It also provides 
information about the type of activities that contributors undertake to fix bugs, and thus allows 
researchers to build accurate measures of task-expertise diversity among members of a group working 
on a bug. 
Bug repositories are shared artifacts that represent the task around which temporary, distributed 
groups self-assemble. Bug-fixing is a distributed, collaborative task that constitutes a “microcosm of 
coordination problems and mechanisms to solve them” (Crowston, 1997: 173), allowing contributors to 
work interdependently and sequentially. As Eric Raymond describes in his The Cathedral and the 
Bazaar, the contributors experiencing and reporting bugs have different expertise from the those who 
understand the problems and those who solve them (Raymond, 1999). In fact, bug resolution involves 
the broadest range of project contributors with different expertise, all participating in the process by the 
means of repeated interactions over shared artifacts – the bug reports. Thus the transparent acts of 
engagement underlying bug-fixing yield rich data about the complex problem-solving dynamics of 
distributed, temporary, task-focused groups, which are themselves embedded in a broader open 
production. Furthermore, the limited role played by exogenous structures, such as hierarchy or 
departmentalization, make this setting especially apt for studying the emergence of learning dynamics 
between interdependent actors in non-hierarchical, non-formalized organizational structures. These 
reasons provide a compelling rationale for the use of data from bug-tracking systems as the basis for 
the analysis reported in this study. 
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3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Data and sample 
Apache HTTP server is the most widespread web server on the market, with a share of 47% at 
the time of writing, followed by Microsoft IIS with the second largest share at 22%. Apache is a 
software program installed on Internet servers hosting web pages. It responds to requests made by users 
through their browser clients by providing appropriate content over the web. Early versions of Apache 
developed in the nineties provided quite simplified features. However, more recently all web servers, 
including Apache, started integrating new functionalities to incorporate more technically advanced 
features that were being developed over the World Wide Web. For instance, web servers are now 
utilized to provide gateways to databases, gaming infrastructure and data storage, or to run enterprise 
applications for use by organizations, rather than individuals Apache is now made of hundreds of 
specialized libraries which altogether cover the very diverse array of functionalities that are required 
from web server programs. 
The Apache server developed into an independent project in 1995 led by a group of eight core 
volunteers who joined forces after discovering they had been independently modifying and improving 
on NCSA HTTPd – the dominant web server software of the time. After having quickly overtaken 
NCSA as the most widely adopted webserver solution on the Internet, the Apache server became the 
base for the creation of a common platform for open source software development called Apache 
Group. In 1999 the Apache Group was incorporated as a non-profit organization known as the Apache 
Software Foundation (ASF). Drawing on the experience acquired while collaborating on the Apache 
server, the goal of the foundation is to organizationally, financially and legally support the development 
of open source software.  Like each of the other 140 projects operating under the umbrella of the ASF, 
the development and maintenance of the Apache server is now overseen by a Project Management 
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Committee chaired by its own vice president. All appointees to the committee are selected from among 
the volunteers who have acquired most significant merit in the project through their contributions to it. 
Meanwhile the right of contributors to modify the software, within Apache, and within all other 
projects operating under the ASF, is assigned by the community of developers responsible for the 
development of that particular project, and is earned by showing commitment and active engagement. 
Newcomers looking for ways to start contributing to a project
2
 are explicitly encouraged on the ASF 
website to find an issue with the software that stimulates their own interest and to engage with  it by 
exploring the reported bugs, improving existing bug reports, and eventually submitting software 
patches.  
I collected data on the complete set of problem-solving activities recorded in the official bug 
repository of the Apache server. The dataset I generated spans the first bug report reported for the 
Apache server (Version 2) in September 2001 and the latest bug report at the time of data collection in 
March 2013. All software bugs engaged with by contributors during this timeframe are included in my 
dataset and all actions taken while working on them are considered. The raw data were collected by 
parsing the web pages of all bug reports included in the dataset with the software, Bicho, (Robles, 
Gonzalez-Barahona, Izquierdo-Cortazar & Herraiz, 2009) in order to reconstruct the sequences of 
timestamped actions taken by individual contributors to modify them. In the final dataset the lifetime of 
a software bug starts at discovery and ends if and when it experiences resolution. Multiple spells are 
recorded for each software bug, with a new spell in the lifetime of a software bug starting every time 
the general state of the bug changes as the consequence of an action taken by a contributor. To build 
the final dataset I stepped through the sequence of actions extracted from Apache's bug repository. An 
action, r, by contributor i at time t in the sequence determines the start of a new spell for the software 
                                                          
2 See http://community.apache.org/gettingStarted/101.html  
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bug, j, on which the action was taken. At that point the sequence of actions taken on bug j before time t 
is used to measure the values expressed by bug j at time t – i.e. in its current time spell – for all the 
variables described hereafter. This process yielded a dataset comprised of 5646 software bug reports 
around which 2630 individual contributors formed distributed, temporary groups, with a total of 24,333 
different actions being taken.  However, as I am interested in collaborative problem-solving and 
distributed group dynamics I kept in the sample only those bugs engaged with by groups of two or 
more contributors. The result was a final sample size of 3470 bug reports and 2143 contributors. An 
average of 9.25 actions per contributor and 4.3 actions per bug were recorded. 
 
3.4.2 Measures and variables 
The dataset contains the following variables: 
Software Bug Resolution The dependent variable is time to software bug resolution. A bug is 
resolved when an action is taken by a contributor to add a 'resolved' flag to its report. More specifically, 
a bug experiences resolution when one of the following conditions verifies: that the reported problem 
cannot be reproduced by contributors or that it is reproducible but is considered to be intended behavior 
and not an error; that the reported problem or suggestion is valid, but that the implementation of a 
solution is considered unachievable without undesirable side effects; that the problem has been 
reported before, irrespective of the current resolution status of the original bug report; that a code 
change which fixes the reported problem is merged in the code base (i.e., resolution by fixing).  A 
software bug flagged as resolved might be reopened at a later date if, for example, the proposed 
solution is found not to be viable or if new developments in the code base prompt the resurfacing of an 
issue previously considered non-reproducible. As a consequence, software bugs in the dataset may 
experience multiple resolution events. Finally, right censoring exists in the dataset whereby software 
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bugs remain alive and unresolved at the end of the observation period. 
 
Repeated Collaboration I measured repeated collaboration by Apache contributors working on 
a software bug at each time spell. To do this I began bv examining the sequence of actions extracted 
from the Apache server's bug repository. An action, r, by contributor i at time t in the sequence 
determines the start of a new spell for the software bug, j, on which the action was taken. I then  looked 
back through  the sequence of actions taken on bug j before time t and counted the number of prior 
collaborations on other software bugs among all contributors who acted on bug j alongside contributor 
i. Prior collaboration is  defined as the number of times both contributor i and another contributor have 
both acted on a software bug other than j in the past, hence the count gives the number of repeated 
collaborations which will have occurred when contributor i takes action on bug j at time t. I limited the 
count of past collaborations by adding a moving time window of six months prior to time t. In other 
words, I only consider as evidence of a prior collaboration the situation whereby co-contributors to bug 
j previously contributed jointly to another bug, insofar as all of those contributions to the other bug 
occurred within a maximum of six months of each other. The formula I adopted to count repeated 
collaborations is the following (see also Figure 3.1 for a visual configuration): 
 
∑∑∑(            )
 
   
 
   
   
   
 
 
where y is a problem-solving action, i is the focal contributor, j is the focal bug, m are bugs on 
which i worked in the past, k are other contributors that have collaborated with i on m, and r is just the 
event count. 
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Figure 3.1: Repeated Collaboration visual representation 
 
Task-specific expertise diversity In order to measure diversity in the expertise applied by 
contributors to the resolution of  software bugs I firstly used the Bugzilla classification of the specific 
actions that contributors can take (see Section 3 for a detailed description). This classification groups 
actions into eight categories representing different types of action that contributors might take and the 
expertise needed to perform them. –These categories are as follows: (1) identification actions– these 
are actions taken to add or correct specific information about the aspect of the Apache server’s code 
base that the software bug is affecting, and which capture knowledge about the direct effect of the issue 
on the software (e.g., information relating the bug to  the component, version and/or hardware it  
affects); (2) monitoring actions– these are actions that provide an  update on the current stage reached 
in the bug-fixing process started by a specific bug report, and which capture procedural knowledge 
about the latter (e.g., checking whether a bug should be defined as new, confirmed, assigned, resolved, 
or closed); (3) descriptive actions – these add or improve on the overall description of the software bug 
affecting the Apache server and capture knowledge about the internal logic of the issue (e.g., adding 
comments or summaries); (4) code contribution actions – these report on the work done on software 
patches and capture the programming skills possessed by contributors attempting to solve an issue 
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(e.g., submitting or reviewing a submitted software patch); (5) triaging actions – these entail setting and 
adjusting the prominence of a bug report in the overall bug-fixing workflow for the Apache server and 
capture knowledge about the latter, as well as the relative importance of a specific issue in the economy 
of the project (e.g., increasing priority and severity levels of a software bug, or changing its target 
milestone); (6) dependency identification actions– these identify other software bugs that interact 
directly with the bug in question and capture knowledge about the full list of issues affecting the code 
base as well as their potential interdependencies  (e.g., identifying the bug dependence tree of a 
software bug, or other bugs that are blocked by the focal one); (7) specialist identification actions– 
these identify contributors potentially most interested in, and suited to, solving a specific software bug 
and capture knowledge about the skill-set of the population of contributors currently active (e.g., 
officially assigning the software bug to a contributor or putting someone’s name on the CC list); (8) 
resolution decision actions– these record whether one of the conditions required for a software bug to 
be flagged as solved was met by a software bug (see ‘Software bug resolution’ above) and capture 
knowledge about the direction taken by the evolution of the code base, also in terms of features and 
intended behavior (e.g., assessing the type of resolution state a software bug might have reached, if 
any). 
Using information on the classification of actions into these categories, I measured diversity in 
the expertise of contributors collaborating on a software bug by examining the categories of actions 
they had performed in previous collaborations. I started with the sequence of actions extracted from the 
Apache server's bug repository. An action, r, by contributor i at time t in the sequence determines the 
start of a new spell for the software bug, j, on which the action was taken. At that point I looked back 
through the sequence of actions taken on bug j before time t and determined on which other software 
bugs other contributors repeating a collaboration with contributor i on bug j had collaborated. 
Consistent with my measure of repeated collaboration I limited the count of past collaborations to a 
89 
 
moving time window of six months prior to time t. For each of the contributors identified as repeating a 
collaboration I then constructed an individual expertise profile by counting the number of actions in 
each category performed on all the software bugs they collaborated on. I finally calculated the 
Euclidean distance between these profiles to capture the tendency toward expertise diversity expressed 
by the contributors active on bug j. The measure I used to capture the distance among individual 
expertise profiles is the following (see also Figure 3.2 for a visual configuration): 
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where y is a problem-solving action, i is the focal contributor, j is the focal bug, m are bugs on 
which i worked in the past, k are other contributors that have collaborated with i on m, and c is the 
category of problem-solving action performed. 
 
Figure 3.2: Expertise Diversity visual representation 
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Additional control variables Every time an action, r, by contributor i is taken on bug j I 
computed a series of measures to control for various individual propensities of contributors and 
organizational aspects of bug-fixing. I measured the General tendency to collaborate manifested by the 
Apache server's contributors by taking the sum of collaborations entered into by the contributors active 
on a software bug. At the start of every new time spell for a bug, j, the total number of past 
collaborations on other software bugs involving contributors active on bug j was counted – whether 
these collaborations were repeated on multiple software bugs or not. –. I also calculated the total 
number of actions already taken by contributors on bug j – Total effort. In both cases I limited the 
counts to a moving time window of six months prior to time t. 
A series of variables was also measured at every new time spell to control for the effect that 
specific transient characteristics possessed by a software bug at time t might have on its resolution. 
Software bug severity was included to control for the propensity to engage with software bugs that are 
considered more urgent or important by the community of contributors. Contributors can assign a 
severity level to a software bug on a seven-point scale comprised of the following categories, in order 
of increasing severity: enhancements, trivial, minor, normal, major, critical, and blocker. Software bugs 
classified as enhancements are interpreted as requests for new features more than as software failures. 
The current severity level of a bug was recorded at every new time spell. Software bug communication 
was constructed by counting the number of comments already attached to a bug report, whilst Software 
bug CC’ing counts the number of contributors already added to the CC list. Both measures were 
included to control for the effect of extra saliency assumed by certain software bugs in the 
communication flow surrounding bug-fixing. Finally, Software bug assignee was constructed by 
counting the number of contributors already officially assigned to a software bug.  
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3.4.3 Model specification and estimation 
I adopt continuous-time event-history analysis to investigate the time to resolution for any bug 
reported in the Apache bug repository since its inception. That is, I study the time between a bug’s 
entry into observation (i.e., when a bug is “opened”) and a subsequent event. In particular, the event I 
model is the transition of a bug to the “resolved” state, which happens when a resolution has been 
performed and there is agreement that the appropriate resolution has been taken. Since bugs can be 
reopened and resolved again several times, I employ a repeated-event approach in my estimation 
technique. 
Event-history analysis is based on hazard functions defining the risk of observing a specific 
outcome (e.g., death, failure, resolution) in a time interval t, conditioning on the actor having 
“survived” until time t. Hazard functions represent the probability that an entity experiences an event 
somewhere between t and t +, divided by the probability that the entity survived beyond time t. A 
useful feature of the event-history approach is the possibility to model temporal variations in the 
probability of transition to available states, due to the effect of covariates that are multiplied to the 
hazard rate. I estimate the hazard function using Cox regression (Cox, 1972), a semi-parametric 
approach used to model event-history data without making assumptions on how is the baseline hazard 
distributed (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; Kacperczyk, 2012). The Cox regression is formalized 
as: 
 
h(t) = q(t) exp{α'X(t)}, 
 
where h(t) is the hazard rate of a transition to a resolved state at time t, q(t) is a non-specified 
baseline hazard, X(t) is a the vector of constant or time-varying covariates,, and α' is the coefficient 
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vector relative to the covariates vector. In particular, following the curvilinear interaction approach of 
my hypotheses, I specify the vector of covariates as follows: 
 
   ( )     ( )     
 ( )     ( )       ( )     
   ( )     ( ) 
 
where C(t) is repeated collaboration, D(t) is expertise diversity, and V(t) is the vector of control 
variables. A significant benefit for using a Cox regression is that this approach does not assume any 
specific distribution regarding the effect of time on the baseline hazard line. In particular, the 
coefficient estimates α’ reflect shifts in the hazard rate that occur as a consequence of changes in the 
vector of covariates in X, assuming that these changes are proportional within each spell and q(t) does 
not depend on the covariates. The Cox hazard regression is particularly apt for my analysis as 
preliminary analysis shows no clear parametric distribution relative to the shape of my hazard rate and 
no clear pattern for time effects on the baseline hazard. An important characteristic of the Cox 
regression in particular and event-history analysis in general is that it yields reliable estimates even in 
presence of right-censoring or left-truncation (Tuma & Hannan, 1984). The time period during which 
right-censored data are recorded terminates before the outcome of interest is observed. For example, a 
bug could remain open during the whole period of the study, as is the case for some of the bugs in my 
dataset. Right-censoring techniques address this by allowing units of analysis to contribute to the 
hazard function only until they are no longer able to contribute, due to the end of observation time. On 
the other hand there is left-truncation when information on the conditions of the units being studied 
before the start of the observation time are unavailable (Cox & Oakes, 1984). Since my observation 
time starts at the very beginning of the project lifetime my sample is not affected by any sample 
selection bias due to left-truncated observations (Kacperczyk, 2012). 
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5. Results 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics including means, standard deviations, and correlations.  
Table 3.1: Descriptives and correlations table 
Variable mean Sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Bug comments 
 
5.61 8.86         
2.Bug cc'ing 
 
0.32 0.99 0.45        
3.Bug assignee 
 
0.03 0.21 0.01 -0.01       
4.Bug severity 
 
4.12 1.49 0.02 0.04 -0.05      
5.Bug attachments 
 
0.02 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.04 -0.08     
6.Bug total effort 
 
3.47 3.21 0.38 0.53 0.14 0.07 0.03    
7.Generalized 
collaboration 
69.4 93.35 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.09 0.18   
8.Repeated 
collaboration 
7.12 2.44 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.20 0.61  
9.Knowledge 
diversity 
54.9 27.9 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.16 0.12 0.19 
 
Since I am interested in collaborative problem-solving practices all bugs that were acted on only 
by a single contributor were omitted from the sample. During the period between 2003 and 2012, I 
identified 3,470 bugs with 3,688 instances of bug resolution (recall that a bug can be resolved more 
than once). Correlations between variables are modest, reducing concern about the possibility of 
multicollinearity. All variables have been standardized to help the interpretation of the relative 
magnitude of single parameter estimates (Aiken & West, 1991). Figure 3.3 shows the Kaplan–Meier 
survival function, the skewness of which indicates that most bugs are likely to be resolved in the first 
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few days, although there is no clear time dependence.  
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Kaplan-Meyer estimator for bug resolution in Apache HTTPD Server, 2001-2013 
 
 
Table 3.2 shows the results of Cox hazard regressions predicting the time required before a bug 
is resolved. These models use Huber–White clustered standard errors at the bug level to account for 
heteroscedasticity.  
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Table 3.2: Repeated events Cox regression of bug resolution in Apache (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Variable 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Bug comments 
 
-0.311** 
 (0.111) 
-0.317** 
(0.109) 
-0.311** 
(0.112) 
Bug cc'ing 
 
0.240*** 
(0.047) 
0.239*** 
(0.048) 
0.240*** 
(0.050) 
Bug assignee 
 
0.086 
0.050 
0.086 
(0.051) 
0.089 
(0.047) 
Bug severity 
 
0.117* 
(0.058) 
0.116* 
(0.058) 
0.115 
(0.060) 
Bug attachments 
 
-2.229*** 
(0.360) 
-2.231*** 
(0.363) 
-2.228*** 
(0.351) 
Bug total effort 
 
0.217** 
(0.086) 
0.224* 
(0.092) 
 0.194* 
(0.084) 
Generalized collaboration 
 
-0.831*** 
(0.250) 
-0.814** 
(0.261) 
-0.831** 
(0.305) 
Repeated collaboration 
 
 0.744** 
(0.219) 
 0.322 
(0.286) 
Repeated collaboration (squared) 
 
 -0.130* 
(0.065) 
-0.151* 
(0.068) 
Expertise diversity 
 
  -0.028 
(0.034) 
Repeated collaboration * Expertise diversity 
 
  0.333* 
(0.158) 
Repeated collaboration (squared) * Expertise 
diversity 
 
  0.081* 
(0.031) 
Log likelihood 
Wald test (d.f) 
N. of observations 
N. of events 
-28806.32 
1782 (7) 
21849 
3831 
-27301.43 
1735 (9) 
21849 
3831 
-27278.75 
1626 (12) 
21849 
3831 
* p < 0.05; ***  p < 0.01 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
   
 
Model 1 is the baseline model with control variables available for the full sample. Model 2 adds 
the independent variable of interest, Repeated collaboration. Model 3 includes the interaction effect of 
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Expertise diversity with the linear and the quadratic term of Repeated collaboration. Estimates from 
Cox hazard regressions can be exponentiated and interpreted as hazard ratios, similar to odds ratios for 
logistic regressions. Hazard ratios are the ratio of the hazard rates corresponding to the conditions 
described by two levels of an explanatory variable, usually having a baseline hazard rate as reference. 
For example, in my study, a hazard ratio of 2 would mean that an observed bug may be resolved at 
twice the rate per unit time of the baseline rate, with a unit increase in an explanatory variable.  
 
Model 1 reports parameter estimates for my control variables. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the number of comments that a bug raises (Bug comments) decreases the hazard that the bug 
will be resolved by 26 percent [exp(–0.311) – 1], indicating that more complex bugs take longer to be  
solved. Meanwhile, my alternative measure of complexity, (number of) Bug attachments, also 
significantly affects the hazard of bug resolution. In the case of my Bug cc’ing measure, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the number of people in the bug cc list, increases the resolution hazard 
by 27 percent [exp(0.240) – 1], confirming my expectations that more visible bugs have a higher 
chance of being  solved sooner because they attract more attention. Similarly, consistent with my 
expectations, more severe bugs and tend to be solved faster (i.e., to increase on average the hazard of 
resolution), showing the effectiveness of formal scheduling attempts. I included two control variables 
that take into account the baseline dynamics of distributed collaboration. The positive and significant 
effect of Bug total effort indicates that the supply of problem-solving attempts is positively related to 
the hazard of bug resolution. A single standard deviation increase in total effort increases the baseline 
rate by 24 percent [exp(0.217) – 1]. On the other hand, the negative and significant effect of 
Generalized collaboration indicates that activity by contributors whose attention is spread across 
multiple bugs decreases the hazard of resolving a focal bug.  
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Models 2 and 3 test the substantive validity of my theoretical hypotheses. In Model 2 I included 
both linear and quadratic terms for Repeated collaboration to capture the degree of group learning 
when individuals repeatedly work together on several tasks. Hypothesis 1 captures the controversial 
relationship between repeated collaboration and group performance. I proposed that an intermediate 
level of repeated collaboration is most advantageous for performance, as the benefits of increased 
group learning are offset in the long run by a myopic reliance on established routines. The linear term 
for Repeated collaboration is positive and significant, whereas the quadratic term is negative and 
significant, showing an inverted U-shaped relationship between repeated collaboration and the hazard 
of bug resolution, as I postulated in Hypothesis 1.  
 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are tested in Model 3. These posit that expertise diversity has a 
moderating effect on repeated collaboration, such that homogeneous groups outperform heterogeneous 
groups at low levels of repeated collaboration and that heterogeneous groups outperform homogeneous 
groups at high levels of repeated collaboration. While the fact that the curvilinear interaction term 
(Repeated collaboration (squared) * Expertise diversity) is statistically significant just tells us that 
there is a moderating effect of expertise diversity, I need to plot the function to assess precisely the size 
and the marginal effect of the interaction at different levels of the moderating variable (Dawson, 2014). 
This is usually done by calculating predicted values of the dependent variable (in my case the hazard 
rate) under different conditions of the independent variable and moderator (in my case high and low 
values of repeated collaboration, and high and low values of expertise diversity) and showing the 
predicted relationship between independent and dependent variable at these different levels of the 
moderator. Figure 3.4 graphically displays this curvilinear interaction.  
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Figure 3.2: The relationship between repeated collaboration, expertise diversity and bug resolution in Apache 
HTTPD Server, 2001-2013 
 
On the Y axis I plotted the multiplier of the hazard rate (see also Hansen, 1999, and Phillips, 
2004 for a similar approach). Analogous to odds ratios, a value above 1 increases the hazard that a bug 
incurs a resolution event whereas a value below 1 decreases the hazard of resolution. The plot in Figure 
4 shows that, ceteris paribus, the hazard of resolution by groups of individuals with heterogeneous 
expertise working on a bug decreases (i.e., an increase in average time to resolution) if they don't reach 
a minimum degree of repeated collaboration allowing them to build a sufficient level of common 
ground and absorptive capacity for effective teamwork (Kraut et al., 2012; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
However, as the level of   repeated collaboration increases, the delay associated with heterogeneous 
expertise also decreases up to a point where this expertise diversity becomes an advantage, and begins 
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to increase, rather than decrease, the hazard of resolution (i.e., a decrease average time to resolution). 
Taking into account the theoretical basis of my hypotheses, it may therefore be argued that the 
combination of high specialization and a high level of group familiarity helps the development of 
transactive memory systems, which in turn affect coordination and performance (Liang et al., 1995; 
Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004). On the other hand, for groups with homogeneous expertise an 
increase in prior collaboration sees a significant decrease in the hazard of bug resolution beyond a 
certain threshold. This argument is in line with theories of creative abrasion and myopic learning which 
identify excessive longevity and lack of specialization as possibly detrimental to the search of novel 
and better solutions (Katz, 1982; Skilton & Dooley, 2010). Furthermore, by directly comparing the two 
lines related to low vs high expertise diversity, I can easily assess which group performs better under 
which condition. As postulated, heterogeneous groups do better than homogeneous group the more 
they repeatedly work together, whilst homogeneous groups do better than heterogeneous groups the 
less they do so. This result thus fully supports hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
The results of this research have important implications for the way scholars think about the 
benefits and challenges of repeated collaboration in distributed, open productions. Specifically, these 
results further highlight the need to move beyond the simple experience-learning-performance model in 
order to think in more complex ways about how and under what conditions repeated collaboration in 
groups might promote or inhibit learning and performance. This study suggests that in order to 
understand whether a given level of prior collaboration in a group has a positive or negative implication 
for group performance researchers need to consider the composition of expertise that exists within the 
group and, more specifically, the extent to which groups are more or less homogeneous in terms of 
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task-related expertise. In this sample of distributed, temporary problem-solving groups expertise 
diversity has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between repeated collaboration and 
group performance: a high level of repeated collaboration could be associated with either a high or low 
levels of performance, depending on whether and to what extent group members possess heterogeneous 
knowledge and expertise. This finding extends previous research on the conditions under which prior 
collaboration might facilitate or hinder group learning and performance by pointing to the significant 
role of knowledge distribution factors. Furthermore, the results of this research clearly suggest that this 
moderated relationship between prior collaboration and performance is non-monotonic. Specifically, I 
find that under conditions of low expertise diversity, the relationship between repeated collaboration 
and performance is an inverted U-shaped, whereas under conditions of high diversity, the relationship 
between collaboration and performance follows an almost linear pattern, with the benefits of 
heterogeneity monotonically increasing with prior collaborations. These results suggest that theories 
and models of the performance implications of expertise diversity in groups must move beyond linear 
assumptions in order to accommodate non-monotonic effects. The findings presented here contribute 
important empirical evidence to support the claim that, under the right conditions, expertise diversity 
can be a key activator of distributed group learning and thereby promote overall group effectiveness 
(Van der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). 
This chapter contributes to three main areas of interest. Firstly, this work extends theory on 
organizational learning by investigating contingent factors that unveil the way in which performance-
based learning is achieved in open productions. Support for the moderating effect of expertise diversity 
highlights the importance of a contingent learning approach, in contrast to prior research that has 
instead advanced arguments about unconditional and linear effects of experience of working together 
(Boh et al., 2007). Existing studies (e.g., Reagans et al., 2005) have theorized about the advantages of 
specialized task-related expertise, which aids the development of transactive memory (theorizing the 
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role of expertise diversity), and about the value of common ground for coordinating effectively across 
functions and for sharing knowledge (theory regarding repeated collaboration). However, existing 
research has often confounded empirically those two concepts, as they have advantages and 
disadvantages that offset each other. Disentangling the effects of repeated collaboration to those of 
expertise diversity is important from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. By specifying 
further the interaction effect between these two constructs we are able to advance our understanding 
about the kind of conditions under which it is preferable to have a diverse versus homogeneous work 
group. Second, my study has important value for reporting theoretical arguments and empirical 
findings that advance our knowledge on open innovation and open productions and their distinctive 
characteristics. This chapter suggests and tests hypotheses that shed light on how teams coordinate and 
integrate the diverse expertise of their members to solve problems in absence of formal contracts and 
hierarchies, a central issue in the emerging literature on open production and project-based 
organizations (Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006; Perretti & Negro, 2007; Bakker, 2010). Finally, this 
chapter has important value for managers concerned with issues of team staffing and reconfiguration, a 
topic that has garnered a fair amount of scholarly attention both from academics and in particular  
practitioners (Reagans, Zuckerman & McEvily, 2004; Groysberg & Lee, 2009). In several contexts, 
groups with fluid boundaries have become the rule rather than the exception (Huckman et al., 2009). In 
settings such as creative industries, software development, and consulting, fluid groups are put together 
to work on a certain task, carry out a certain project and then disbanded. Usually group participants are 
then reassigned to a new group to work on a new project. My results advocate a more nuanced 
approach for project managers who have to deal with team staffing issues, a view in which they 
explicitly consider both experience of working together and degree of knowledge homogeneity 
amongst team members. For instance, they should be aware of the crucial role of shared homogeneous 
knowledge and common ground for groups that have low experience working together. At the other 
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end, they should also be aware that as groups gain experience of working together, more specialized 
and heterogeneous expertise is preferable for better coordination and group cognition processes. 
My study has two main limitations. Firstly, I examined group learning and expertise diversity in 
within a series of distributed, fluid groups that all belong to the same organization. A research design at 
the intra-organizational groups level of analysis allows to rule out explanations rooted at the 
organizational level, although it dampens the generalizability of results beyond that single 
organizations. Future analysis should confirm results in different organizations and different types of 
groups. Secondly, when I postulate the effect of expertise diversity at different levels of repeated 
collaboration I neglect the fact that organizational members learn from each other while working 
together, so their set of expertise is likely to change over time. Whether groups tend to become more 
homogeneous or more heterogeneous over time as a consequence of repeated collaboration is an 
empirical question that I leave open to future studies. 
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Chapter 4 
 
IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND SUSTAINED PARTICIPATION 
IN AN OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The viability of open productions depends critically on their ability to attract and retain voluntary 
contributors. This study shifts attention from the principal focus of existing research, on ex-ante 
motivations – intrinsic and extrinsic – for this voluntary participation, to examine the nature of 
contributions over time and the consequences for sustaining participation. I suggest that participant 
retention is critically impacted by the social dynamics of open productions through the progressive 
socialization and legitimation of participants in the course of their work. Individuals construct their 
identity profiles as specialists or generalists by narrowly focusing or widely dispersing their efforts 
across knowledge domains. Drawing from the literature on the sociology of categories, I argue that 
the expertise of specialist contributors is more easily evaluated by fellow participants, aiding 
integration and fostering sustained participation. However, I propose a moderating mechanism 
inherent in the collaborative nature of open productions, whereby the beneficial effect of a specialist 
identity is diminished as contributors engage and re-engage in collaborative practices. This allows 
repeat collaborators to broaden their identity profile without damaging their standing within the 
community, on which their continued participation relies. I test my hypotheses using data on 
problem-solving in the form of source code contributions to the Apache HTTP Server repository. I 
examine the duration of the participation of 82 individuals who contribute 1425 commits, involving 
10757 files over the time period 1996-2013. The results support my arguments. I discuss the 
broader implications for the literature on sustained participation in open productions and on the 
sociology of categorization processes.  
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4.1 Introduction 
One of the most crucial success factors for the viability of open productions is their ability to 
sustain individual participation and retain human capital (Fang & Neufeld, 2009; Duchenaut, 2005). 
Existing research has shown that open productions may be seen as operating in a condition of fluid 
participation –  i.e., a situation in which participants vary in the amount of time they devote to 
productive processes and where organizational boundaries are uncertain and changing (Cohen, 
March & Olsen, 1972). Fluid participation is typical of open productions because only a minority of 
organizations in the entire ecosystem ever manage to attract and maintain a level of engagement of 
contributors compatible with their survival (Lomi, Conaldi & Tonellato, 2012; Krishnamurthy, 
2002; Scacchi, 2002). This fluidity also manifests itself in the wide variety of motivational factors 
affecting decisions to join or leave open productions, which transcend the traditional incentives 
provided by formal contracts (Lerner & Tirole, 2002). This feature raises an important overarching 
question to be addressed in the study of success factors for open productions: What mechanisms 
sustain long-term voluntary participation within them? 
As notable examples of open productions Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS) projects are 
characterized by continuous inflows and outflows of – mostly voluntary – participants. 
Notwithstanding the well-known success stories, most F/OSS projects have struggled to attract and 
sustain a sufficient level of contributors’ participation (Crowston, Annabi & Howison, 2003). Open 
productions fail to survive without voluntary contributions. Since contributors are often volunteer 
participants, rather than standard employees, open productions do not rely on traditional 
employment contracts and incentives to retain their human capital (von Krogh, Spaeth & Lakhani, 
2003). Although the crucial question of the dynamics of voluntary contributions to open 
productions has spurred extensive research into individual participation in F/OSS projects, most 
studies to date have primarily focused on identifying individuals’ motivations for getting involved 
in a project (Roberts, Hann & Slaughter, 2006). Usually the implicit assumption in this line of 
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research is that an ex-ante condition exists driving motivation to participate and stay in the project. 
In the literature most motivations fall into three broad categories: extrinsic motivations, intrinsic 
motivations and internalized extrinsic motivations (von Krogh et al., 2012; Fang & Neufeld, 2009). 
Extrinsic motivations are primarily instrumental and represent a situation where efforts are 
undertaken in order to obtain a separable outcome, whereas intrinsic motivations pertain to actions 
that are carried out to fulfil a satisfaction inherent in the action itself rather than a payoff resulting 
from its consequences (Hars & Ou, 2002). Internalized extrinsic motivations arise when individuals 
internalize external incentives so that they are perceived as induced by self-regulatory behavior 
rather than exogenous contingencies (Deci and Ryan, 2000). While prior literature has devoted 
much attention to the way in which contributors in open productions are intrinsically and 
extrinsically motivated to dedicate their time and effort to the creation of a public good (Lakhani & 
von Hippel, 2003; Roberts et al., 2006; von Krogh et al., 2003; 2012), little is known about how and 
why individuals' sustained participation changes over time as a consequence of the actual work 
practices that individuals undertake. I argue that there is a lack of substantial attention to the nature 
of the practices that underlie sustained participation in open productions. In particular, by deciding 
either to specialize in work within a single knowledge domain or to spread their effort across 
several domains, organizational participants shape their identity as specialist or generalist (Adamic 
et al., 2010; Anderson, 2012). Specialist members enjoy certain advantages derived from having a 
more clearly defined identity in the eyes of their audience, whereas generalist members tend to be 
devalued or ignored because the diversity of their contributions gives rise to an unclear or confusing 
identity (Hannan, 2010; Leung & Sharkey, 2014). However, generalist members, whose identity is 
not constrained by clear expectations from their audience, may enjoy greater role flexibility and 
freedom of action and may therefore choose to stay in the organization longer (Zuckerman et al., 
2003; Becker, 1973). I argue that the degree to which an individual’s identity emerges from their 
day-by-day work practices as more focused or generalized has important implications for our 
understanding of how sustained participation in open productions is achieved.  
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Thus, the objective of this study is to address the following two research questions: How do 
work practices in open productions relate to the construction of participants' identities? How do 
these identity profiles change over time and affect sustainability of participation? While the existing 
literature focuses on the reasons why individuals contribute to open productions in the first place, 
these research questions shift attention to the nature of these contributions over time and the 
consequences that they have for the sustainability of individual participation. In particular, I draw 
from the relevant literature on open productions (Levine & Prietula, 2014; Baldwin & von Hippel, 
2011) and on the social dynamics of categories (Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman et al., 2003; Hannan, 
Polos & Carroll, 2007) to develop a contingency framework that advances our understanding of the 
effects of assuming a focused (specialized) versus complex (generalist) identity on sustained 
contributions to a Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS) project. 
In the next part of this chapter I follow Zukerman (1999; 2003) in developing theoretical 
arguments that shed light on the fundamental trade-off underlying the focused versus complex 
nature of identities. Both specialism and generalism convey advantages and disadvantages that may 
offset each other according to specific contingent factors. I consider the roles of experience and 
repeated collaboration as crucial contingent factors that moderate the relationship between identity 
specialization and sustained participation. In particular I argue that, to the extent that audiences 
perceive and evaluate peer participants' efforts according to recognized knowledge-based 
categories, participants who associate themselves with fewer categories are able to attract greater 
peer' attention. Participants who focus on simple and recognizable identities by working on fewer 
domains are more easily evaluated in terms of their expertise and their potential contributions to the 
organizational welfare and are thus more easily accepted as legitimate members. On the other hand, 
participants who attempt to develop a more complex identity by making contributions which span 
many different categories of knowledge risk losing the opportunity to obtain any recognition for 
their work and thus drop out at higher rates. However, once the contributor has gained enough 
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experience in one knowledge domain and has repeatedly collaborated with other members her 
legitimacy as a source of expertise is recognized by her peers. Hence the costs of spanning different 
categories decrease and generalist members enjoy greater flexibility and fulfillment for being part 
of an open production with fluid boundaries. The trade-off between the advantages of focused and 
complex identities is then explained by whether individuals have accumulated enough experience 
and a sufficient quantity of collaborations to be considered legitimate members of a community.  
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing the theoretical arguments and the main 
hypotheses, I test these by analyzing developers’ sustained participation in a F/OSS project, in 
terms of contributions to the software source code. I use event history models to predict the hazard 
of a developer dropping out of the project as a function of identity specialization, experience, 
repeated collaboration and a series of relevant controls. I present the results of my analysis and 
discuss their implications for the advancement our understanding of participation in open 
productions and the social dynamics of categorization processes. 
 
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Literature review: participation in open productions 
Open productions cannot be sustained without the voluntary contributions of groups of 
individuals who are willing to bear personal costs in terms of time and effort provided in order to 
help achieve a public good. The question of why individuals voluntarily participate in open 
production has been a central topic of attention in the relevant literature over the past fifteen years 
(for a review see von Krogh et al., 2012 and Crowston et al., 2012). In particular, several studies 
within the existing literature on F/OSS have investigated the broad spectrum of different 
motivations that individuals may possess when they decide to contribute to the community. For 
example contributors may participate in order to ‘scratch a personal itch’ related to specific aspects 
of the software they care about (Raymond, 1999), to satisfy their own needs (Lakhani & von 
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Hippel, 2003, Franke & von Hippel, 2003), to feel part of a like-minded community (Ghosh, 1998; 
Hertel et al., 2003), to gain status within the community (Raymond, 1999).  
Much of this motivation-based research sprang up in response to a seminal paper on open 
source software by economists Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, who asked a foundational question: 
“Why do top-notch programmers choose to write code that is released for free? Is this 'gift 
economy' consistent with the self-interested-economic-agent paradigm?” (Lerner and Tirole, 2001: 
821). The two authors advanced an argument grounded in labor economics that put signaling at the 
center of their theoretical inquiry. They argued that developers' motivation for voluntary 
participation is derived from the indirect signaling about their capabilities to the software 
development industry as a whole that such participation allows, with the expected payoff coming in 
the form of future higher earnings. With the aim of systematizing this heterogeneous body of 
research Crowston et al. (2012) reviewed early research on this subject to consistently investigate 
the series of reasons that induce individuals to contribute to F/OSS projects. The studies they 
reviewed showed that motivations usually belong to one of three families: extrinsic, intrinsic and 
internalized extrinsic motivations. Crowston and colleague’s analysis provides evidence to show 
that reputation (Lerner & Tirole, 2002) and career development concerns (Hann et al., 2002, Hars & 
Ou, 2002) are among the most salient extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic motivations show the 
prevalence of pure fun-based motives such as the enjoyment of sharing or mutual learning 
opportunities (Ghosh, 1998; Shah, 2006), whereas users’ own needs (Markus et al., 2000; Lakhani 
& von Hippel, 2003) are the among the most frequently cited internalized extrinsic motivations. 
Open production scholars have then extended this body of literature by examining what 
types of motivation sustain individual participation in F/OSS (Shah, 2006; Fang & Neufeld, 2009; 
Dahlander & O'Mahony, 2011). These studies have consistently found that motivations are not 
static. For instance, Shah (2006) interviewed contributors from several F/OSS projects who 
revealed that, notwithstanding the initial push that propels initial participation in the community, 
115 
 
most participants drop out once they achieve what they initially intended. Developers who decide to 
stay have to move from a merely 'user need' motive to an intrinsic motive, such as passion or fun. 
Consistent with this finding, Fang and Neufeld (2009) showed that initial motives to contribute are 
not necessarily related to sustained participation, as developers who contribute long-term are those 
who are able to create an environment of continuous and fruitful learning.  
Building on this latter line of research, this study aims to shed light on the conditions 
through which an open production system fosters sustained participation which is thus reproduced 
over time. Like Fang and Neufeld (2009) and Shah (2006) I highlight the evolving nature of 
contributor activity and its dynamic effect on participation. However, in contrast to these two 
studies I shift attention from generalized motivations for participation to a much more detailed 
account of individual work practices that – I argue – constitute the basis for sustained participation 
by shaping contributors' identities. This approach is similar to that of Duchenaut (2005) and 
Dahlander and O'Mahony (2011) in considering work activities as the theoretical and empirical lens 
through which we can understand individual progression in open productions. Duchenaut (2005) 
investigated socialization processes within the Python project from both a learning and a political 
perspective, and documented how contributors who are successful in progressing toward the center 
of the project are strategic in the way they shape the network around them. He showed that to 
advance in the project it is necessary to be constantly involved in code production and discussions 
around code production. Understanding the relationships between individuals and code and 
choosing the right allies in terms of collaboration and discussion helps contributors to become 
legitimate “socialized” members. Analyzing archival data relating to contributions to the GNOME 
project, Dahlander and O'Mahony (2011) identified three mechanisms through which developers 
acquire lateral authority and therefore progress toward the center of the project: technical 
communication, technical contribution, and coordination work. Furthermore, the authors showed 
that individual commitment changes as a consequence of career advancement. My work builds on 
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these efforts to consider work activities as central mechanisms whereby individuals interact with 
other participants and become socialized in the project. I suggest a novel mechanism affecting the 
likelihood of sustained participation that has been so far overlooked in the literature, identity 
construction.  
 
4.2.2 Identity construction in open productions 
Research in economic and organizational sociology shows an extensive effort to understand 
how classification structures and categorization impacts on individual and organizational outcomes 
(Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman et al., 2003; Hsu, 2006; Hannan, 2010). In organizational sociology 
categories can be thought of as socio-cognitive partitions that cluster together similar social entities, 
such as individuals and organizations, in markets (Negro & Leung, 2013; Zerubavel, 1997). Hannan 
and colleagues (2007) have formalized this concept by defining categories as labels that audiences 
apply to clusters of similar social entities. A label crystallizes if audiences reach a certain level of 
agreement as to which entity belongs to the category and which doesn't. Categories then drive 
future perceptions of entities labelled within the same cluster, such as the features the entity 
possesses or the behavior that is to be expected from its constituents (Leung & Sharkey, 2014).  
One key finding in this stream of research is that organizations, actors, or products 
attempting to span multiple categories defy clear evaluation, and are subsequently discounted or 
ignored. Zuckerman (1999) first proposed an argument linking category-straddling and unclarity of 
perception. He showed that stock analysts were confused by firms which spanned recognized 
industry categories. The reason for this confusion rests on the fact that stock analysts specialize by 
industry, and so have limited capacity to properly evaluate companies that transcend the boundaries 
of their focused expertise. Companies that straddle categories are therefore at higher risk of being 
devalued or completely ignored by stock analysts. This 'categorical imperative' has been 
117 
 
investigated in multiple settings and widely supported by empirical evidence (for a review, see 
Hannan, 2010).  
Zuckerman and colleagues (2003) subsequently advanced this line of research further, 
investigating the role of categories in labor markets. Building on Faulkner's (1983) insights into the 
typecasting process among Hollywood composers, the authors elucidated a fundamental trade-off 
regarding the outcomes of categorization in markets. Faulkner explained typecasting as a process 
whereby the future opportunities of an actor in the labor market are constrained by the current social 
attributes of that actor, especially in relation to work experience. By studying career patterns of 
Hollywood feature-film actors, Zuckerman and colleagues revealed typecasting's double-edged 
nature: actors who specialize in one film genre have a higher chance of being cast again in the same 
genre, but a lower chance of being cast in a different genre, although they have a higher chance 
overall of being hired than non-specialists. The underlying idea here is slightly different from that 
of the 'categorical imperative'. If the categorical imperative is based on the assumption that 
specialized audiences don't have the cognitive means to understand generalist entities, typecasting is 
based on the 'signaling' assumption that when actors don't specialize in any category it is because 
they don't possess the skills to truly master any of them. To the extent that audiences believe that 
skills are hard to evaluate and result from category-specific learning investments, they regard 
experience in one category as evidence that an actor does not have the necessary skills to participate 
in another category. Generalists – or 'jacks of all trades' –thus face a particularly hard challenge in 
attempting to demonstrate competence in each of the categories in which they appear  and are 
therefore likely devalued to 'masters of none' (Hsu, 2006) who move across categories as a result of 
inadequacy. Thus, the typecasting process implies that actors whose skills span categorical 
boundaries face significant difficulty in gaining recognition for this breadth of ability, because they 
are easily confused with the unskilled. Building on Zuckerman's ideas of categorical imperative and 
typecasting, I argue that individuals in open productions face a similar challenge when they start 
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participating in organizational activities. To the extent that different projects reflect the 
development of distinct skills and knowledge, individuals start constructing their identity by the 
simple act of choosing how to allocate their effort across project boundaries. The question of 
whether individuals will continue participating in the open production thus turns from relying on a 
purely motivational rationale to instead resting on a more dynamic account of how individuals are 
progressively socialized into the community through their work activities. Identity construction is a 
key element that is enacted through work practices that entail sustained participation (Fang & 
Neufeld, 2009; Lave & Wenger, 1990). Individual participation in an open production requires the 
construction of a recognizable identity, i.e., a process of establishing who one is, what one can do, 
and to what extent one becomes legitimized and valued by other participants (Handley et al., 2006). 
This idea is based on theories of social identity, in particular stressing processes of identity 
regulation – i.e., an individual’s response to peers' incentives such as rewards and promotion acts – 
and those of identity work – i.e., a deliberate effort to form, maintain, or revise one's perception by 
the relevant audience in relation to social context and work practices (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). 
When audiences – i.e., other participants in the project – perceive a contributor’s focused, specialist 
identity they are better able to evaluate his or her knowledge in terms of current skills and potential 
contributions to the open production, a process which favors that contributor’s socialization. 
Socialized contributors are more likely to become legitimate members and thus gain access to 
higher level community resources, such as increased status, restricted areas, and community tools. 
As newcomers get progressively socialized in the project, their knowledge and access to project 
assets and resources rise, which in turn encourages even greater participation in the future. 
Therefore I postulate: 
H1: The expected time duration over which a contributor’s participation is sustained 
(sustained participation) in the project is positively related to his or her degree of identity 
specialization. 
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The more contributors accumulate work experience in one or more categories the more they 
are progressively socialized in the organization, due to the fact that in open productions each 
contribution is thoroughly discussed before being approved. As Zuckerman and colleagues 
demonstrate (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001; Zuckerman et al., 2003), once individuals gain 
recognition in their markets or inside their organizations, higher-status  individuals can better 
sustain deviation from the behavior that is expected by labels attached to their associated category. 
To the extent that open productions are meritocracy-driven environments where status depends on 
the volume of one's experience, generalist individuals (i.e., individuals with lower identity 
specialization) with substantial experience are more likely to be perceived by audiences as highly 
skilled in many categories rather than unskilled in most. This high recognition by peer members 
then facilitates progress in the project and is thus positively related to sustained participation. 
Conversely, audiences are also more likely to evaluate highly experienced contributors with a 
narrow identity as indicating a limited skill set. Therefore, following Zuckerman's and colleague’s 
logic, I hypothesize: 
H2a: Contributor experience moderates the relationship between specialization and the 
time duration over which participation is sustained in the project (sustained participation). In 
particular, the positive effect of specialization on sustained participation is higher when experience 
is lower. 
H2b: At a high volume of experience, the expected duration of sustained participation in 
open productions is higher for generalist contributors than for specialist contributors. 
 
A second and more novel contingency effect comes from the empirical evidence that, far 
from working in a vacuum, individuals constantly interact with other participants, co-operating in 
ongoing discussion, evaluation and re-evaluation of work on a project. The result of this iterative 
interaction process is a reshaping of contributor identities over time. Some researchers have 
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suggested that contributors move from peripheral participation toward the center of the project in a 
manner akin to classic apprentice-master learning dynamics (von Krogh et al., 2003; Duchenaut, 
2005; Dahlander & O'Mahony, 2011). However, in F/OSS almost all communication is technology-
mediated, hence the newcomers lack most of the tangible means for learning from the “master”, 
such as the interaction face-to-face. Nevertheless, mailing lists and collaboration artefacts constitute 
not simply the end product of efforts in open productions, but also the material infrastructure that 
F/OSS contributors use to interact with one another. As Duchenaut (2005) described in one of the 
few attempts to address this issue in the context of open source software “The multiple components 
of an Open Source project that at first seem to be hard material are in essence text. This distributed 
network of people and things is constructed through the materialization of language. There is a 
hybridism of dialogue and code, where the dialogue is directly embedded in the code” (Duchenaut, 
2005: 327). When contributors engage in collaborative problem-solving activities in open 
productions they interact over a shared infrastructure that fosters extensive communication and 
reciprocal feedback processes. Increased feedback and communication aide identity-construction 
and legitimation of the expertise of individual contributors to a project, thus encouraging sustained 
participation without the need to incur the costs associated with having a specialized profile. 
Conversely, as in the case of highly collaborative individuals, generalist members – i.e., members 
with low identity specialization – will benefit from the flexibility and freedom of not being attached 
to any specific label while still being perceived as legitimate members in the community Therefore 
I posit that: 
H3a: Repeated collaboration by a contributor moderates the relationship between 
specialization and sustained participation in the project. In particular, the positive effect of 
specialization on the duration of sustained participation is higher when the volume of repeated 
collaboration is lower. 
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H3b: At high volume of repeated collaboration, the expected duration of sustained 
participation in open productions is higher for generalist contributors than for specialist 
contributors. 
 
4.3 Empirical setting: code development in the Apache HTTP server 
I test my hypothesis using data I have collected on code development in the Apache HTTP 
server, a large and successful F/OSS project. I focus on code development rather than bug-fixing 
because this setting allows me to better analyze processes of socialization and identity construction, 
whereas individuals involved in bug-fixing do not necessarily contribute to progression of  the 
project, and their degree of own use value motivation is higher (Crowston & Scozzi, 2008). I have 
chosen Apache as a case study because it is a relatively complex project with many software sub-
modules that constitute separate environments for specialization, interaction and learning 
(González-Barahona, López & Robles, 2004). This feature, besides Apache's long lifespan, allows 
me to observe a great deal of variance in developers “career paths”, unfolding as a result of different 
work activities that in turn shape identity construction.  
The community of contributors who are in charge of developing the Apache HTTPD Server 
is completely made by volunteers (Fielding, 1999), an exogenous condition that I exploit to rule out 
purely extrinsic pay-based motivations
3
.  The voluntary nature of the work means contributors 
cannot plan to dedicate consistently large amounts of time to the project, a fact which necessitates 
the development of processes emphasizing decentralized decision-making and traceable and 
transparent communication. Apache developers rely on transparent mailing lists to communicate 
with one another, and a democratic system for voting to settle disputes. Due to the widely dispersed 
geographic distribution of group members, coordination is often pursued through participation in 
mailing list discussions, sort of “virtual meeting rooms" where conversations happen 
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 See also http://www.apache.org/foundation/how-it-works.html#structure 
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asynchronously and transparently. Some projects additionally use more synchronous messaging, 
such as internet relay chat (IRC) or instant messengers. High costs language barriers make voice 
and face-to-face communication rather rare. The asynchronicity of mailing lists communication 
makes it a much preferable means of communication, as it allows the creation of transparent 
archives that are better suited for the coordination of voluntary contributors. 
According to the Apache Software Foundation guidelines
4
, the Apache projects are managed 
using a collaborative, consensus-based process. Rather than operating within a strictly hierarchical 
structure, with higher positions associated with increasing power, authority is exerted horizontally 
as contributors in different functions are granted different rights and access to the various areas of 
the organization. Advancement in the project is based on meritocracy. In one of the founder’s own 
words: “The more work you have done, the more you are allowed to do” (Fielding, 1999: 43).  
This study focuses on Apache users known as contributors. Contributors are users who 
provide or modify code or documentation to the project. Contributors have extra rights and 
responsibilities, above and beyond those of ordinary users, in terms of activity on the mailing list 
for developers, contribution of code, patches, documentation, feedback, and participation in 
discussions on development issues. Contributors are also called developers. Depending on their 
contribution developers may progress to the status of committer. As soon as they demonstrate their 
quality by having contributed for a protracted amount of time (i.e., usually six months) they are 
nominated for membership as committers and are then subject to a vote for membership by the 
existing committers. Contributors who become committers sign a Contributor License Agreement, 
gain access to write to the code repository so they can commit code and patches autonomously. 
Committers vote whenever a new piece of software is added or modified, and are allowed to access 
and commit code changes to the code repository which is based on Subversion, an open source 
Concurrent Versions System (CVS). Even though the process for software development is not 
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unique nor formalized, Apache contributors undertake a fairly routinized list of actions when they 
commit new software code. This series consists of: identifying room for improvement on a number 
of lines of source code; deciding whether someone will work on it; laying out and discussing a 
possible improvement; downloading locally a copy of the source code for development and testing; 
presenting and discussing for review the modifications to the code to the mailing list; and finally, 
sending the code commit with its relative documentation to the CVS repository. This process may 
take several attempts before reaching a satisfactory conclusion, depending on the scope of the 
potential improvement, although it is advised that the whole set of source code lines changed should 
be included in a single commit. Every commit yields a review file with a description of all 
modifications to the code, a patch for testing them and a complete log of the actions taken. This 
summary is then submitted to the developers’ mailing list for review. For each commit all of the 
members in the developer community are accountable for checking the mailing list to make sure all 
modifications are relevant and pertinent. 
 
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Data and sample 
To test my hypotheses I created a unique longitudinal dataset containing the complete 
history of code commits to the Apache HTTP Server CVS repository, and later to its successor, 
Subversion. In open source software development contributors identify, program and submit 
modifications of the software source code to a centralized repository where other contributors who 
have access to it have the right to discuss, peer-review and vote on submitted changes. I mined both 
the CVS and Subversion repositories using the web parser CVSAnalY (Robles, Koch & Gonzalez-
Barahona, 2004). This tool retrieves the information about every commit to the repository, and 
dumps it into a database where it can be conveniently analyzed. To avoid duplication of issues and 
concentrate on the core development of the software I restricted my sample to changes committed 
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to the Apache HTTP Server trunk. In software development jargon, trunk refers to the unnamed 
branch of a file tree under revision control. The trunk represents the base for software development 
over which a project builds its progression. 
I have relied on several sources to gather the data on developers contained in the dataset. 
The Subversion repository parsed with CVSAnalY provided information on the time stamp of the 
commit, the username and ID of the committer, and the full pathname of changed files. I used the 
data collected through this repository to derive the specialism variable of theoretical interest and the 
two moderating variables, Cumulated experience and Repeated collaboration. I then used the Ohloh 
online database – an open hub that gathers extensive data on several F/OSS projects and their 
contributors – to cross-check available information and to search for additional information on the 
committers’ background for use as control variables, such as activity in other projects and type of 
known programming languages. Finally, I used the Apache bug repository and mailing lists to get 
information on the first instance of activity in the project for each of the contributors. Relying only 
on information on first commits to capture the beginning of participation in a project is unreliable as 
commits usually follow a time period of adjustment and learning that typically results in 
communication and bug-fixing activities (von Krogh et al., 2003) 
To construct the sample I collected data on all of the commits submitted to the Apache 
Subversion repository for the time period from 1996 to 2013. During this time period 111 
developers were uniquely identified as contributing to the repository with a total of 10757 files 
changed. Using the information from the complete paths of the changed files, I reconstructed the 
affiliation of each file to the 23 sub-modules that constitute the Apache HTTP server. To build the 
final dataset I gathered information using the whole sequence of actions parsed from Apache's code 
repository. Multiple spells are recorded for each contributor, with a new spell in the lifetime of a 
contributor starting every time his or her status changes as a result of committing a new set of lines 
of code to the Subversion repository. A commit action, r, by contributor i on software module j at 
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time t in the sequence determines the start of a new spell for committer i, who performed the action. 
Every time a new action occurs, the sequence of actions performed by contributor i before time t is 
taken to code all the variables relative to contributor i at time t. This process resulted in a dataset 
containing 1454 commits performed by 111 individual contributors on a total of 10757 files being 
changed. However, in the final sample I decided to retain only those contributors who had 
submitted more than one commit. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, one-time commits are 
usually the consequence of an idiosyncratic need on the part of the user which requires them to 
modify a particular feature in the software source code. These commits are more likely to result 
from a “user value” type of motivation rather than from any intention to contribute to the public 
good. Secondly, the longitudinal process of identity construction I seek to shed light on in this study 
is based specifically on multiple instances of collaborative problem-solving. As such, single 
instances are not relevant. This procedure resulted in a final sample size of 82 contributors and 1425 
commits
5
. An average of 20.2 commits per contributor was recorded. However, in line with the 
existing literature on open productions, there is a core of contributors whose actions account for the 
majority of overall activity, with 22% of individuals responsible for 71% of all commits. 
 
4.4.2 Variables and measures 
Dependent variable. The goal of this chapter is to examine the conditions under which 
individual participation is sustained in an open production. I measure contributors’ sustained 
participation in the project using individual tenure, that is, the time duration of contributor 
participation in the project. Existing research has used individual tenure with projects as a measure 
of participation. Howison and colleagues (2006) reported a highly skewed distribution for 
participation in F/OSS. In the 120 SourceForge projects that they investigated, the authors found 
that usually contributors don’t last more than a month in a project, independently of the role taken. 
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   Models estimated using the unrestricted dataset yielded similar results. 
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However, the duration of participation may vary in a substantial way according to the different roles 
undertaken by contributors. For instance, Robles and Gonzalez-Barahona (2005) reported especially 
long tenure among Debian package maintainers compared to other contributor roles within that 
operating system. 
At any point in time a contributor is at risk of ending his or her participation. To codify exit 
from the risk set and distinguish active from inactive developers I calculate the maximum amount 
of time elapsed between two commits by the same individual, and subtract it from the end of 
observation time. This gives me a threshold of time for each individual beyond which a contributor 
is considered inactive. To measure the entry of individuals into the risk set I gathered information 
from the Apache bug repository and the developers’ mailing lists and for each contributor codified 
the first instance of participation in the project. For contributors whose first action  could not be 
found in either repository I set an entry time equal to the time of first commit minus the average 
difference between the first commit and the first action, across all contributors. 
Since my interest is in sustained participation and the dependent variable technically 
measures its opposite (i.e., the hazard of leaving the project) I interpret negative and significant 
covariate parameters as increasing the likelihood of sustained participation. Concomitantly, positive 
and significant parameters signify, ceteris paribus, a higher chance of contributors leaving the 
project earlier. 
 
Identity specialization. The main independent variable of theoretical interest is the degree of 
specialism versus generalism in work practices, which I use as a proxy to measure a focused versus 
more complex identity. In order to capture this theoretical construct in my data I rely on the highly 
modular structure of the Apache project. Modularity has been consistently examined in the 
literature on organizations in general (Simon, 1962; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Baldwin & Clark, 
2000) and open productions (Baldwin & Clark, 2006; Langlois & Garzarelli, 2008; Henkel & 
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Baldwin, 2009). A key element of this line of research can be identified in a principle called the 
“mirroring hypothesis” (Baldwin, 2008). Henderson and Clark (1990) first related the concept of 
mirroring to product development groups: “We have assumed that organizations are boundedly 
rational, and hence that their knowledge and information processing structure come to mirror the 
internal structure of the product they are developing” (p. 27). Hence, modular systems facilitate the 
spread of very important organizational features, such as division of labor, within-group 
specialization and learning. Within module boundaries contributors in open productions invest time 
and effort to develop specialized skills and knowledge that make such organizational arrangements 
“nearly decomposable systems” (Simon, 1962), or systems where most interactions take place 
within modules and few across modules. 
In Apache specialization the division of labor is achieved through a highly modular 
architecture (González-Barahona, López, & Robles, 2004). I identified 23 different sub-modules 
within the trunk of Apache HTTP Server project
6
. These sub-modules reflect different areas of 
software development that require specialized programming skills to be addressed. For instance, the 
module labelled “database” stands for the Apache DBD framework which manages connections to 
SQL backends efficiently, whereas the module labelled “ssl” is a directory housing code for 
OpenSSL functionality. I tracked information regarding file pathnames contained in all of the 
contributors commits over time and  identified which modules the files refer to. I started with the 
sequence of actions extracted from the Apache server's CVS and Subversion repositories. An 
action, r, by contributor i at time t in the sequence determines the start of a new spell for the 
contributor i,. At that point I looked back through the sequence of actions taken by contributor i on 
module j before time t and determined on which other modules the contributor had worked in the 
past. I then constructed an individual expertise profile by counting the number of commits in each 
module. I finally computed a Herfindal-Hirschmann Index to capture the degree of specialization 
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 See http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk/modules/README for a complete list. 
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within modules of contributor i. The formula I used to capture identity specialization is the 
following: 
    
   
(∑   
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Where i is the contributor, j is the module, N is the total number of modules in the project 
and s the number of file modified in each of the modules touched in the commit under analysis. The 
statistic is normalised using the total number of modules identified in the project (N). 
 
Cumulated Experience 
In my interaction hypotheses I argue that two contingency factors –  cumulated experience 
and repeated collaboration – moderate the effect of identity specialization on sustained 
participation. I capture cumulated experience by counting, at the time of a new commit, the 
cumulated number of files modified in the past by the same contributor, normalized by a decay 
function that applies a higher weight to more recent commits. Again I began with the sequence of 
actions extracted from the Apache server's CVS and Subversion repositories. An action, r, by 
contributor i at time t in the sequence determines the start of a new spell for the contributor i. At 
that point I looked back through the sequence of actions taken by contributor i and counted the 
number of file modifications. I then weighted the result by a linear decay function. The formula for 
cumulated experience is the following: 
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where r{1…t}, t is the current time in the sequence , and s the number of file modified at 
each point in time. 
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Repeated Collaboration 
 As was the case in the previous chapter, I measure repeated collaboration as evidenced by 
Apache contributors working together on the same modules at each time spell. Software 
development requires a high degree of coordination and collaboration as every changelog that is 
submitted to the development mailing list has to be reviewed and accepted by other participants 
before any subsequent change can be made. Furthermore, as different modules entail a different set 
of skills and specialized knowledge, repeated collaboration takes on additional important in 
guaranteeing the necessary level of cohesion and common ground required for effective work 
within module boundaries (Baldwin, 2008). To measure repeated collaboration I began, once again, 
by examining the sequence of actions extracted from the Apache server's repository. An action, r, 
by contributor i on module j at time t in the sequence determines the start of a new spell. I then  
looked back through  the sequence of actions taken on module j before time t and counted the 
number of prior collaborations on the same module among all contributors who acted on module j 
alongside contributor i. Repeated collaboration is defined as the number of times both contributor i 
and another contributor have both modified files on module j in the past, hence the count gives the 
number of repeated collaborations which will have occurred when contributor i takes action on 
module j at time t. The formula I adopted to count repeated collaborations is the following: 
    ∑∑∑     (      )
 
   
 
   
   
   
      
where J is the vector of modules in the project, L is the vector of other contributors l  
 
Other control variables 
Every time an action, r, by contributor i is taken on module j I computed a series of 
variables to control for various individual propensities of contributors to stay or leave the project as 
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a result of specific work practices. As in the previous chapter, I measured Apache contributors’ 
General tendency to collaborate by taking the sum of collaborations undertaken by contributors, 
regardless of the module in which they occurred or of whether the collaborations were repeated. 
Thus, at the start of every new time spell for a contributor, i, the total number of past collaborations 
on whichever module involved contributors active on module j was counted – whether these 
collaborations were repeated on multiple modules or not. For the second control I computed the 
total scope of contributions already performed by individuals in different modules, to capture the 
overall exposure to the project. This measure is different from identity specialization, as the first is 
an unweighted, raw count of modules touched by the contributor, whereas the second takes into 
account the overall activity, in terms of volume of file modifications in each module. I also gathered 
information on each contributor’s external activities (that is, external to the focal project), to capture 
a generalized commitment to the open source community, indicating a higher degree of intrinsic 
motivation. To do this I codified a dummy variable recording whether a contributor was active in 
any other open source project prior to time t. Finally, I measured contributors’ level of technical 
capabilities as represented by programming languages primarily used to develop code changes. The 
assumption is that the greater the number of different programming languages known by the 
contributor, the higher are his or her technical capabilities, and the higher the chances of  sustaining 
a fruitful and fulfilling participation in the community over time. 
 
4.4.3 Empirical model specification and estimation 
As was the case in my analysis of bug resolution in the previous chapter, I adopt continuous-
time event-history analysis, this time to examine Apache contributors’ sustained participation in the 
project advancement in terms of source code changes committed to the CVS repository. Event 
history analysis may be understood as being based on “failure time process”, which is made of 
entities – such as individuals or organizations – that are observed over time, starting at some 
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beginning point. These entities are said to belong to some state, for instance the individual is alive, 
the organization is in business. These entities are said to be at risk of transitioning to another state 
(e.g., the individual dies, the organization goes out of business). at any particular point in time, and 
such probability is given by the hazard rate that we are modelling. These stochastic transitions to 
other states are called “events”. Therefore, event-history analysis is based on hazard functions 
defining the risk of observing a specific outcome (e.g., death, failure) in an interval after time t, 
conditional on the subject having “survived” to time t. Hazard functions represent the probability 
that an entity experiences an event somewhere between t and t +, divided by the probability that the 
entity survived up to time t. To be specific, I model the time between a contributor’s entry into 
observation (i.e., when a contributor submits his or her first commit to the CVS) and a “failure” 
event. In particular, the event I model is the transition of a developer to the “inactive” state, which 
was computed as discussed in the previous section. After an entity experiences an event, such entity 
may transition to yet another state or may be dropped from the “risk set”, i.e., the array of units that 
are at risk of experiencing an event. When, at the end of the observation period, an entity has not 
made any single transition from one state to another – i.e., has not experienced any event – such 
cases are said to be “right censored”. For example, a contributor could remain active during the 
whole period of the study and could experience failure after the end of my observation time. Right-
censoring techniques address this by allowing units of analysis to contribute to the hazard function 
only until they are no longer able to contribute, due to the end of observation time. 
To test my hypotheses I use Cox proportional hazard models (Cox, 1972) that allow me to 
make use of the continuous data at my disposal and to account for the fact that some contributors 
are still participating at the end of the observation time (and are thus treated as right-censored). The 
Cox regression is formalized as: 
 
h(t) = q(t) exp{α'X(t)}, 
132 
 
where h(t) is the hazard rate of a transition to a resolved state at time t, q(t) is a non-
specified baseline hazard, X(t) is a the vector of constant or time-varying covariates,, and α' is the 
coefficient vector relative to the covariates. A useful feature of the event-history approach is the 
possibility to model temporal variations in the probability of transition to available states, due to the 
effect of covariates that are multiplied to the hazard rate. In particular, to account for the interaction 
terms in my hypotheses, I specify the vector of covariates as follows: 
α'X(t)=α1C(t)+α2D(t)+α3E(t)+ α4C*D(t)+α5 C*E(t)+α'V(t), 
 
where C(t) is identity specialism, D(t) is cumulated experience, E(t) is repeated collaboration and 
V(t) is the vector of control variables. The Cox hazard models are agnostic about the assumptions of 
the shape of the hazard function, as long as it is constant within each spell. The coefficient estimates 
α’ reflect shifts in the hazard rate that occur as a consequence of changes in the vector of covariates 
in X, assuming that these changes are proportional within each spell and q(t) does not depend on the 
covariates. Cox hazard regressions have no intercept, since they are subsumed into the baseline 
hazard. The coefficients can be interpreted as the change in hazard for a one-unit change in the 
underlying covariate. 
 
4.5 Results 
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables included in my models, 
encompassing means, standard deviations and correlations. The correlations between variables 
show that, as expected, the scope of contributions (N of modules) is negatively correlated with 
Identity specialization, though not so highly as to cause concern regarding multicollinearity. There 
is also a high positive correlation between Experience and Repeated Collaboration showing that 
individuals with greater experience have a higher chance of collaborating repeatedly with other 
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individuals. I retained both of these variables in the model to allow the teasing apart the two effects 
and to identify the marginal effect of prior repeated collaboration over and above the cumulated 
number of actions. I standardized all variables to reduce correlations between multiplicative terms 
and to facilitate the interpretation of the relative magnitude of single parameter estimates (Aiken & 
West, 1991). 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics and correlations 
Variable mean sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.N of modules 
 
 
5.9 6.24         
2.Cumulated 
Experience 
 
117.79 213.36 0.03        
3.Activity in 
other projects 
 
0.84 0.16 0.28 0.14       
4.Technical 
Knowledge 
 
10.1 4.28 0.32 0.35 0.31      
5. Generalized 
Collaboration 
 
80 64.73 0.63 0.07 0.30 0.34     
6.Repeated 
Collaboration 
 
3.47 3.21 -0.03 0.65 0.09 0.25 0.04    
7.Identity 
Specialism 
 
0.64 0.38 -0.72 0.25 -0.26 -0.27 -0.42 0.26   
8.Identity 
Specialization * 
Cumulated 
Experience 
96.33 215.18 0.16 0.81 0.21 0.43 0.19 0.69 0.03  
9.Identity 
Specialization * 
Repeated 
Collaboration 
54.9 27.9 0.24 0.69 0.19 0.36 0.28 0.84 0.06 0.53 
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I report the baseline survival function using the Kaplan–Meier estimator in Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 3: Kaplan-Meyer estimator for time of sustained participation, Apache HTTP Server, 1996-2013 
 
The graph shows the baseline survival times without the inclusion of any covariate. Results 
of the Cox model are reported in Table 4.2. I used robust Hubert-White sandwich estimators to 
cluster standard errors around each contributor. Table 4.2 shows the results of Cox regressions 
predicting the hazard of leaving the project. A negative and significant parameter in the regression 
would indicate that a unit increase of the relative covariate would decrease the hazard of the 
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observed individual leaving the project, i.e., increase his or her chances of continuing to participate 
in the project. 
 
Table 4.4: Repeated events Cox hazard regression of bug resolution in Apache (robust standard errors in 
parentheses) 
Variable 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Scope of Contributions 
 
1.155*** 
 (0.288) 
0.779* 
(0.317) 
0.080 
(0.507) 
0.263 
(0.547) 
Cumulated Experience 
 
0.112 
(0.269) 
0.359 
(0.284) 
0.991* 
(0.489) 
2.109* 
(0.956) 
Activity in other projects 
 
-0.206* 
(0.104) 
-0.179 
(0.103) 
-0.192 
(0.130) 
-0.231 
(0.132) 
Technical Knowledge 
 
-0.704*** 
(0.179) 
-0.792*** 
(0.195) 
-0.787*** 
(0.230) 
-0.727*** 
(0.230) 
Generalized Collaboration 
 
-0.631* 
(0.301) 
-0.665* 
(0.318) 
-0.581 
(0.367) 
0.894* 
(0.407) 
Repeated Collaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
0.738 
(0.426) 
Identity Specialization 
 
 -0.550* 
(0.245) 
-0.657** 
(0.252) 
-0.410*** 
(0.147) 
Identity Specialization * 
Cumulated Experience 
 
  0.861* 
(0.374) 
1.250 
(0.969) 
Identity Specialization * 
Repeated Collaboration 
 
   0.912** 
(0.287) 
     
Log likelihood 
Wald test (d.f) 
N. of spells 
N. of events 
-220.393 
32.30(5) 
1425 
53 
-219.313 
35.31 (6) 
1425 
53 
-216.520 
39.44 (7) 
1425 
53 
-215.933 
50.49(9) 
1425 
53 
*p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p< 0.001 
Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses 
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Model 1 is the baseline model with control variables available for the full sample. Model 2 
adds the main independent variable of theoretical interest, Identity Specialization. Model 3 and 
Model 4 include the linear interaction terms of Experience and Repeated collaboration with Identity 
specialization. As was the case in the previous chapter, I interpret the results by exponentiating the 
estimates from the Cox regression in order to produce hazard ratios. Analogous to odds ratios, 
hazard ratios with a value greater than one indicate an increase in the likelihood that an event will 
occur, whereas a value less than one decreases the hazard of it occurring. 
Model 1 reports parameter estimates for my control variables. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in Technical Knowledge – that is, in the number of known languages – decreases on 
average the likelihood of dropping out by 51percent [1-exp(-0.704], possibly indicating that 
contributors with advanced skills have the necessary capabilities to deal with a larger and more 
challenging set of problems, and are better valued by other project members. Contributors who are 
also active in other projects have a higher chance of sustaining their participation in the focal 
project, suggesting that commitment increases as involvement in the whole open source community 
increases. The negative and significant parameter for Generalized Collaboration shows that, ceteris 
paribus, collaborative practices tend to help socialization of contributors in the community, which 
in turn increases on average the likelihood of sustained participation. In fact, a standard deviation 
increase in the Generalized Collaboration parameter decreases the chances of leaving the project on 
average by 47percent [1-exp(-0.63)]. Interestingly, this result, together with the non-significant 
parameter for Cumulated Experience, indicates that individual work activities that are not 
embedded specifically in social practices of interaction and collaboration do not help to foster 
enduring participation in open productions. Finally, the highly positive and significant parameter for 
Scope of Contributions shows that a dispersed attention spread across too many modules is 
detrimental to the motivation to sustain participation in the long term.  
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This last result strongly hints at the expected results from Model 2, in which the main 
independent variable of theoretical interest, Identity Specialization, is added to test the substantive 
validity of Hypothesis 1. In line with the literature on the sociology of categorization (Zuckerman, 
1999; Hsu, 2006; Hannan, 2010) I find that an increase in the degree of specialization, indicating 
the construction of a focused identity, increases the expected tenure of contributors in open 
productions (i.e., decreases on average the hazard of individuals dropping out of the project). Thus 
the negative and significant parameter for Identity Specialization, taken together with the positive 
parameter for Scope of Contributions, supports Hypothesis 1. A standard deviation increase in 
Identity Specialization decreases the likelihood of leaving the project by 42 percent [1-exp(-0.55)]. 
Models 3 and 4 introduce some contingency factors to circumstantiate the conditions under 
which specialization promotes sustained participation. Hypotheses 2a and 2b are tested in Model 3. 
I interact Cumulated Experience with Identity Specialization with the expectation that experienced 
individuals benefit more from a complex than from a focused identity when they are already 
socialized in the community. The positive and significant parameter of the interaction term indicates 
that the negative effect of Identity Specialization on the hazard of leaving the project decreases as 
the level of Cumulated Experience increases. That is, high specialization appears beneficial for 
sustained participation only at lower levels of cumulated experience. To investigate further the 
contingent effect of experience on the relationship between specialization and sustained 
participation I decided to plot the dependent variable at different levels of the independent and 
moderating variables. In the case of event history models the typical approach is to calculate 
predicted values of the hazard rate under different conditions of the independent variable and 
moderator and showing the predicted levels of the hazard rate multiplier at these different levels of 
the moderator. Figure 4.2 plots the result of this exercise. The multiplier of the hazard rate is plotted 
on the vertical axis, while the horizontal axis represents different levels of Identity Specialization, 
ranging from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. As 
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before, values above one increase the baseline hazard of dropping out of the project, whilst values 
below one decrease it. The plot in Figure 4.2 shows clearly that two very different shapes of the 
hazard rate exist at different levels of the moderator. Ceteris paribus, the risk of exit from the 
project is decreased for more experienced individuals with a more spread out, complex identity, 
while the opposite holds true for those with low levels of experience. This argument is in line with 
existing research on typecasting (Faulkner, 1980; Zuckerman et al., 2003) which shows the 
detrimental effect of being typecast on future career opportunities once musicians and actors have 
already gained sufficiently long tenure in the industry. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Interaction between Cumulated Experience and Identity Specialization 
 
However, the results change as I introduce the second interaction term in Model 4. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b posit that the effect of specialization on the hazard of leaving the project is 
contingent on the degree of prior repeated collaborations engaged in by the focal individual, such 
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that at higher degree of prior repeated collaboration participants with broader, more generalist 
identities incur a lower risk of leaving than specialists. To test these hypotheses I included in the 
model a second interaction term, Identity Specialization * Repeated Collaboration. The parameter is 
positive and significant, indicating that at higher levels of repeated collaboration the negative effect 
of specialization on the hazard of dropping out decreases. Highly collaborative contributors gain 
legitimation through socialization with other contributors, therefore they don’t need to be 
constrained to a specialist profile. Figure 4.3 shows the plot of this interaction term. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Interaction between Repeated Collaboration and Identity Specialization 
 
However, once I include Repeated Collaboration in the model the interaction term with the 
first moderator (i.e., Identity Specialization*Cumulated Experience) becomes non-significant. This 
result has interesting implications for theories of participation in open productions and the social 
outcomes of categorical and typecasting processes. Simply gaining more experience is not sufficient 
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to guarantee effective socialization in an open production. Socialization, and consequently sustained 
participation, is achieved only through consistent collaborative practices. A focused identity is 
important for obtaining recognition in the early stages of participation. However, subsequent 
extensive collaborative practices requiring interaction with peers allows individuals to gain a level 
of legitimation that goes beyond that achieved by focusing and specializing one’s expertise. Thus, 
once a sufficient level of collaboration is achieved, participants with a broader, more generalist 
identity have a higher chance of sustaining participation in the project over the longer term. These 
results support hypotheses 3a and 3b and question the validity of hypotheses 2a and 2b once 
collaborative practices are accounted for. 
 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
The aim of this work was to address the following overarching question: What mechanisms 
sustain long-term voluntary participation within open productions? I have argued that individual 
work practices contribute to the construction of participants’ identities and that these different 
identity profiles influence the way in which participants are evaluated and socialized in the project. 
Using data from code contributions to the Apache HTTP Server open source project, my results 
show that contributors with a focused, specialist identity are less likely to make an early exit from 
the project than contributors with a broader, more generalist identity, a tendency in line with recent 
theories on the sociology of categorization processes (Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, 2006; Leung & 
Sharkey, 2014). However, this effect is contingent on the way in which individuals engage in 
collaborative practices with fellow participants. Repeated collaboration serves as a mechanism by 
which participants may gain legitimacy as contributors to the project without the need to confine 
themselves to a narrow range of problems and the specialist identity profile this confers. The 
underlying assumption here is that both specialist and generalist identity profiles entail costs and 
benefits. Specialist members enjoy certain advantages derived from having a more clearly defined 
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identity in the eyes of their audience, whereas generalist members are more likely to be devalued or 
ignored. However, generalist members, whose identity is not constrained by clear expectations from 
their audience, may enjoy greater role flexibility and freedom of action and may therefore achieve a 
longer tenure in the project (Zuckerman et al., 2003). My results address this trade-off by showing 
that as the extent of repeated collaboration engaged in by an individual project contributor 
increases, the positive effect of a specialist identity on the probability of that individual sustaining 
participation progressively decreases,  a such that a less constraining, generalist identity  becomes 
more favourable to ongoing involvement. Repeated collaboration thus enables contributors to gain 
the necessary level of socialization and legitimation in the project to allow them to broaden their 
identity profile without incurring a cost to their reputation in the form of a devaluation of their 
expertise by other participants.  
My study contributes to two main areas of interest. Firstly, it adds to the literature on open 
productions, and in particular to the stream of research addressing the issue of sustained 
participation. While previous research has devoted a great deal of attention to the way in which 
contributors in open productions are intrinsically and extrinsically motivated, ex-ante, to dedicate 
their time and contributions to the creation of a public good (Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003; Roberts 
et al., 2006; von Krogh et al., 2003; 2012), this study shifts attention to the nature of these 
contributions over time and to the consequences this activity has for the sustainability of individual 
participation. I extend recent work by Fang and colleagues (Fang & Neufeld, 2009; Qureshi & 
Fang, 2011; Sun, Fang & Lim, 2012) which considered participation, not merely as a by-product of 
initial motivation, but rather as a dynamic process that unfolds over time as a result of an 
individual’s activities. This paper provides insights into the specific nature of these activities (i.e., 
identity construction, repeated collaboration) and demonstrates that sustained participation is a 
natural outcome emerging from successful socialization processes between contributors and their 
communities. This finding also extends earlier work by von Krogh et al. (2003) and Shah (2006), 
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which demonstrated that short-term and long-term contributors to open productions are motivated 
by different factors, the former by idiosyncratic needs and the latter by enjoyment and identification 
with the community’s values. I extend this work by suggesting that no matter what the initial 
motivation, collaborative practices undertaken over time shape contributor identity and the chances 
of long-term, successful participation within the community. 
Secondly, this work contributes to the literature on the sociology of categorization processes 
and typecasting by identifying a contingent factor influencing the likelihood of success of those 
with specialist versus generalist identity profiles. The very influential paper by Zuckerman and 
colleagues on typecasting (2003) argued that tenure in the film industry is a very important factor in 
determining the dynamics of actor typecasting. They demonstrated that the benefit of having a 
focused identity is much greater for novice actors, in the process of building their reputation, whilst 
actors with longer tenure, who have already gained recognition within the industry, enjoy greater 
flexibility to be cast in a broader spectrum of genres. My work extends this view by arguing that 
participants in professional settings interact with their peers by means of their work activities. 
Instances of interaction and collaboration create the necessary conditions for organizational 
participants to be successfully integrated and become legitimate members of the community. My 
results suggest that experience is not a sufficient explanation for this process, once I control for 
repeated collaboration. Organizational participants do not become legitimate members of the 
community simply by accumulating experience; they also need to repeatedly collaborate with other 
participants. Having shored up their reputation within the community in this way, experienced 
collaborators can then afford to extend their work into other areas of specialism, building a more 
generalist identity profile without incurring  the risk of reputation devaluation.  
This study has a number of limitations that may open up avenues for further research. 
Firstly, although the Apache Software Foundation has openly stated in its guidelines that all 
contributors are voluntary participants and are not paid by the foundation, there exist a few hybrid 
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situations where some contributors work for third party companies interested in developing Apache. 
However, at present public data on employment situations are scattered online and information on 
extrinsic motivations is very difficult to gather, especially for early contributors who have not been 
involved in the project for very long. Secondly, although this work relies on constructs such as 
socialization and legitimation, they are not explicit. These mechanisms are implied by the fact that 
participants who contribute for a fairly long period of time (i.e., approximately six months) have to 
be nominated and successfully elected in order to gain write access to the repository and voting 
rights. However, future research could address this issue and explicate the way in which role 
advancements foster sustained participation. Thirdly, this paper does not account for differences in 
performance between contributors, in terms of acceptance or rejection of modifications. Future 
research could delve into this topic, mining performance data within developer mailing lists to 
reconstruct the complete history of modification requests in order to investigate the performance 
feedback mechanisms that influence sustained participation. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
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5.1 Summaries of chapter results and contributions 
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to provide a framework for the concept of 
“open production”, examining its internal organizational logic and showing how it emerges from, 
and extends beyond, the basic model of problem-solving organizations. To do this I considered 
open source software projects as specific solutions to the problem of economic production. As such, 
open productions face the same issues as conventional hierarchical organizations, such as division 
of labor, collaboration, and coordination.  I have built on previous work on open innovation (see 
Lakhani, Lifshitz-Assaf & Tushman, 2013) but examined a wider range of processes, encompassing 
several foundational concepts in organizational sociology and cognition: attention allocation 
(Chapter 2), group learning and expertise diversity (Chapter 3), identity construction and sustained 
participation (Chapter 4). My work complements current explanations based on motivation and 
incentives to show how open productions are sustained through mundane work practices that create 
complex interdependencies between problems and problem-solvers. I have provided examples in 
which both individual decision-making and organizational outcomes are embedded in, and 
determined by, a transparent problem-solving structure. In particular, I have illustrated three 
fundamental processes that served as dependent variables in my studies and which formed the basis 
for my research questions within the context of self-managing teams with fluid boundaries. These 
were: i) problem selection, ii) problem resolution, and iii) sustained participation.  
Building on existing research, my work adds a focus on the micro-organizational 
mechanisms that make open production effectively possible as a strategy for technology 
development. Unlike much of the prior literature on open productions, I do not emphasize 
motivation, status-seeking or efficient allocation of property rights. I concentrate instead on the 
actual work practices– the day-to-day activities that are involved in open productions and ultimately 
make them sustainable problem-solving arrangements. I focus on individual acts of problem 
solving– the smallest possible constituent unit of work practices. As such, the research design I 
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have implemented and the models I have developed have allowed me to examine work practices at 
a level of detail that has so far been inaccessible for prior research. 
In the following sections I summarize the main findings for each of the three empirical 
chapters and discuss their contributions to the literature on organization theory. I then identify the 
scope conditions for my studies and derive implications for the generalizability of the arguments 
advanced in the dissertation. 
 
5.1.1 Chapter 2 
In this chapter I investigated the dynamics of attentional processes and the importance of 
their role in problem-solving and decision-making in open productions. Drawing from the 
perspective of the Carnegie School in which problems compete for the limited attention of 
participants  (March & Simon, 1958), I presented two attentional mechanisms – attention clustering 
and attention spread – that guide participants’ decisions regarding how to allocate attention among 
problems. I showed that apparently individualistic attention allocation decisions are in fact the result 
of the embeddedness of individuals in a complex network of interdependencies linking problems 
and problem-solvers in an organization. When deciding which problems to engage with participants 
do not rely solely on those which fall immediately within the range of their own attention; they also 
take into consideration problems to which neighboring individuals have turned their attention.   
The analysis shows a positive tendency towards attention clustering, indicating that 
attentional processes tend to follow repetitive patterns of joint interest towards problem-solving: 
collaborating on a problem makes it more likely that two contributors will allocate their joint 
attention to future problems. Furthermore the analysis suggests that problems tend to be recipients 
of a disassortative attention spread, indicating that already popular software bugs are less likely than 
their less popular counterparts to attract additional attention in the future from highly active 
contributors. As a consequence of the associated tendency toward decentralized problem-solving, 
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attention is more homogeneously distributed across problems, an important contributory factor for 
the viability of the project, since the entire portfolio of presenting problems requires resolution, both 
those that are ‘attention-grabbing’ and the more obscure.  
This chapter contributes to the literature on organizational attention by extending the current 
understanding of attentional processes as either purely bottom-up or top-down (Ocasio, 2011 ). I 
propose that attention is ultimately a function of other members' attention, giving rise to attention 
networks, where transparent attentional cues are used by individuals to assess and select objects of 
attention for problem-solving activity. This paper also extends recent work on distributed social 
cognition (Smith & Collins, 2009; Kaplan, 2011) which showed that market evaluations don’t occur 
in a vacuum, but are embedded in attention networks linking interdependent actors’ views (Prato & 
Stark, 2013). What I have added to this perspective is a series of specific mechanisms through 
which individual acts of attention allocation concatenate and reproduce behavioral patterns that 
drive collective problem-solving efforts. 
 
5.1.2 Chapter 3 
In this paper I examined the contested relationship between group members' repeated 
collaboration and group performance in the context of bug-fixing in an open source software 
project. I took as my point of departure competing theories and evidence on the effects of repeated 
collaboration, showing both positive and negative potential impact on group performance. I then 
sought to delineate more precisely the boundary conditions that determine the likely direction of the 
effect. In particular, I investigated the role of the distribution of task-related expertise among group 
members as a determining contingent factor in this dynamic relationship. My analysis shows that 
the relationship between group experience of working together and group performance is non-
monotonic, with a state of decreasing returns coming into force beyond a certain point. I also show 
that expertise diversity moderates the relationship between repeated collaboration and team 
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performance. Groups composed of individuals with homogeneous expertise perform better than 
groups with heterogeneous expertise at lower levels of prior collaboration, because homogeneity 
helps establish common ground in the early stages of a group project (Kraut et al., 2002). Whereas 
at later stages of a project, where groups have a longer track-record of collaboration, those that are 
composed of individuals with heterogeneous expertise perform better than those with homogeneous 
expertise. In this latter scenario specialization and expertise diversity are considered critical to the 
maintenance of group performance in the long run (Kane, Argote & Levine, 2005). My 
investigation contributes to two major areas of theoretical interests. Firstly, this work extends theory 
on organizational learning by investigating contingent factors that unveil the way in which 
performance-based learning is achieved in open productions. The importance of a contingent 
learning context is underlined by the moderating effect of expertise diversity shown here, which 
contrasts with research in other settings, substantiating arguments about unconditional and linear 
effects of experience of working together (Boh et al., 2007). Existing research (Reagans et al., 
2005) has laid out a theoretical case for the value of specialized task-related expertise as an aid to 
the development of transactive memory (theorizing the role of expertise diversity), and about the 
value of common ground, both to allow effective coordination across functions and knowledge–
sharing (theory regarding repeated collaboration). However, because these two phenomena have 
advantages and disadvantages that offset each other, they are frequently confounded in empirical 
analysis. Distinguishing the two, as was made possible in my analysis, is significant from both an 
empirical and a theoretical standpoint. By specifying further the interaction effect between these 
two constructs we are able to advance our understanding about the kind of conditions under which it 
is preferable to have a diverse versus homogeneous work group. 
The second key contribution of my study is to the body of theoretical and empirical work on 
open productions, advancing understanding of their distinct features. Amongst these the dynamics 
of collaboration emerge as an important area for investigation. As such, this study sought to 
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illuminate the particular causes that influence the way in which expertise diversity interacts with 
repeated collaboration, the latter being a process which has already presented itself as a central issue 
in the emerging literature on open production and project-based organizations (Sorenson & 
Waguespack, 2006; Perretti & Negro, 2007; Bakker, 2010). 
 
5.1.3 Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4 I argued that the identities of individual project participants, as repositories of 
project-relevant expertise, emerge from the substance of the contributions they make through their 
ongoing work, and that these different identity profiles influence the likelihood that participants will 
sustain participation in an open production. Using data from code contributions to the Apache 
HTTP Server open source project, my results show that, in line with recent theories on the 
sociology of categorization processes (Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, 2006; Leung & Sharkey, 2014), 
contributors with a focused, specialist identity are less likely to make an early exit from a project 
than contributors with a broader, more generalist identity, However, this effect is shown to be 
contingent on the way in which individuals engage in collaborative practices with fellow 
participants. Repeated collaboration serves as moderating mechanism, whereby legitimacy as a 
valid and valuable contributor to the project may be obtained without the need to demonstrate 
narrow, specialist expertise. As such, repeat-collaborating generalists gain an advantage over 
specialists, in terms of the probability of sustaining participation in a project over time.  
This study contributes to two main areas of interest. Firstly, it adds to the literature on open 
productions with respect to the stream of research addressing the issue of sustained participation. It 
achieves this by shifting attention from the motivations of contributors to commence participation 
in a project to the nature of these contributions over time and the consequences of this activity for 
the sustainability of individual participation. I extend recent work by Fang and colleagues (Fang & 
Neufeld, 2009; Qureshi & Fang, 2011; Sun, Fang & Lim, 2012) which considered participation, not 
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merely as a by-product of initial motivation, but rather as a dynamic process that unfolds over time 
as a result of an individual’s activities. In this paper the constituent characteristics of these activities 
(i.e., identity construction, repeated collaboration) are elucidated, demonstrating that sustained 
participation is a natural outcome emerging from successful socialization processes between 
contributors and their communities. Earlier work by Von Krogh et al. (2003) and Shah (2006) found 
that short-term and long-term contributors to open productions are motivated by different factors, 
the former by idiosyncratic needs and the latter by enjoyment and identification with the 
community’s values. My study extends this work by suggesting that, regardless of the initial 
motivation for participation, it is the engagement in successive collaborative efforts over time that 
helps shape the identity of contributors within the community, and that this is a key explanatory 
factor in their on-going participation in the longer-term.  
A second key area to which this study contributes is the literature on the sociology of 
categorization processes and typecasting. This is accomplished by identifying a contingent factor 
influencing the likelihood of success of those with specialist versus generalist identity profiles. My 
work builds on the work of Zuckerman et al. (2003) by arguing that participants in professional 
settings interact with their peers by means of their work activities. Organizational participants 
become successfully integrated, legitimate members of the community through instances of 
interaction and collaboration. My results suggest that, once repeated collaboration is controlled for, 
experience alone is not a sufficient explanation for this process. In other words, organizational 
participants do not become legitimate members of the community simply by accumulating 
experience; they must also engage in ongoing collaboration with other participants. Having thus 
consolidated their reputation within the community, experienced collaborators can afford to extend 
their work into other areas of specialism, constructing a broader, more generalist identity profile, 
without incurring the risk of reputation devaluation. 
 
154 
 
5.2 Scope conditions and limitations 
Here I discuss the scope conditions for the results reported in chapters 2 to 4, beyond the 
specific limitations and suggestions for further research that I identified within those chapters. 
These conditions have important implications for the generalizability of my findings. My 
hypotheses were tested in the context of F/OSS projects, which have been conceptualized as 
private-collective innovation models combining elements of individual investment and collective 
action (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). This economic model is based on teams of geographically 
distributed participants who often work on a voluntary basis and are motivated to invest their time 
and effort to create non-rival and non-excludable public goods innovations. This private-collective 
model of collaboration, innovation and production is however generalizable beyond software. In the 
introduction to this dissertation I introduced the term “open production” to illustrate production 
ecosystems that (i) create goods of economic value; (ii) grant open access to participants to 
contribute and consume freely; (iii) are based on constant interactions and information exchange; 
(iv) purposefully coordinate participants’ labor. This phenomenon has seen a rapid proliferation in 
recent years, to which organization and innovation researchers have responded with growing 
interest, as the literature on user and open innovation indicates (for a review, see Levine & Prietula, 
2014; Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011). Examples of open productions can typically be found in user 
innovation communities, whereby organizations reach out to a community of users who contribute 
voluntarily to the development and design of innovative products and services (Jeppesen & 
Frederiksen, 2006). These communities exist across a variety of industries, including sports 
equipment (Franke & Shah, 2003; Lüthje, 2004), the automotive sector (Ili, Albers & Miller, 2010), 
biotechnologies (Bianchi et al., 2011), musical instruments (Jeppesen & Frederiksen, 2006), and 
software development (Dahlander, Frederiksen & Rullani, 2008). All open production systems can 
be very heterogeneous in terms of incentives structure and organizational design. However in my 
research I identified three foundational organizational features – i.e., modularity, transparency and 
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technology-mediated communication – that open productions must possess in order to be identified 
as such. I argue that these features help us identify the scope conditions within which my results can 
be generalized. 
5.2.1 Modularity  
A production system is assumed to be modular when its parts are capable of functioning 
independently but are also able to operate in conjunction to support the whole. A modular system is 
one in which the “constituent parts ‒ resources, tasks, or components ‒ are partitioned into subsets 
called modules” (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011: 1401). Modularity refers to what Herbert Simon 
called near-decomposability (Simon, 1965). Elements contained within each module show a high 
degree of interdependence, in the sense that modifications to one element are tightly coupled with 
modifications to other elements. However elements spread across modules show a high degree of 
independence, in the sense that modifications to one element are very loosely coupled with 
modifications to other elements (Thompson, 1967; Baldwin & Clark, 2000). Modularity is critical 
for collaborative systems such as open productions because production activities can be carried out 
for each module in parallel, without requiring a high degree of integration and communication 
between modules. Contributors active in separate modules that belong to a larger system do not 
need to work simultaneously or to be colocated. They can set up an infrastructure for asynchronous 
work that will integrate the single modules together and make up a system that functions as a whole. 
As I showed in Chapter 4, modular systems are crucial for inducing an effective division of labor 
and specialization of skills within complex open productions. In more traditional settings these are 
achieved through formal hierarchies and contracts conceived to overcome differences in principal-
agent incentives. Production systems that do not exhibit a high degree of modularity face a much 
greater struggle to create the knowledge boundaries necessary for a more efficient division of labor, 
a process upon which effective problem-solving and task self-assignment processes are based. 
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5.2.2 Transparency  
In open production systems or within system modules, participants can rely on social 
transparency rather than modularity to achieve coordination. Social transparency refers to the fact 
that each contributor’s activities are “transparent” to other participants. Most work practices are 
carried out using social applications that let members track and follow the activities of other 
members, irrespective of their location. Every participant works separately to improve the system, 
contributing upon the transparent work of other participants. In open collaborative projects, 
transparency and modularity usually build on each other, both contributing to coordination and 
division of labor (Colfer & Baldwin, 2010). As I’ve shown in this dissertation, in open source 
software this new approach mixes version control systems with features of social media to create 
transparent work environments, where every action undertaken by any individual is immediately 
visible and traceable by other project members (Dabbish et al., 2013). Contributors to open 
productions keep everyone up to date on things they do or work on and in turn decide which 
individuals or problems of interest they wish to pay attention to. Since social transparency allows 
participant to be aware of what feature of the project is being modified, when, where and by whom, 
this meta-information is used by other participants to coordinate their efforts and respond to 
changes in content appropriately (Stuart et al., 2012). In Chapter 2 I argued that these kinds of 
attentional cues will produce direct and indirect effects on the attention allocation mechanisms of 
other members, and their consequent decisions about self-assignment to problems. In Chapters 3 
and 4 I argued that transparent environments – coupled with effective communication structures – 
are necessary for the establishment of group processes, such as recognition of other participants’ 
expertise and the formation of Transactive Memory Systems (TMS). In production systems that are 
not based on a transparent environment – in which each action is visible and traceable – participants 
lack the means to gauge the expertise of other contributors and cannot form a clear idea of the 
distribution of skills within the community. Furthermore, a lack of transparent infrastructure 
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inhibits coordination as it makes it more difficult for contributors to respond efficiently to changes 
in content by other contributors.  
 
5.2.3 Technology-mediated communication 
Communication is a foundational feature of open productions, which are by definition 
characterized by geographically distributed teams. Contributors use communication channels to 
learn about and evaluate other contributors (Rulke & Rau, 2000), tap into otherwise inaccessible 
knowledge pools (Palazzolo, 2005) and develop tacit knowledge that eventually leads to the 
creation of working routines (Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003). In this dissertation I modelled 
problem-solving and collaborative activities within the context of geographically dispersed software 
development groups that rely mostly on instant messaging and email for day-to-day 
communication, as these asynchronous media are relatively cheap and easy to use. Distributed 
groups may also communicate in other ways, such as by video or audio conference, but they are 
unlikely to have as much face-to-face interaction as a typical co-located group. When group 
members are separated from one another geographically they can experience decreased cohesion 
within their work group. Nevertheless, although their development may take longer, there is 
evidence that the group cognition processes on which I base my arguments – such as TMS (Chapter 
3) and identity evaluation (Chapter 4) – can develop effectively in groups that collaborate solely 
through computer-mediated communication (Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2007). It is customary for 
open productions to create dedicated mailing lists and an instant messaging infrastructure to 
stimulate discussions around every single change to the product or service under development. 
Transparent discussions and private communication are the biggest information source for 
participants who learn about the community and its contributors. Production systems that fail to 
sustain the centrality of communication channels are at risk of being populated by segregated 
participants who lack any means to integrate their knowledge with the rest of the community. 
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The three features discussed above constitute the backbone of open production that exploits 
the distributed knowledge of geographically dispersed volunteers who dedicate their time and effort 
to the creation of public goods. These features also define the scope conditions within which my 
findings are generalizable relative to foundational organizational aspects of open productions.  
As we have seen open productions represent a relatively new attempt to achieve 
technological innovation through an alternative use of incentive structures and intellectual property 
strategy. Contributors have the right to access and modify the product design and a responsibility to 
guarantee that every modification to the product design is accessible by other contributors. In this 
sense it seems we are witnessing the rise and rapid diffusion of a new form of economic production, 
and with it the demise of the traditional separation between the roles of producer and consumer. In 
this environment the consumer has been, to varying degrees, integrated into the role of producer and 
is thus largely responsible for the innovation of products and services. The implications of this 
boundary erosion ‒ such as the reframing of the role of markets as interfaces where supply and 
demand meet ‒ are far-reaching and, as such, they are beyond the scope of this dissertation. They 
do, however, represent fascinating avenues for future research.  The studies I have presented here 
provide evidence of organizational mechanisms operating specifically within the F/OSS context that 
nevertheless speak coherently to existing organizational and sociological theory. Whilst remaining 
confined in direct generalizability to environments exhibiting the core features outlined in this 
chapter, I therefore hope I may contribute in some way to inspiring future research beyond the 
scope of these studies.  
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